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# ***Daily Report***

## ***Supplement***

# **Sub-Saharan Africa**

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# Sub-Saharan Africa SUPPLEMENT

FBIS-AFR-90-050-S

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14 March 1990

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**\* French Turn to Europe Said To Worry Africans**

90EF0237A Paris LE MONDE in French  
2 Feb 90 p 4

[Article by Jean de la Gueriviere: "The Conference of French Ambassadors in Africa—Political Promises and Economic Disengagement"]

[Text] The annual conference of French Ambassadors in sub-Saharan Africa ended on Wednesday, 31 January, with a reception at the Elysee Palace during which Mr. Mitterrand said that in terms of aid, France "leaves far behind countries such as the United States and Japan that propose vast plans but spend very little." The head of state reasserted that aid to the countries of Eastern Europe would not jeopardize the programs for Africa.

In spite of the assurances of the French politicians, the Africans find more and more reasons to worry in regard to the decisions made by some economic officials. Two issues, without direct link, illustrate the French disengagement on the black continent, whatever the good words lavished in the name of cooperation.

According to union officials, the days of SEDES [Economic and Social Development Studies Company] have been numbered since the decision made by its general directorate in September 1989, to dismantle this institution, which played a not insignificant role in French listening and advising in Africa. Created in 1958 by Mr. Francois Bloch Laine, in a spirit aimed at promoting a mixed economy, SEDES did not have a specifically African vocation, but it deployed 60 percent of its activities overseas, specifically south of the Sahara. Among its credits are contributions to the structural adjustment plans of Gabon, Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Madagascar, and numerous listening posts for the reorganization of African administrations.

**Major Banking Maneuvers**

The Central Fund for Economic Cooperation and the Ministry of Cooperation are among the shareholders of SEDES, but the majority of its capital is in the hands of a subsidiary of the Trust and Deposit Fund which, in the name of profitability, has decided to put an end to an experiment that had become expensive. It is true that some African states, victims of this measure, have abused the ordering of studies that were never paid for. The very relative profitability was ensured primarily by services provided on the basis of international (World Bank, UNDP [UN Development Program], EDF [European Development Fund?]) or French (Central Fund, FAC [Aid and Cooperation Fund], Ministry of Foreign Affairs) financing. The paradox of the situation lies in the fact that in some cases SEDES officials made themselves the champions of "a logic different from that of the purely accountable one of the World Bank and the IMF." Those who have not been affected yet elsewhere expect to have to stop their activities in March.

Of a different nature, but with even more serious consequences, is the project to liquidate the BIAO [International Bank for West Africa] by the BNP [National Bank of Paris], which holds 51 percent of its capital. With its 17 local subsidiaries and its 300 agencies, the BIAO has been a real institution over its 137 years of existence. There is not a single economic official who, following independence, did not go by its venerable headquarters at the Rue de Messine in Paris.

But the old lady of the Franco-African financial world is suffering deeply from the bankruptcy of the sub-Saharan banking system as a whole, specifically because of the indebtedness of states and administrations with regard to enterprises. The situation is particularly critical in the subsidiaries in Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, and Senegal. In order to effect a recovery of the situation, it would be necessary very quickly to inject 800 million francs into it. But a total recovery would require 1.4 billion francs.

The BNP, which as a matter of fact has an African network of associated banks (the BICI [International Bank of Commerce and Industry] network) at its disposal, sees less and less justification for this non-profitable competition and would like the Board of Directors meeting of the BIAO to shut down the enterprise on 13 February. But African opposition has been stronger than expected. Meeting in Dakar on 16 January, the African managing directors of the BIAO group signed a memorandum that reads as follows: "The parent company has committed serious management errors for which it would be inherently unfair that the African subsidiaries, and thus the African economies, would have to suffer the consequences."

Named after an African governor of the central bank, the "Ouattara Plan" was developed in opposition to the "putting to death" of the BIAO. Having gone beyond the experts, the quarrel has become an affair of state in which President Houphouet-Boigny himself is said to have become personally interested. The idea is to combine African capital to substitute it to the BNP. Powerful Nigeria might participate in this rescue in the form of private contributions.

A French official from the world of finance, who follows these major banking maneuvers close up, assured us that it would not be inconceivable for South-African capital one day to become associated with this operation, giving the impression that exploratory contacts had already been made.

**\* Stagnant European Investment on Continent Noted**

90EF0269A Paris LIBERATION in French  
21 Feb 90 p 12

[Text] European companies are letting Africa lie fallow. The EEC may be Africa's leading trading partner, but European manufacturers are not making a dash for Africa. As a result, exports are at a standstill.

In the year 2000, there will be 830 million Africans, 150 million of them to the north of the Sahara and 680 million to the south. If only in terms of population, Africa is a continent that Europe (with less than 400 million inhabitants) will have to reckon with. Although Europe is Africa's leading trading partner (with 53 percent of imports and 58 percent of exports), European manufacturers are not clamoring at Africa's door. Jean-Pierre Prouteau, the former minister, had the distinct impression of repeating himself yesterday when he submitted his report to the CNPF [National Council of French Employers]. This year's report is even more alarming than last year's. In 1988, Africa imported little more than it did in 1985: 47 billion in current dollars as compared with 41 billion three years earlier. In the same time period, Asian imports jumped 70 percent, reaching 346 billion dollars. It is true that not every African country shares the same fate. Of the 10 major clients of the industrial countries, South Africa tops the list, followed by the North African countries, Nigeria, Kenya.... Ivory Coast is tenth—the only country in the franc zone to make the list, despite the fact that France is Africa's main supplier with 20 percent of the market.

The flow of finances is not faring any better. It is true that Africa is the largest recipient of public aid to development from France (59 percent), Italy, Belgium and the United Kingdom, but private flows have dried up. Manufacturers and bankers are staying clear of what they once considered favorable ground. In 1987, the transfer of private French funds was negative (-2.5 billion francs) and in 1988, Africa paid back 4.7 billion francs to France, the difference between new investments and reimbursements of previous export loans. Among the major industrialized countries, Japan and West Germany are the only ones to have increased their private funds to Africa.

And yet, in a survey last October by Jean-Pierre Prouteau, the business volume reported by 470 French companies (one-third the number of companies active in Africa) rose an average of five percent in 1988 over the previous year, with the largest increases occurring in Togo (23 percent) and in Nigeria (22 percent). He believes this is partially attributable to restructurings that resulted in the departure of a number of expatriates. But half of these companies have no plans to invest in Africa in the next three years and three-fourths of them are seriously thinking of redirecting their business outside of Africa. Among other reasons, 61 percent of them say they are hurt by contraband in sub-Saharan Africa.

Prouteau concludes, however, that it is worth braving out. There are opportunities for French investors outside the franc zone, particularly in the Maghreb and in southern Africa. Employers believe in regional integration, as yet unsuccessful in Africa, although the World Bank is attempting to revive it: the united Maghreb on Europe's doorstep, the mineral rich area spanning Angola and Zaire.... They also hope that pledges made "to development and to the greater integration of developing countries in the world economy" will be kept by

the countries that made them at last year's summit in Paris. In particular, by encouraging the commercial banks to conclude agreements quickly with such countries as Ivory Coast—too wealthy to qualify for public debt relief, but mired in a private debt totaling 60 percent of its external debt.

### \* Commentary Urges Democracy for Entire Continent

90EF0269B Paris LE POINT in French  
19 Feb 90 p 31

[Commentary by Jean-Francois Revel]

[Text] And what about freeing the rest of Africa? The Republic of South Africa is not the only country on the African continent that has more than 600 million inhabitants. Black South Africans represent not even one-twentieth of the total. It is perfectly right to care deeply about the five percent who are black South Africans and to rejoice in the birth of democracy that we can expect to see in South Africa, if all goes well. But there is the other 95 percent of Africans in whom Europeans and Americans seem to have lost interest, at least where human rights and democracy are concerned.

The United Nations expelled South Africa from its ranks in 1974. Well done. But, by the same moral and democratic standards, it is difficult to understand how the United Nations could simultaneously admit Sekou Toure, the Ceausescu of Guinea, or continue to welcome Ethiopia led by Mengistu, who has killed more than one million Ethiopians with organized famine, deportation, and the theft of foreign aid. In 1982, President Mitterrand did not think twice about making an official visit to Burundi where two mass exterminations in less than 20 years left 500,000 dead out of a total of 4.5 million. Those are instances of blacks massacring blacks, it is true. But does that make them unimportant? Manhunts in Liberia in recent weeks have destroyed several thousand human lives and the reign of terror has unleashed an exodus to Ivory Coast. How strange that when white Africans violate human rights, we impose sanctions; when black Africans violate human rights, we send them money.

Democracies show interest in Africa (other than South Africa) primarily in economic ways. Regrettably, the result is nil because Africa's economic woes have political causes. They are called dictatorship, excessive state control over the economy, single party systems, a plethora of incompetent civil servants appointed out of favoritism, and finally—the scourge inevitably created by this type of economy—corruption and the misappropriation of public funds, particularly of foreign aid.

Little or no international aid reaches those it is meant to help. If the aid is in the form of goods, it is stolen en route and sold on the black market, or it is used by leaders to build private homes ("drought villas" as they are known in Mali, an allusion to the financial aid sent in response to the drought of 1984). International aid thus



supports detrimental regimes that are responsible for the poverty. I am not saying that aid should be cut off. But it must be made to reach the population and not allowed to be intercepted by governments. It must be repeated: The solution to poverty in Africa is political more than economic. Democracy is not a luxury. It has practical value above all: Democracy means watching those in power and replacing them if they steal or produce bad results. It is often said that there is no democracy as long as there is widespread poverty. The opposite is true: There is no effective fight against poverty as long as there is no democracy.

Some countries have achieved development with little or no democracy. South Africa is one of them. But in none of these cases did the state take possession of the economy. Free enterprise and the marketplace continued to survive. By contrast, wherever political dictatorship is accompanied by economic dictatorship, poverty persists and underdevelopment is maintained by the authoritarian system. That is the type of regime that nine out of ten Africans have to endure. If we are concerned about their welfare, we should also be helping them to free themselves.

**\* Ghana, Togo, Nigeria, Benin End Meeting**

34000124A Accra *PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC*  
in English 30 Jan 90 p 1

[Article: "4 Agree on Common Inspection of Goods, Travelling Documents"]

[Text] The Third Ministerial Meeting embracing Ghana, Togo, Nigeria and Benin has agreed on a common inspection of goods and travelling documents at border crossing points.

Dr Obed Asamoah, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, told the Ghana News Agency (GNA) in Accra yesterday that this formed part of a number of decisions taken at the just-ended quadripartite meeting in Lagos to facilitate free flow of people and goods.

The meeting stressed that the harmonised ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] customs arrangement should be adopted.

It was agreed that the four states would set up an inspection team comprising the police, immigration and customs officers "to experience through travel", how people are subjected to various forms of harassment.

Other decisions, De Asamoah said, include, the opening of borders for 24 hours in respect of persons and 20 hours for goods.

Health cards are to conform to the World Health Organisation requirement which calls for cards on yellow fever only, Dr Asamoah said.

To facilitate trade between the four states, the meeting decided to encourage interaction among businessmen in the four states and the establishment of forex bureaux at the borders to facilitate trade.

Dr Asamoah said the meeting agreed that all should make efforts to complete the ratification of ECOWAS protocols on free movement of persons and goods as well as the implementation of the ECOWAS trade liberalisation scheme.

He said with regard to importation of vehicles, each country can only demand an initial deposit of 2,500 CFA or the equivalent in hard currency from the traveller for the first 30 days and thereafter a further 2,500 CFA or its equivalent for another 30 days.

After this duration, he said, the persons will be asked to pay full duty or enter into bond in lieu of duty.

On crime prevention, Dr Asamoah said the meeting decided to adopt an agreement on information on stolen goods to prevent the passage of such goods through the frontiers.

It was proposed that information should be circulated on criminal activities likely to undermine the security of member states.

Each country was required to draft a text on drug trafficking which should be vetted and approved by its Ministry of Justice for signature at the next session.

Dr Asamoah expressed the hope that each country will implement the decisions faithfully to enhance economic co-operation among the states.

He said the meeting took into consideration political changes taking place in Eastern Europe and called for economic integration of the African continent.

Dr Asamoah said the Ministerial OAU [Organization of African Unity] Sterling Committee Meeting to be held in Addis Ababa next month will prepare a treaty for an Economic Community for Africa.

He expressed the hope that the 1990's will see the complete eradication of apartheid to enhance economic integration.

## Cameroon

**\* Drug Seizures Increase in Size, Variety**

34000461B Yaounde CAMEROON TRIBUNE  
in English 7 Nov 89 p 7

[Article by Eddia Soter: "The War on Drugs Is Raging"]

[Text] The war declared on the use of hard drugs worldwide has entered high gear. Although in recent months, this has centred on the latin American country of Colombia where the Medellin Cartel has virtually taken the government of President Virgilio Barco hostage, the consumption of narcotics is certainly more widespread than many people would be prepared to admit. In the United States of America drug abuse has ruined whole families and communities and Europe and Asia have not been spared. In West Germany the city of Hamburg is planning to hatch a controversial scheme of controlled distribution within a legal framework so that the municipality can impose taxes on this largely clandestine business.

Sometime last year a major international bank, the B.C.C. was named for providing safe deposits for drug money from South America.

The ramifications and techniques of the drug barons as well as their networks are so complex that anti-narcotic agents worldwide are at school everyday learning how to puncture and unmask the artisans of this get-rich-fast trade.

For centuries, mankind has consumed various species of hard-drugs, either because of the sheer pleasure they procure from them or because of their medicinal powers. But this uncontrolled use—of drugs is not without hazards. Many well-known personalities have perished following the absorption of an overdose of hard drugs and others have developed permanent dementia, irreparably dooming their existence.

Here in Cameroon, although the problem is relatively novel, it is no less a headache. Antinarcotic agents have recently been reporting an upsurge in both the tonnage and species of their seizures. It is in light of this menace of proliferation that a team of international experts is currently in the country to help customs and other law enforcing agencies to polish their tactics.

At the international level, many more countries, aware of the dangers to society of addiction, are creating centres of readaptation for the hooked. Information and education have been identified as an efficient method of control.

United Nations estimates show that money peddled by drug barons is only second to that which changes hands among arms dealers. The problem has taken a crisis dimension and the 159 countries of the World Body have slated a special session next February to find ways and

means of saving mankind from the scourges of drugs. It is a war in which everyone must participate.

**\* Drug Gang Arrested; Indian Hemp Seized**

34009461A Yaounde CAMEROON TRIBUNE  
in English 5 Dec 89 p 4

[Article by Christopher Kongor, CAMNEWS: "Ndop Gendarmes Dislodge Indian Hemp Dealers"; first paragraph is introductory paragraph]

[Text] The Ndop court of first instance has issued a five-year imprisonment term to Tita Ndembemanyi, the brain behind a gang of dealers in Indian Hemp tracked down in Baba I recently by Ndop gendarmes. His four other colleagues received three years each behind the bars.

On a tip off about the dangerous activities of Tita Ndembemanyi, Ndom Gendarmes descended in Baba I. On their way they saw Tita who for no reason escaped into the bush. But the gendarmes continued their mission when in Tita's home they discovered huge quantities of the drug in his keeping. Tita having escaped, the law enforcement officials arrested his wife who was detained at the Ndop Gendarmerie brigade until her husband came to the brigade.

He was immediately arrested while the wife was liberated. Sensing danger, Tita released a list of his colleagues in crime who were subsequently picked up by the gendarmes. These include Adirisu Quarimunya, Permenta Valentine Nongo, Paciuse and Nah Appolo.

After their arrest it was learnt that the Tita gang attacked one Mr. Peter Ngyidze, a trader and after beating him up made away with CFA 40,000. The victim who sustained head wounds was being treated in Ndop general hospital. They were said to have been operating in Ndop in a Toyota Taxi No. CE 6557 D belonging to one Arona Mona, a native of Fouban who was also convicted.

## Zaire

**\* Mobutu Interviewed on Economic Problems, Crisis**

90EF0167A Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE  
in French Dec 89 pp 213-217

[Interview with President Mobutu Sese Seko by JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE; date and place not given]

[Text] Anniversaries come and go, but they are not necessarily the same. Last 24 November, Zaire celebrated the 24th anniversary of the Second Republic. This time marked the opportunity for it to take a large step forward in putting new equipment into operation. In the space of a few days, the country inaugurated the Mobayi hydroelectric dam and the first three computer centers in the country. These technological accomplishments are



symbolic of the desire of the authorities to break with a past that was frequently too static.

"Our country is a subcontinent in itself," President Mobutu likes to say. He is right. Rich in potential, Zaire is just as rich in unsatisfied needs. The country's equipment, while considerable in comparison with other countries in the subregion, is clearly still insufficient to allow all the regions of the country to develop properly. The figures speak for themselves: the capital, Kinshasa, has as many or more inhabitants than many neighboring countries! The economy, finance, transportation, and telecommunications are all vital aspects of daily life in Zaire. In these basic areas, JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE decided to go directly to the heads of the sectors to gather their views, and, of course, first of all to the number-one in charge, President Mobutu.

Having addressed national and international political problems in a previous issue, this time he intends to emphasize the economic side of his administration, and without concealing the failures, to boot. Zaire is better known for its historical or contemporary political problems than for its economic performance. However, there is real vitality in this sector. An example of this is the recent demonstration in Paris known as "Made in Zaire." It serves as a thread underlining this article and helps explain the position of entrepreneurs in the country's political, economic, and social life.

President Mobutu met with us at the end of a busy week full of commemorations of all kinds. He had also received an official visit from President Soares, the Portuguese chief of state, who arrived in Kinshasa as the head of a large delegation of businessmen. That day economic aspects moved up to share the spotlight with diplomatic events.

In the following interview, President Mobutu answers at length the questions of JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE's reporters, before giving some of his closest advisers an opportunity to speak.

#### **Stabilization and Recovery**

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] Mr. President, you have just celebrated 24 years in power. The Second Republic has, therefore, easily reached the age of maturity. How do you personally judge the economic balance sheet?

[Mobutu] To answer your question, I need to go back to the origin of our current problems. It is important to remember the political disputes of the first six years of Zaire's independence, which led to the total destruction of our economic infrastructure. Beginning in 1965, thanks to my action, the country entered a period of economic and political stability.

The 1967 monetary reform, together with the rise in the price of copper and investors' confidence, brought on massive capital inflows. The real growth of the GDP [gross domestic product] was seven percent a year

between 1968 and 1974. This period of economic growth allowed us to carry out several hydroelectric and road projects. Moreover, it enabled us to create large national companies in the areas of water supply, electricity, transportation, and insurance. Unfortunately, beginning in 1975, a number of essentially external factors, primarily the decline in copper prices and the increases in oil prices, affected our payment capacity, thereby worsening the debt problem and government finance. Since that time, the major economic balances have been broken. This is the reason for our adjustment efforts through various stabilization and economic recovery plans. And, the results obtained thus far are encouraging.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] Now that Zaire is celebrating the 24th anniversary of your presidency, we see a very clear improvement in the economic situation. How do you explain this unquestionable recovery?

[Mobutu] In my opinion, this improvement is mainly the result of the strict management of government finance. A great effort was made to increase government revenue and to ensure better spending controls, which enabled us to limit the monetary financing of government expenditures and thus reduce inflationary pressures. Other measures in the area of interest rates helped contain the demand for goods and services. In addition, our central bank conducted an active policy to increase the supply of foreign currencies on the exchange market, thereby, leading to a reduction in the gap between the official and parallel rates.

Of course, these results are encouraging, but they must be pursued to create the conditions for a sustained and lasting growth.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] Can you tell us what you regard as your major successes and failures in the area of economic policy?

[Mobutu] Among the failures, I would cite the "Zairianization" experiment, the primary objective of which was to create a Zairian middle class and to reduce the foreign influence on our country's economy, and mainly on small commerce. Unfortunately, the actual results have been disappointing. Among the successes, I could mention the control of a broad sector of the government's holdings in the economy by Zairians. This is the case with Gecamines.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] In recent months, you have been extremely active politically, whether developing Zaire's international relations or dealing with the more specific problems of the African continent (including the debt situation). Does this mean that at the same time you have been neglecting domestic economic issues?

[Mobutu] Of course not. The proof is that Zaire has just concluded a new economic program with the IMF and the World Bank. This reflects the success of the various measures adopted by the Executive Council in the areas

of managing government finance, the stabilization of the exchange rate of the zaire, and controlling inflation.

These accomplishments serve as a platform on the basis of which we will continue our economic recovery efforts with the assistance of these two international financial agencies.

In the production sector, energetic measures have been adopted to encourage and develop the production of grains, where there is still a shortfall, among other measures.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] What are the main lines of your economic policy at the present time, and do you have any major economic projects for your country for the next decade, now that the first five-year plan is coming to an end (1986-1990)?

[Mobutu] At the present time, the main features of our economic policy are contained in our five-year economic and social development plan for 1986-1990, which is directed towards building basic infrastructure, improving management, and achieving an average four-percent growth rate to offset the three-percent annual growth in the population. In this context, the government is withdrawing from production activities and leaving them to the private sector.

I do not want to affect the work that is going on to draw up the plan, but I believe that the next plan will take into account the need to continue setting up social and economic infrastructure, with special emphasis on roads, means of communication, and distribution of electricity in the interior of the country.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] There is still an enormous amount of work to be done to expand economic relations between African countries. In your opinion, why is this South-South cooperation, which some consider to be vital, still only in its infancy?

[Mobutu] This South-South cooperation is vital as you say. When all the countries in the southern hemisphere become fully aware of the advantages to be drawn from it and when they have overcome their reluctance linked to issues of national sovereignty, I am convinced that there will be no further obstacles and that this cooperation will become a reality.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] For you who knew so well the economic situation in Africa at the time countries were gaining their independence, what do you think of the current status of African economies and the many challenges they still face?

[Mobutu] The current pitfalls should not lead us into defeatism, but should instead encourage us to redouble our efforts to reinforce the steps already taken towards economic recovery in our countries. We should be optimistic and have faith in our own competence and in the future.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] Zaire has just renegotiated a new structural adjustment program with the IMF. Does this mean that your economic policy was a failure, or, on the contrary, is it a sign that lenders have confidence in your program of action?

[Mobutu] It is not a sign of failure on our part. Moreover, despite the fact that the program concluded with the IMF was suspended in June 1988, Zaire never lost the confidence of its traditional partners. When we renewed our program with this international financial institution, it was because we received its assurances that it would consider our growth objectives supported by a positive net transfer of capital, and at the same time incorporate the social dimension that has been missing from previous programs.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] In the face of a crisis that persists despite everything, what new economic measures do you intend to implement?

[Mobutu] In the short term, we intend to pursue our activities to stabilize the economic environment and reform the system of incentives, both of which are requisites for lasting growth. This is one of the major concerns of our structural adjustment program for 1989-1992. These activities will then be replaced by the next five-year economic and social development plan.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] Like a number of African countries, your country has a heavy external debt burden. What do you estimate your debt to be and what in your view should the countries of the North do for Zaire and other African countries to meet the urgent needs of the situation?

[Mobutu] Zaire's external debt is about \$7.2 billion. This is perhaps not enormous next to the immense potential of my country. However, debt servicing absorbs a large part of our export receipts and the government budget.

With such an overwhelming burden, it is impossible to ensure the minimum social expenditures and to make the required basic investments.

My position on the debt issue was clearly set forth during my speech to the United Nations General Assembly on 4 October 1989.

Using as a basis the cooperation model already in place in some countries such as Belgium and the People's Republic of China, I invited the international community to convince Africa's creditors to accept the principle of a grace period of at least 10 years and then to agree to repayment of all debts in local currency, to go into a fund to finance priority development projects.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] Our continent also suffers from inequitable remuneration for the raw materials it exports, to the point that people are talking about despoiling our riches. Everyone knows that this is a subject that you are particularly keen on, but why, in your opinion, do your African partners, who claim to be

so concerned over the serious crisis confronting us, still refuse to adopt the necessary measures?

[Mobutu] The answer to this question seems simple. The inequitable remuneration for our exports of raw materials affects our debt payment capacity, among other things. This is why we have always thought that besides the meetings held by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD, on this subject, we should be trying to sensitize politicians from the northern hemisphere so as to stop the deterioration in our terms of trade by setting a minimum price, not only so that we can service our debt, but more importantly also so that we can finance our development. We regret that our partners remain insensitive to this appeal. On 4 October 1989, from the podium of the United Nations, I urged the industrialized countries to show more solidarity with our countries.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] Can you tell us what are the main features of the Marshall plan for Africa that you would like to see adopted?

[Mobutu] The points I just listed form the backdrop for a solidarity plan for Africa comparable to the famous Marshall Plan for Europe. I would add to them the need for larger flows of fresh capital from the international community to our countries to help in our economic recovery efforts.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] On the international scene, the recent changes in Eastern Europe have triggered immediate support from the countries of the European community. Do you agree with Senegalese President Abdou Diouf when he says that this time Africa is running the very serious risk of being completely left on the sidelines?

[Mobutu] We are following with interest the changes taking place in Eastern Europe, and also the outburst of solidarity that the West is showing towards this part of the world. We think, however, that there is no reason to believe that Africa is being left out, despite the statements of certain European leaders, especially when our major partners have suggested that our current relations be reoriented towards other forms of cooperation. We just wish, however, that the West would show the same outburst of solidarity towards Africa.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] The EEC countries are also in the process of completing their economic integration process. In your opinion, what should the African countries do in the face of the prospect of a single market in 1993, which is bound to cause some upheavals?

[Mobutu] It is evident that Europe in 1993 will be different from the Europe of today. Economic integration will be a reality and there will be stronger control over production structures. Our trade with Europe will have to be adapted to these changes. To do this, Africa should, in turn, form a large viable economic entity following the pattern of this new Europe, in accordance

with the spirit of the Lagos plan of action. The future, in fact, belongs to large groupings capable of promoting trade on the basis of their complementarity.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] Domestically, in recent years Zaire has experienced very high rates of inflation, but in the past few months, there have been encouraging results on this front. How do you explain this success and what are the main axes of your monetary policy, particularly in light of the difficult position of your local currency, the zaire?

[Mobutu] As I have already told you, this success is primarily attributed to sound management of government finance and the struggle against the erosion of the currency by regular supplies of foreign exchange on the exchange market. Of course, we have also been careful to control the expansion of the money supply.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] At the end of 1988, Zaire questioned a certain number of so-called "privileged" relationships and, with your instigation, a policy to diversify its partners was implemented. What have been the results of this policy?

[Mobutu] Zaire has always tried to diversify its relations by means of a judicious open-door policy. Thus, despite our policy of liberalism, we have maintained relations with countries of the East and West. Although our relations with Belgium have long been privileged, this stems from the advantages it has drawn from its position as former colonial power. So this questioning, to use your expression, has been beneficial to us because it has enabled us to redefine our relations of cooperation with our partners, relations that must, henceforth, be based on the principle of mutual respect, national sovereignty, noninterference, and equal rights.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] The government's financial difficulties limit its possibilities for action. Do you believe that private economic agents will in the future act as locomotives, which is the role they should play in a liberal economy?

[Mobutu] Your question is pertinent. Our choice of economic liberalism was set forth in the 1986-90 five-year plan. While leaving the productive sector to private initiative, the plan assigned the government to the role of stabilizing the economic environment and particularly rebuilding basic infrastructure, by implementing measures to encourage foreign trade and by setting up a system of incentives. In this connection, our investment code is among the ones with the most incentives in the world. Everything has been done to encourage the participation of private economic operators in the country's development. For instance, we have decided to promote small- and medium-sized businesses and to rely on them to develop our industrial fabric.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] You say that small- and medium-sized business is to be a preferred vehicle



for economic and social development. What are you specifically doing to give it the resources to play this role?

[Mobutu] Small- and medium-sized business will now play an important role in our country's economic and social development. To achieve this, we have created the Office for Promoting Zairian Small- and Medium-Sized Businesses (OPEZ), which has been given the means to intervene on their behalf in the areas of training, management, and financial assistance, mainly through the Guarantee Fund for Small- and Medium-Sized Businesses. This office has agencies in the hinterland of the country to facilitate contact with producers in the interior. I would like to point out that our investment code has a whole chapter on this type of business. To all this, we should add the bilateral and multilateral agreements in effect to make this important sector more dynamic.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] The government must give economic operators the resources to work under the best possible conditions. But it is difficult to open up the interior of the country. What are the priority activities in the field of transportation by rail, road, air, and waterways?

[Mobutu] In accordance with the master plan for roads, precise guidelines have been given to the Executive Council to ensure the construction and maintenance of national highways and local roads needed for the circulation of persons and goods. Some construction projects are already in advanced stages. This is the case with national highway No. 1 running from Banana to Lubumbashi and with the Kisangani-Bukavu segment that is being tarred, to give just two examples.

However, there have been difficulties in building roads because of the immense size of our country, nearly half of which is covered with forests and swamps. Also, road construction costs in Zaire are comparatively higher than in some African countries.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] National and international telecommunications are still difficult. You are making a special effort in this field. It is true that this is a prerequisite for a well-running economy. Do you intend to make this a priority in the investment plan?

[Mobutu] We are attaching special importance to the telecommunications problem or to its impact on the progress of agriculture through extension programs or to improving the administration of the country.

However, telecommunications are one of our priorities, just the same as road construction that I have just spoken of. Efforts are still being made to rebuild and renovate communication and broadcasting equipment throughout the country.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] In sectors as strategic as mining, water, transportation, or even electricity, you

have always followed a voluntarist policy of reappropriating the national wealth so that Zairians are masters of their own destiny.

What do you plan to do for the oil sector, which is so critical to Zaire's economic development?

[Mobutu] In the oil sector, we want to make Petrozaire the preferred tool of the oil policy of the Executive Council and our government, which is in line with the spirit of economic liberalism that we advocate. Throughout the world, every government has always given preference to its own oil industry. This is the case with Shell in Great Britain, Petrofina in Belgium, and Elf Aquitaine and Total in France, and even in the Third World, with Petrobras [Brazilian Petroleum Corporation] in Brazil.

In Zaire, Petrozaire will not be the only economic agent in the sector. It will work for the account of the government to produce, import, and market oil products.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] The Mobayi-Mbongo hydroelectric power plant, frequently criticized, has just been officially inaugurated. It is the latest symbol of Zaire's surprising energy potential. What are your new plans for this sector?

[Mobutu] We have a master plan for the distribution of electricity, which outlines our programs in this sector up to the year 2005. We will be working hard to implement this plan.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] It has often been said that mines, which are scattered geographically throughout the country, could be a factor for national, and maybe even subregional, economic integration. How do you view this possibility?

[Mobutu] Economic integration can actually be achieved by the mining industry on a national as well as a subregional plane. For the time being, we are working more to encourage other local processing industries to move closer to the mining industry.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] The "Made in Zaire" exhibition that was just held in Paris was a real success, from what observers have said. It showed that Zairian business leaders had confidence in their country's economy and were increasing their investments. Do you intend to support and promote this type of promotional activity that leads to a better understanding of your country's achievements?

[Mobutu] I would have to say yes and add that I am delighted with the success of this exhibition. We will continue to do everything we can to support initiatives of this sort.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] You intend to safeguard Zaire's exceptional ecosystem. What steps do you plan to take to make your tourist and hotel sector more dynamic than it is at present and at the same time preserve the environment?

[Mobutu] We have always been interested in developing our tourist industry and in preserving the equilibrium of our ecosystem. We are currently involved in the following activities to accomplish this: renovation of the

tourism infrastructure in the northeastern part of the country, and improvement of the protection of endangered species, improvement of tourist sites close to the economic poles of Kinshasa, Bas-Zaïre, and Shaba.

**\* Seminar To Evaluate East European Events**

34010073A Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans  
23 Jan 90 p 6

[Text] The effect of changes in Eastern Europe on South Africa will be highlighted in March at a seminar in Johannesburg.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Pik Botha will be the main speaker. He recently visited Hungary.

Experts on Eastern Europe and international companies that are already involved there will inform businessmen and other interested people about the political developments and changing conditions in the East Bloc.

Among other things, the economic importance of those countries, the possibilities for trade, the exchange of know-how, and the apparent decline of CEMA [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] will be discussed.

Mr Riaan Eksteen, political analyst for the Ed Hearn and Rudolph brokerage firm and former director-general of SABC [South African Broadcasting Corporation], will organize the seminar. He will be visiting several countries in Eastern Europe in March.

**\* New Aspects of Walvis Bay Dispute Analyzed**

34000459A Johannesburg THE STAR in English  
19 Feb 90 p 11

[Article by Gerald L'Ange: "South Africa's Malvinas in the Making?"]

[Text] Windhoek—On March 21 Namibia will become independent—well, perhaps not all of it.

There will still remain the vexed matter of Walvis Bay and the 12 offshore islands that are claimed by both South Africa and Namibia.

The adoption this month of a constitution declaring Walvis Bay and the islands to be an integral part of Namibia has formally put the infant republic of Namibia in confrontation with Pretoria at birth, for Pretoria has adamantly reaffirmed that both port and islands are part of South Africa.

There is more to the dispute than the fact that Walvis Bay is the only viable deep water port for Namibia. It also involves the use and control of the romantically-named islands: Plum Pudding, Ichaboe, Hollandsbird (shown on some maps as Hollamsbird), Possession, Albatross, Penguin, Pomona, Halifax, Long, Seal, Mercury and Sinclair's.

Known collectively as the Penguin islands, they all lie within two nautical miles of the coast.

This means that their territorial waters overlap with those of Namibia. So unless South Africa relinquishes sovereignty there will be no easy answer to the question of who has control in the overlapping waters.

The problem gets even more tangled at Luderitz Bay, Namibia's only other port. Two of the islands—Penguin and Seal—lie at the entrance to the port. It seems that, in theory at least, South Africa could bar the passage of Namibian ships to and from Luderitz Bay because the only navigable approaches to the harbour are within the territorial waters of the two islands.

**Innocent Passage**

Conversely, Namibia could bar South African ships from approaching the islands since they fall within Namibia's territorial waters.

In reality neither situation is likely to come about because international law gives all vessels the right of innocent passage through any country's territorial waters. But more than one country has in the past decided that its needs overrode this particular law.

That is not the end of the complexities. If Namibia were ever to proclaim Luderitz Bay an internal water, which it can legally do by reason of its geographic features, then Penguin and Seal Islands would become enclaves within Namibia. They would presumably be beyond South African reach without the consent of the Namibian government, for there is no right of innocent passage in internal waters.

It is a unique situation with no parallel elsewhere and there is no international law that would apply in this eventuality, says Captain A.G. Soderlund of the South African Navy in a paper written for internal publications.

Accepted practice is that no state should close off waters in such a way that they cut off the territorial waters of another state from the high seas. This would theoretically preclude Namibia from cutting off Penguin and Seal islands. But this would in turn interfere with Namibia's right in international practice to declare Luderitz Bay an internal water. So which should have precedence is a toss-up.

South Africa's claim to the Penguin islands appears as watertight in international law as is its claim to Walvis Bay. They were annexed by Britain in 1866 and formally included into the Cape Colony in 1874. When Germany claimed all territory between Cape Frio and the Orange River it excepted Walvis Bay but included the islands. The dispute was referred to a mixed commission, which ruled in favour of Britain. Together with Walvis Bay, the islands became part of South Africa with the formation of the Union in 1910 and sovereignty automatically passed to the Republic in 1961.

There is very little on them except seabirds and seals. The potential for taking guano from the islands offers limited commercial value. This value would increase if oil or diamonds were found in worthwhile quantities in their territorial waters.



But even if no such riches are found the Namibian government will almost certainly take the view that it is intolerable that it should not have sovereignty over islands within its own territorial waters.

In laying claim to Walvis Bay the Windhoek government will get strong support from hinterland African states because it could relatively easily be linked by rail to the interior of the sub-continent.

In his paper Captain Soderlund compares Walvis Bay with the Malvinas (Falkland) islands, whose disputed ownership led to the war between Britain and Argentina in 1982. Calling it "South Africa's Malvinas in the making," he points out that in order to defend Walvis Bay against attempted seizure it would be necessary to ensure that it could be supplied from the sea.

As one of the political options for staving off demands for the incorporation of Walvis Bay into Namibia, Captain Soderlund mentions the idea of turning the enclave into a duty-free trade zone, an idea first raised, he says, as far back as 1926.

The free port concept has consistently been supported over the years by various business interests in Namibia but never by the South African Government.

Recently, however, it was raised again by the MP [Member of Parliament] for Walvis Bay, Mr Christo de Jager.

Pretoria's sovereignty over Walvis Bay and the islands gives it political leverage that it will not lightly give up, but it has intimated it might be willing to negotiate with a friendly government in independent Namibia over the future use of Walvis Bay.

One suggestion that is expected to get favourable consideration in Pretoria is the idea of giving Namibia the use and perhaps even administration of Walvis Bay without South Africa relinquishing sovereignty.

Namibia will apparently start independence with sovereignty over at least one island with a gastronomic name—a lump of rock just north of the Orange River called Roast Beef.

But it may have to fight for the Plum Pudding.

#### \* 'Irrelevancy' of De Klerk's Actions Noted

34000452 Johannesburg THE NEW NATION  
in English 9-15 Feb 90 p 10

[Commentary]

[Text] Oppressors throughout world history seem to have an inherent inability to voluntarily let the oppressed people go free. From the time of the Pharaohs in ancient Egypt to President de Klerk in modern South Africa, the story is the same.

The legend has it that even after a series of plagues had been visited upon the Egyptian kingdom, not until the firstborn had been killed, did Pharaoh finally decide that it was time for slaves to go free. Even after publicly making the awaited announcement, Pharaoh's heart kept on somersaulting, until he ultimately tried to stop the freedom march, only to be drowned in the Red Sea, which remains an important symbol to those who have reluctantly embarked on armed struggle after exhausting all the peaceful means to bring about meaningful change.

While President de Klerk was historically obliged on the 2 February to meet all the pre-conditions for the creating a climate conducive to the conduct of genuine negotiations with the representatives of the oppressed people, his heart also kept on somersaulting, and he announced only half measures which do not make the formal unbanning of the ANC [African National Congress], the SACP [South African Communist Party] and other political organisations politically meaningful given the continued existence of the state of emergency as well as laws that criminalise political activity. Sincere analysts are therefore bound to conclude that President de Klerk, like Pharaoh, intends to pursue the people's organisations even after he has publicly announced their freedom to engage in political activity.

Our analogy still continues a bit further. It is said that Pharaoh feared the increasing numbers of the slaves, and advised the mid-wives that all the slaves who gave birth to sons should have them killed right away. President de Klerk's government similarly fears the black majority in South Africa, and is thus working on a scheme to prevent the birth of a true democracy in the country, by having his cabinet ministers and constitutional lawyers put forward some untenable political plan aiming at preserving the economic privileges of the whites as a group.

#### Crisis Build-up

Seen in this context, it becomes clear that the unbanning of the ANC and SACP after 30 and 40 years respectively, is a climax of a series of plagues that have been building up in South Africa since 1960. We therefore need to make a detailed analysis of the nature of this crisis build-up over the years, and appreciate some of the important political decisions that have been made both by the liberation movement, headed by the ANC, and by the white government, headed by the National Party.

Such an approach further explains why it would be futile exercise for the oppressed to engage in a fruitless and, ultimately, damaging debate about who is more progressive among the leaders of the apartheid government. To do so would amount to crediting De Klerk with political vision about a free South Africa, whereas the positions which he and his cabinet have been forced to reach are due to the struggles of the people. This is not to suggest that the present government must not be encouraged to take further steps towards the eventual dismantling of apartheid: rather, it means that the oppressed must break out of the culture of powerlessness and the notion that

crucial changes can only take place when the oppressors have decided to, as well as begin to realise that with the same strength by which they have driven apartheid to a crisis, they are capable of establishing within the country a new form of government of the people, for the people and by the people. And that ultimately, this development will be determined not by the apartheid government but by the people in struggle.

In the course of the past 30 years the ANC and its allies have led a struggle that has made a profound political and organisational impact on South African politics in spite of the most formidable difficulties. These difficulties consist not only of the barbaric persecutions to which its members have been, and continue to be subjected, but also of the immense complexity of the historical conditions under which it has had to fight against the apartheid system.

### **Building From Scratch**

Following the banning of the ANC in 1960 and the subsequent arrest of part of its leadership in Rivonia, the movement was severely handicapped. Almost all the its known cadres and leaders had been rounded up, driven underground or forced into exile. There was public political silence in the land. And the only hope that existed under the circumstances was to rekindle the flame of struggle on the basis of the few personnel that had escaped the apartheid security network and gone into exile.

Credit in this regard is due to the far-sightedness of the National Executive Committee of the ANC which, even before its banning in 1960, could foresee that the government intended to ban the people's organisations in that regard, but also went ahead to make arrangements for such an eventuality. Several of its leaders, including Oliver Tambo, Moses Kotane, JB Marks, Duma Nokwe, Moses Mabhida, Joe Slovo, Yusuf Dadoo and others, were instructed specifically to leave the country and establish the organisation's presence outside.

Their mission, as understood at the time, was primarily to mobilise international support, and not necessarily to build up the underground movement inside. That task was to fall on the shoulders of another group of leaders, who had to remain within the country at all cost, even though some of them had already broken the South African law by going abroad to prepare themselves militarily. This internal leadership, including Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Harry Gwala, Wilton Mkwayi, Ahmed Kathrada and others, formed the backbone of the structures that had to carry on the resistance under the new conditions.

### **Promises**

To a large extent, the conditions that prevailed at the time made the tasks almost impossible. For the group that had gone into exile, it had to reckon with the fact that most of the African countries at the time were not independent. Even those that were, like Tanzania, were

far from the borders of South Africa, thus making the journey into exile itself a very dangerous venture from the point of view of their own security. But more than that, the difficulty of direct communication with their colleagues inside the country virtually placed the group in exile in almost total isolation from the actual arena of struggle.

Many of those who left under ANC instruction did so reluctantly, for they realised the problems that existed in exile as well as the significance of being with the people in the course of their struggle.

Some of their fears about the exile conditions were soon confirmed by practice, when the nature of the solidarity assistance which they had taken for granted to be coming from some newly free African countries was not forthcoming. Despite the public condemnations of the apartheid policies that were uttered by almost all the newly independent African states, as well as promises of assistance that had been given during the Mandela tour of Africa, it turned out, in actuality, that the promises were rather exaggerated. Instead, only two countries, namely Algeria and Tanzania, were willing to back up their promises with concrete measures.

### **Internal Difficulties**

For the underground leadership inside, problems were no less formidable. They set out to wage an armed revolution against a country with a rich economy, a large army and police, with a high level of industrialisation, with modern roads and railways which facilitated the transport to troops and police to any part of the country.

They also had no friendly borders to act as sanctuary in the event of hot pursuit by the enemy, nor did they have appreciable logistical supplies to sustain the conduct of a serious war against the apartheid government. In the words of the founders of Umkhonto weSizwe, which are contained in their draft plan, "Operation Mayibuye": "The time for small thinking is over because history leaves us no choice".

Yet despite these formidable difficulties and obstacles, both internally and in exile, the ANC, within a matter of one generation, has brought about an irreversible crisis for the apartheid system and forced the white regime presiding over it to publicly acknowledge its central position in South African politics—even if by implication. Not so long ago, Jimmy Kruger, the Minister of Justice and Politics, boasted that the apartheid government had broken the back of the ANC. But today it is fair to ask: Where is Jimmy Kruger? And where is the ANC?

### **Emergency**

The most remarkable similarity in political circumstances that exist today and those which existed during the unbanning of the ANC in 1990, is the presence which existed within the country of the state of emergency.

Given the massive popular resistance, in both rural and urban areas, that had developed during the late 1950s, the apartheid government felt that it was under siege, and that the usual legal and administrative methods of maintaining its authority were not adequate. Even though, strictly speaking, and comparing those events to the present period, no serious threat to the government could be objectively perceived from the mass movement, the government was nevertheless in panic.

The balance of strength between the government and the liberation movement in 1960, contrasted to the one that exists now in 1990, can be illustrated by a very simple example. In 1960 when the first state of emergency was proclaimed, the government managed to disable the people's movement and created visible a state of peace in the country. Of course this was a false peace. And about three decades later, when another state of emergency was proclaimed, not only did the government and its security organs fail to destroy the mass democratic movement, but the mass democratic movement actually became stronger during the very period of the state of emergency. The foundation of SAYCO [South African Youth Congress] during the state of emergency, and the inability of the government to interfere with the trade union and political organisation of COSATU [Congress of South African Trade Unions], also show that the apartheid state in the 1980s was less capable of defeating the people's organisations as it was in the 1960.

When mass political organisations have reached a stage of being able to advance as well as retreat in an organised fashion, then you must know that the time of the government in power is finished. There is nothing on earth that is capable of defeating a people's movement once it has reached that stage. Governments in eastern Europe that have been toppled successively by the popular uprising were not even in least confronted by as formidable a mass democratic movement as has been developed in South Africa.

#### Protest To Challenge

Gone are the days when people appealed to superintendents or community councils, or took their complaints to the police stations. The people have discovered that the apartheid government is not prepared to listen to them, because, after all, it is not their government. Their groans and angry demands have been drowned in the sound of police machine guns. Any hope of consultation, concessions or even reform has been buried together with the massacred victims of apartheid terror. The call is no longer for a "national convention", in which the government and the people's organisations would seek out to reach a patriotic compromise in order to establish a government of some form of power sharing, with the economic privileges of the whites securely preserved. Now the call is for the establishment of a Constituent Assembly of democratically elected delegates, who alone would have the sovereignty to write a new constitution for South Africa.

#### \* Secret Right Wing Organization Targets Left

34000447A Johannesburg THE STAR in English  
1 Feb 90 p 15

[Article by Kitt Katzin and Steve McQuillan]

[Text] A chilling picture has emerged of how and why a secret right-wing organisation, likened in character to the once-formidable Afrikaner Broederbond, has been directly linked by police to the apparent political murders of Dr David Webster and former Swapo advocate Mr Anton Lubowski.

Details of the operations of the new secret group, which police claim was responsible for the two as yet unsolved murders, have been uncovered by THE STAR in a prolonged investigation of its own.

First indications of the character and objectives of the movement came from senior police sources in papers lodged in the Supreme Court in Pretoria.

Brigadier Floris Mostert, chief investigating officer in the Webster murder and commander of the Brixton Murder and Robbery Squad, levelled a list of serious allegations against the group when he opposed an application for the release of Mr Ferdie Barnard, a former narcotics detective who is allegedly a member of the organisation or was working on its behalf.

In an affidavit submitted to court last week, which led to an application for Mr Barnard's release being rejected, Brig Mostert expanded on the "sensitive" information he had gathered on the group's activities.

He disclosed the organisation committed murders and terrorised left-wing radicals with intimidation and violence, but said he could not reveal all the facts as secrecy was of the "greatest importance."

An investigation by THE STAR, however, throws some light on the strategies and activities of the group and on the movements of some of its alleged members.

It has been disclosed that:

- Mr Barnard, who has been detained under Section 29 of the Internal Security Act since October 31, had at least twice met Irish national Mr Donald Acheson, who has been charged in Windhoek with the Lubowski murder.
- Both meetings took place in Johannesburg before Mr Lubowski was killed outside his home in Windhoek on September 12. (Mr Acheson is charged only with the Lubowski murder while Mr Barnard is being questioned in connection with both killings—Lubowski and Webster.)
- Mr Barnard, who has allegedly confessed to being under the command of the military intelligence arm of the South African Defence Force [SADF], met Mr Acheson soon after the Irish national was due to



appear on a shoplifting charge in Johannesburg. However, he never stood trial and disappeared to Windhoek where he was arrested on the night Mr Lubowski was shot.

- Mr Acheson, meanwhile, has apparently admitted in prison in Windhoek to knowing Mr Barnard—but by another name. He identified a photograph of Mr Barnard, but said he did not know him as "Barnard." There is wide speculation that Mr Acheson was in some way "set-up."
- This appears to confirm suspicions that members of the secret organisation used code names and were not known to each other by their real names. They apparently also do not know who their superiors are.
- A further indication of this is that payments were apparently made in cash to members of the organisation for "services rendered" by intermediaries using false names.
- Some members of the group may have been "set up" in regard to illegal actions they are alleged to have perpetrated. This has given rise to speculation that they may have been used as pawns.
- Mr Barnard, it is believed, operated under the cover of an insurance company representative while undertaking tasks for the organisation.

It is understood police established a link between Mr Acheson and Mr Barnard when they found a telephone number in Mr Acheson's apartment in Windhoek. The number turned out to be registered to a paging service in Johannesburg in the name of a former Springbok athlete involved in a legitimate insurance business. It is believed Mr Barnard carried one of the company's radio pagers.

#### Forsyth Link

Mr Barnard was allegedly instructed to shadow the movements of an activist who had close contacts with Dr Webster, though it is not known for what purpose. THE STAR has spoken to the person concerned, who has requested his identity remain secret.

However, investigations show that a possible reason for the surveillance may be linked to the case of former security police spy, Olivia Forsyth, who escaped from the African National Congress (ANC) in May 1988 and took refuge in the British Embassy in Lusaka before she was freed.

According to sources, friends of Lieutenant Forsyth, who has since returned to South Africa, were perturbed about her situation at the time she was holed up in Luanda—the Angolan government at first refused to allow her to leave and the ANC demanded that she be handed back—and approached the activist for help.

He and Miss Forsyth had known each other as students. It is believed the activist may have responded by discussing the matter with Dr Webster to see if the academic could help. It is not known to what extent Dr Webster became involved.

Also, several strange reports have surfaced in connection with the Lubowski shooting.

In repeated anonymous calls to the WINDHOEK OBSERVER newspaper, a caller said Lubowski's assassins had long since flown out of Africa. The caller added that the case had aroused the attention of the United States Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation—not an unreasonable suggestion considering Lubowski's assassination occurred on the eve of Namibian independence negotiations and had the potential of wrecking the peace plan.

Also, in court papers, Mr Acheson described how a police officer had asked him to collect firewood for an informal braai at a dam construction site in Namibia soon after he was detained. On at least two occasions, he claimed, keys were left in an unattended motor car—once at the dam and once outside a police station. He claimed police told him how far it was to the border.

Mr Acheson said it appeared he was being encouraged to abscond and feared for his life.

Police in Windhoek are on record as saying they cannot discuss the Acheson/Lubowski case because of national security concerns.

#### Intimidation, Violence

THE STAR has also established that the organisation is alleged to have intimidated prominent people and was involved in the burning of academics' motor vehicles and the stoning of buses.

These incidents are being investigated by police.

It is claimed that the organisation threatened people with violence and death over the telephone. THE STAR knows of at least one person, an advocate, who received such a call.

Police are said to be investigating further incidents of violence allegedly perpetrated by the group and believe Mr Barnard is withholding vital evidence in this regard.

Dubbed by some as an "armed Broederbond," the new right-wing organisation also apparently has access to the security police, the military and government departments. And, like the Broederbond, it was formed to achieve political objectives.

However, unlike the Broederbond, whose purpose was and still is to reinforce Afrikaner political advancement, the new group is intent upon destroying the base of the present-day National Party and the Government's reform initiatives.

There is growing evidence to show that the right-wing group could also be linked to military intelligence.

Sources say evidence in this respect may soon become known and police confirm they are investigating a possible connection.

Mr Barnard withdrew an initial application for his release on the grounds that as a self-confessed MI operative, he feared for his life. He would be killed by "interested parties," he said, if he were freed.

The SADF has denied he was a member of military intelligence.

**\* Reforms Spark Fear of Right Wing Backlash**

34000445A Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL  
in English 9-15 Feb 90 p 4

[Report by Gavin Evans: "The Far-Right Backlash Is Country's Greatest Danger"]

[Text] Stayaways, calls for resignations from parliament, appeals to police to join the struggle, vows to cripple essential services, threats to take up arms ... such was the stuff of extra-parliamentary groups this week.

So what's changed? What's changed is that the calls are coming from an angry and desperate far right, incensed with the scale of F. W. de Klerk's concessions and ready to go to war.

The Conservative Party (CP) responded cautiously to a call from a loose coalition of far-right groups for it to resign from parliament and for town councils to force by-elections for these structures.

"The challenge facing the volk is the question of an effective strategy in the struggle against NP-capitulation," CP leader Andries Treurnicht told the WEEKLY MAIL, in answer to the question of whether his party would leave parliament to force an election.

"The Conservative Party will consider a strategy in a responsible manner and in time will make its decision known."

The party has made clear that it has every intention of entering the extra-parliamentary terrain in a big way.

Faced with the real possibility that there will never again be another all-white general election, the CP has little option but to join its erstwhile extra-parliamentary allies in the realm of street politics.

Among the actions announced by the CP are the following:

- A call for 900,000 adult supporters to stay at home for "two or three days" as part of a campaign to force De Klerk to hold a white general election. The stayaway action would be a "one-off" demonstration of right-wing support rather than a continuous action;
- A call for supporters in the police, fire brigades, schools and bus services to join the stayaway;
- A plan to hold between 500 and 1,000 public meetings, culminating in a mass rally in Pretoria on May 26;
- The distribution of hundreds of thousands of pamphlets;
- A series of protest marches around the country.

CP information head Koos van der Merwe, said the CP was not calling for violence, although "through its crookery and by jumping on the white electorate" the National Party [NP] was creating a climate where "violence can become a possibility."

At another press conference Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AMB) leader Eugene Terreblanche threatened that he and his supporters would resort to violence "to save the volk."

"If the constitutional door is closed, we will fight," he said.

Terreblanche was joined at a press conference on Wednesday by Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) leader Jaap Marais and Robert van Tonder of the Boerestaat Party.

The AWB and Boerestaat Party are planning a march in Pretoria tomorrow afternoon to deliver to the Union Building a letter of protest against the unbanning of the African National Party, the South African Communist Party [SACP] and the Pan Africanist Congress.

Earlier this week a representative of the marchers, Piet Rudolph, said they were expecting 5,000 to 10,000 people to join.

The three groups, which over the past year have drawn closer together and become increasingly isolated from the CP, called for a strategy to force a white general election.

The thrust of their complaint was that the government had deceived the volk prior to last year's election.

"Before the election Mr De Klerk did not say he was unbanning the ANC or SACP. He did not say he would allow them to open offices throughout the country, including in the capital of the Boerevolk, and show the hammer and sickle in our streets," said Terreblanche.

Earlier the CP's Koos van der Merwe called the NP "a lot of political crooks" because last year it told the electorate there was no place for the ANC in a South Africa governed by the NP, and now it had capitulated.

"There is no way De Klerk can drag the Afrikaner into his new South Africa," said Van der Merwe, adding that he would not be satisfied with "a smallholding in the Karoo."

Van Tonder said the CP could not effectively fight the government through the winner-take-all Westminster parliamentary system, and would have to look towards other strategies.

But in a less confrontational tone, he told the WEEKLY MAIL he was not implicitly opposed to the release of Nelson Mandela and wished to participate in negotiations.

"If South Africa was a normal dispensation of independent states, neither Mandela nor Barend Strydom would

ever have been jailed. But instead it's a concoction of states and that's why they're in jail, and why we need to unravel this mixed-grill through negotiations."

Van Tonder said he would be present at the negotiating table representing the Boerevolk Party in a bid to have a Boer Republic "reinstated."

The Kappiekommando has promised to unleash its "underground," while the "New AWB (one of several breakaway groups) has declared "open war" on the government and the ANC.

"Now the fight becomes open war and the best man must win," said Eddie von Maltitz, the group's leader.

#### \* Signs Reveal Security Force Threat to Reforms

34000445B Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL  
in English 9-15 Feb 90 p 4

[Report by Eddie Koch: "The Restless Soldiers Lurking in Background"]

[Text] Allende's Chile, the Second Republic in Spain ... history is haunted by governments that experimented in democracy without effective command over the colonels.

Long before F. W. de Klerk's dramatic lurch to the left there were signs—police death squads, army special forces, covert links between officers and neo-fascist groups—that the country's civilian rulers did not have complete control over their soldiers and policemen.

And in the seven days since the president's speech the reflex reactions of the police have resurrected the spectre of a right-wing revolt in South Africa's security forces.

But both academic analysts and anti-apartheid activists believe there is more likely to be a low-key war of attrition than full-scale rebellion by its members.

"The instruments of defence and coercion available to the South African state are among the most varied and diffuse in the world," says Mark Phillips, researcher at the Centre for Policy Studies in Johannesburg.

"The security establishment includes the Department of Defence, the various intelligence services (Military Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, the National Intelligence Service and Security Policy) and the Directorate of Security Legislation.

"The police force's security arms are the riot squad, 'reaction units', kitskonstabels, a special guard unit, a special task force. Other components are the municipal police, mine police, military police, traffic police, and private security companies."

The Afrikaaner Weerstandsbeweging and other far-right groups have made it a point of policy to infiltrate these units. According to one estimate, at least three out of four white policemen in the Transvaal align themselves with the Conservative Party.

The fear of a police revolt was clearly uppermost in De Klerk's mind when in early January he called a counsel of police officers from the rank of colonel to explain the need for the dramatic course he was about to embark on and to plead for their loyalty.

There are doubts, however, that the politics of persuasion are enough to curb the immense power these forces wield.

Policemen have been accused of extreme brutality in dealing with street marches that greeted news about the unbanning of the African National Congress [ANC] in the streets of Johannesburg as well as protests over the townships of Tembisa and Thokoza on the East Rand.

Said a union press release that described a strike at a Unilever factory in Wadeville this week: "Police were brandishing knobkerries with a clear intention of provoking workers so as to attack them."

And this week Police Commissioner Johan van der Merwe, who led the police officers in their parley last month with De Klerk, implicitly contradicted cabinet ministers' claims that, for the ANC's top leadership, it was safe to come home.

"From a police point of view, people against whom we can bring cases of terrorism, subversion and sabotage will—unless amnesty is granted—still face prosecution," he said.

Human rights lawyer Azhar Cachalia, who is also treasurer of the United Democratic Front, believes the general's intervention was carefully designed to blunt the impact of the president's reforms.

"If this was the measured response of the most senior officer in the police, then we can surely expect to see less-measured action, either maverick or co-ordinated, by those lower down the ranks of the police and the SADF [South Africa Defense Forces]," he says.

"But, at the same time, De Klerk clearly has the support of many senior officers in the security forces, with the exception of the security police."

There are developments which suggest that there is enough turmoil in the police to blunt any coherent political initiatives by the securocrats:

- At least 12 policemen a day are resigning from the force. Many of these are senior officers.
- The Harms Commission, appointed to look into political assassinations, clearly means business. De Klerk, if he wishes, will be able to use the evidence they collect as a Sword of Damocles against those security agencies most likely to defy him: units in the police and military that were established for covert counter-insurgency work.
- There is growing discontent among black policemen within the force. Late last year municipal police staged a strike against poor conditions of work in townships on the East Rand.



"I have come across black policemen who say they are happy with De Klerk's changes because now there will be the opportunity for equality in the force," says Cachalia.

- A small but significant group could follow dissident police captain Dirk Coetzee and his handful of colleagues who have defected to the other side with highly sensitive information.

Phillips believes the very range and diversity of security agencies is another source of comfort for the Nationalist government.

While the generals in the air force and the navy may not be all the president's men, they are predominantly professional soldiers who take their jobs more seriously than their politics.

Says Phillips: "The integration of the Rhodesia intelligence forces and Zanu's intelligence units in independent Zimbabwe shows that this ethic can have some positive effects."

**\* Democratic Party Explores Relations With ANC**  
34000454A Johannesburg *FINANCIAL MAIL*  
in English 9 Feb 90 p 45

[Text] Intense backroom discussions are going on among various MPs [Member of Parliament] of the Democratic Party about its relationship with the ANC [African National Congress]. A well-informed source tells the *FM* that some MPs have indicated they are seriously considering joining the unbanned organisation.

The strategic planning committee of the party has apparently met to discuss the issue of DP [Democratic Party]-ANC cooperation. A meeting of the committee (chaired by Robin Carlisle, MP for Wynberg) took place two weeks before President F W de Klerk's speech on Friday. Other MPs on the committee are Kobus Jordaan (Umhlanga), Tony Leon (Houghton) and Louis de Waal (North Rand).

A DP MP tells the *FM* the committee has been looking at the party's role. "De Klerk's announcement has strengthened our belief that a repositioning vis-a-vis the ANC is now imperative," he adds.

It seems a group of MPs, led by DP co-leader Wynand Malan, intends joining the ANC. Other names being mentioned—purely speculatively—by sources in the DP are Natal MPs Peter Gastrow, Pierre Cronje (both left the former PFP [Progressive Federal Party] to join forces with Malan) and Jordaan, as well as De Waal and Jannie Momberg (Simon's Town). In discussions with various MPs this week it became clear that the list could be much longer. Decisions to join the ANC may be taken within a year or 18 months, according to one source.

MPs approached for comment say that policy gaps between the ANC and DP are not unbridgeable and consensus would be enhanced by the NP [National

Party]'s reluctance to abandon entirely its race-based group concept. They also feel that the DP has already crossed the psychological barrier of negotiating with the ANC because of its encounters with the organisation when it was banned.

These MPs believe the economic differences between the free marketeers in the DP and the ANC's proponents of nationalisation could be resolved by co-operation in the pre-negotiation phase. "We would at least be in a better position than the NP to exert any influence on the ANC," one believes.

On Tuesday, in his first speech in parliament in 10 years, Jordaan (a former Nat senator) briefly raised the issue. De Klerk, he said, had correctly indicated that an important change in emphasis, visible in statements and viewpoints by the ANC, had already taken place. "During our interaction with extraparlimentary organisations, we have experienced that, despite differences in strategies, we are sharing more and more the same principles (*beginselfstandpunte*)."

Jordaan spoke glowingly of his former political boss, Chris Heunis, whom he served when Heunis was minister of constitutional development.

From Jordaan's opening remarks in his speech it became clear that the meetings with the ANC had the blessing of Heunis. Referring to the unbanning of the ANC, Jordaan said: "I am convinced that this was also a day of great joy to my ex-colleagues and minister at the Department of Constitutional Development. These are people with whom I share many ideals."

In his speech, Wynand Malan said that he had always, in private conversations and in public, tried to put pressure on the NP and ANC to start the political process. "The next step now is the contact," he said. "I am an Afrikaner in the DP. I share my language and cultural interests with Afrikaners in the AWB [Afrikaner Resistance Movement], the CP [Conservative Party], the NP and the ANC..."

The DP believes in free elections on one voter's roll, said Malan. "We also accept that the majority of representatives in parliament and in government will be black. We believe that we will be part of the parliament and do not believe we will not be part of the government."

It has been clear to political commentators that De Klerk's announcement, while lauded by the DP, has placed the left-of-centre party in a position where it will have to prove its relevance to the voters.

Parliamentary leader Zach de Beer in his speech reacted with indignation to any suggestions that his party has become irrelevant. "When you have fought through the years for your values and policies, and others are converted (to those values), how on earth does that make you irrelevant?"

However, a formal link with the ANC, which has yet to reject violence completely, and is still intent on nationalising mines and banks, is clearly a risk to take for a new party which made electoral gains through compromise.

Many of its supporters may not like the new link.

#### \* ANC Examines Future Tasks, Structures

34000446B Johannesburg THE NEW NATION  
in English 2-8 Feb 90 pp 6-7

[Text] "Our meeting in Lusaka last week produced the clear message, that without struggle, there is no freedom," an ANC [African National Congress] national executive member said in London this week following the organisation's NEC [National Executive Committee].

Reviewing the three-day meeting, attended by the organisation's veteran leaders recently released from prison, he said that the emphasis had been on ensuring "that the masses are moving in action."

At the meeting both the NEC and the released leaders agreed that the transfer of power to the people was within reach—but that greater struggle was indeed necessary. This, he said included the armed struggle.

Press reports have, however, interpreted a statement by the organisation's secretary general, Alfred Nzo, as indicating that the movement did not have the capacity to intensify the armed struggle.

The ANC has retaliated by stating that "the media missed important points made before and after this acknowledgement."

"...The acknowledgement of the difficulties in escalating this form of struggle were made precisely to suggest, that we needed to pay more attention to building up our military capacity."

Apart from a range of variables, one of the problems facing MK has been the slow development of the "underground of the ANC, and the movement is painfully aware of this," a senior member of the organisation's military wing explained.

In its January 8th statement, the ANC, stressed that the task of building the underground was of central and decisive importance. The underground, it pointed out was in fact one of the four pillars on which the movement's entire strategy rested.

Difficulties created by the absence of adequate underground structures were compounded by the fact that the ANC had no rear base that one can speak of.

MK's activity was also affected by the fact that it had to abandon its camps in Angola and look elsewhere to accommodate its soldiers.

Despite the limitations, the armed struggle has yielded important gains, and has made significant contributions to the "present political chemistry" the organisation stresses.

Responding to criticism that the armed struggle in SA [South Africa], especially against a much superior army, has been ineffective, the ANC says that if that was the case, the country would not have militarised to the extent that it has.

It also cites the fact that SA has had to spend millions to defend itself against the armed struggle and has had to work out strategies against the frontline states to fight infiltration of MK guerrillas.

Despite these gains, it emphasises, that much still remains to be done.

But is there still time to remedy the shortcomings given the rapid pace of developments in the country's political scenario?

"I feel strongly that this (shortcomings) should be corrected," an official said.

"We should not be caught up in the euphoria of De Klerk's rhetoric because we do not know the agenda," he cautions.

It must be remembered that De Klerk is the leader of the NP [National Party], which is committed to the ideology of white domination.

"He has always been a senior member of his party and those monitoring his activities say he has a reputation to be verkrampd."

But the possibility, that De Klerk could have changed, cannot be completely discounted. However, given the NP's constituency and the underlying premise of the policies on which it has built its support, there are doubts as to whether the party could preside over any meaningful change.

"The restructuring and rearranging are being done in order to give the NP more time to refurbish apartheid," the official says.

And this is the basis of an underlying suspicion that De Klerk's agenda is designed primarily to divide and weaken the ANC.

But the organisation has been consistent in depriving the government of the opportunity and space to develop a coherent strategy, it is argued, "hence the groping for answers."

That, however, still does not rule out the possibility that De Klerk could grab the initiative.

This is hardly likely, the ANC believes. "If De Klerk unbans the ANC, lifts restrictions, stops political trials and generally responds positively toward the Harare

declaration in creating a climate for negotiations, it could create more problems for him.

"He will have unleashed an avalanche in the sense that the ANC will have at its disposal some of its most experienced leaders at a number of levels....

"And you cannot just unban the ANC. You will have to do more" to realise a non-racial democratic SA. In this sense the question of the transfer of power will shift to centre stage.

But has the ANC considered what the organisations would do next once unbanned, for example, on the return of exiles.

This issue was not specifically discussed at the recent NEC. But the organisation says that its position has always been that when it succeeds in getting itself unbanned, its members will return to the country and continue the struggle.

"We do not think it depends on the regime to say, come back."

The organisation says, it will nevertheless plan the return of its members in such a way "that when they return, they would already be deployed."

The ANC has however indicated that one thing is for certain, they will not go back as refugees.

The African National Congress's extended National Executive Committee meeting in Lusaka just over a week ago set the scene for what is certain to be its most important National Conference ever.

Having been upgraded from a Consultative Conference to a National Conference, the meeting, scheduled for around June, will be attended by members of the ANC inside and outside the country.

It will go ahead irrespective of whether the organisation is unbanned or not.

Given the urgency of the situation and the present challenges facing the organisation and the democratic movement as a whole, the conference will "need to discuss very openly how we move forward, how we unite the oppressed people of SA (and) how we broaden the front."

The conference, according to a senior ANC source, will also have to examine how it will work with the MDM [Mass Democratic Movement] in the event that it is unbanned.

How the organisation will go about building MK into a "people's army" is expected to be another crucial point on the agenda. "This will be a situation where MK will be discussed, not only by us who have been in the forefront of things in the past 26 years but by comrades who are thinking freshly about the problems of MK, comrades inside the country who have seen us in action,

who will be in a position to be openly critical about the way we are handling things."

The organisation will also hold fresh elections. Asked whether major leadership changes could be in the offing, the ANC source pointed to the fact that there were many people, "some of whom have been outstanding in terms of their contribution ... and they have to be considered for leadership of the movement."

"There are also senior comrades, who have served terms of imprisonment for both the ANC and MK activities. So there must be a need for a new mandate and a new leadership.

"Of course, the ANC would have a broad spectrum from which to choose, given the present situation. Some members have come in from the underground, some have come in through the MDM, the trade unions, from the rural areas.

"I think the spirit would be to build an effective leadership of the ANC."

At this stage it also seems highly unlikely that the ANC would allow its president OR Tambo, to step down as president of the organisation.

#### **Stand United in Negotiations**

The African National Congress convened one of its most crucial and historically significant National Executive Committee sessions last week.

It had present, for the first time in more than 26 years, its most senior leadership in the form of those that had been released in October last year. It was also convened at a time when rapid changes in the political situation demands of the organisation a great deal of tactical flexibility.

As the organisation said in its January 8 statement: "The situation ahead of us imposes new responsibilities on our movement..."

Much of the time at the NEC was taken up by the Harare Declaration, which set out the organisation's perspective on negotiations. Changes in the ruling bloc were also subjected to intense scrutiny.

At the end of it here seemed consensus that the National Party's F. W. de Klerk was in fact a different type of leader. But just in case this perception was misconstrued, a senior official clarified his organisation's view by saying that De Klerk was a new type of leader in the sense that he was a product of "the most serious crisis facing the National Party."

#### **Growing**

The difference therefore is that De Klerk is leading a party that is no longer as powerful as it was under B. J. Vorster and P. W. Botha.

In contrast, the ANC was growing in stature and acceptability, both inside the country as well as internationally. And inside the country, this support goes beyond just the MDM and its various formations.

One of the ANC's primary functions in the immediate period ahead, therefore would be to deepen and broaden this support.

And in this sense, the organisation says it is looking beyond the Conference for a Democratic Future (CDF) with the objective of uniting more groups under this umbrella.

This, an official, explains is important in the context of the talk about negotiations. "In the event of negotiations, our biggest draw card is going to be unity."

This will not simply be a unity of the oppressed but also a unity of democrats. And herein lies the importance of the theme of the ANC's January 8 statement—"United Action for a Democratic South Africa," he points out.

#### Prospects

The prospects of negotiations and the demands that the ANC has listed in the Harare Declaration, however, present their own set of challenges for the organisation.

One of the most crucial questions is: what happens after the ANC is unbanned, as demanded in the Harare Declaration? For the ANC, this does not represent an end to the struggle.

"The unbanning of the ANC does not bring about a democratic SA," the organisation explains. It adds that the struggle will continue and it will work together with the MDM and the trade unions to demand the "transfer of power."

It is also unlikely that the ANC will abandon the armed struggle just because it is unbanned.

"MK is not there merely because the ANC is banned. It is an answer to the violence of the regime," the organisation explains.

And at this level the unbanning of the ANC is likely to open up a Pandora Box for the De Klerk regime.

#### Violence

In as far as the ANC military wing is concerned, the movement is committed to responding to state violence for as long as it exists, even after the movement is unbanned.

"The regime will have to sit down and give consideration to MK. Members of MK are members of the ANC."

But this does not mean that a continuous assessment of conditions will not be necessary.

"We must be firm in principle and flexible in tactics," the ANC says. And the possibility that the armed

struggle could be suspended in some areas where the organisation has won ground cannot be ruled out. The question, for example, might well arise—why conduct military operations in an area like Transkei where Bantu Holomisa has been articulating "good positions" relating to the unbanning of the ANC and a referendum on re-incorporation into SA.

While the possibility of a suspension of military operations in some areas and under certain circumstances might well be considered, this in no way suggests that the ANC would disband MK.

Far from that, the ANC believes that its military wing must be strengthened even in a hypothetical situation where there is in fact a temporary cessation of the armed action.

#### \* 'Nationalization' Challenges ANC's Credibility

34000453E Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL  
in English 9 Feb 90 pp 28-29

[Text] Only a few months ago, the extent of any reforms announced by a Nat State President would have been judged by the depth of chagrin on the Right. However, after President F W de Klerk's profound and far-reaching statements on Friday, what Andries Treurnicht had to say in parliament this week appeared both predictable and irrelevant.

De Klerk has freed the National Party—if not the whole Afrikaner tribe—from the confines of its own ideology. He has not so much emancipated the unenfranchised blacks as prepared the way for his own people to use their considerable skills, talents and resources for the benefit of the whole region.

The response that matters, and is still substantially being awaited as the *FM* goes to press, is the considered view of the ANC [African National Congress] and what it plans to do now. For it, too, if it chooses to be magnanimous, could by clever use of the greater freedoms now open to it lift the whole southern African region on to a plateau of peaceful prosperity which would have seemed an impossible dream only a short time ago.

Southern Africa has abundant natural resources, the exploitation of which requires technical skills and capital. SA [South Africa] has the industrial and financial infrastructure that could enhance this exploitation to the substantial benefit of people of all races and cultural backgrounds in the region.

There has been economic decay, partly as a result of Nat policies here and the collectivist ideals of the liberation governments to the north. But there has been nothing like the economic devastation that 70 years of communism has brought to Soviet Russia and, since World War 2, to eastern Europe. Simply put, a peaceful southern Africa—stripped of its political fantasies—could offer



private foreign investors some opportunities far more lucrative and secure than much that might be found in eastern Europe.

Indeed, it might well be argued that while the ANC may be capable of disrupting and delaying this prosperity, it is unlikely to be able—even if it were so inclined—to thwart the process entirely.

For the ANC, slow and unimaginative as it has shown itself to be, is losing—and could lose faster—its credibility and support in the developed world. If it adheres to violence and scorns the opportunity to seek democratic justification openly and peacefully, it will nurture the seeds of its own destruction.

Its weapons supplies and tactical support systems are already in jeopardy as a result of the explosion of the Marxist myth of equality and plenitude through collectivism in eastern Europe and Russia. The Nordic countries, which have given support naively and unstintingly, have some economic problems of their own to face and have already shown some impatience at African political intransigence.

But the country with the wild cards could be the US, for it is capable of turning the threat of removing sanctions into a powerful inducement to the ANC and other black bodies to negotiate seriously with Pretoria.

Conversely, the developed world has little else with which to belabour SA, even if it wished to. The real sting to this economy came from the 1985 capital freeze and subsequent disinvestment. That is not only incapable of repetition but the process is being reversed. Disinvestment is but a trickle and capital inflows, while still small, are gathering momentum.

Trade sanctions, as we have argued for some time, are no longer really an issue. They are unlikely to be tightened—especially after De Klerk's reforms—and the economy has shown itself to be remarkably resilient in finding new markets. Sanctions are an unnecessary impediment to growth but they are incapable of strangling it.

Nor are the developed countries, which control substantial aid flows, likely to be impressed by economic policies in Africa that have been shown to reduce self-sufficiency, encourage poverty and uphold dictatorships. They no longer regard the extent of their charity to the Third World as a measure of virtue. Those who have been instruments of their own impoverishment are not popular in the West.

The ANC has more than the eyes of anxious SA whites on its policy utterances. It has the developed world as well as the eastern European, whose own experience belies the economic sense of much of what the ANC has been saying about a post-apartheid society.

Take, for instance, what Comrade Alfred Nzo, ANC secretary-general, has to say about nationalisation: "The nationalisation of key elements is necessary to get

resources for the democratic government to carry out its programmes...(It) could not allow its plans to be thwarted by lack of resources." The truth is that nationalisation deprives government of the resources it requires.

Nzo, who clearly has no grasp of elementary economics, has only to look at the shortages of food and other basic commodities and sad queues of disappointed customers in eastern Europe to see the manifest deprivation of nationalisation. As British Liberal Prime Minister W E Gladstone found by chance in the last century, rising government revenues come from lower taxes and excises that encourage private commercial and industrial endeavour.

Moreover, if the mines, banks and what the ANC calls monopoly industries here were nationalised, more than 60% of the companies quoted on the JSE [Johannesburg Stock Exchange] would be owned by government, which would have to run them. If that were to happen, foreign investment capital and technical skills would simply not flow in our direction. The press would be effectively nationalised and the flow of commercial information frustrated and distorted.

Scarce economic resources would, in consequence, be wasted through misallocation by a pricing system that received the wrong signals. Price controls, hyperinflation and a concentration of wealth into fewer hands would be the inevitable outcome.

Economic history has shown repeatedly that a rising level of prosperity comes from government that foster private initiative and aim for the fastest possible economic growth rate that is capable of being sustained. Those that sacrifice growth to income or asset distribution inevitably end up with a poorer populace, offering fewer jobs and declining real incomes.

No matter how sound these economic arguments, we suspect the ANC will require some form of heroic economic gesture from government and business before it leaves the negotiating table—regardless of what political agreements may have been reached.

It is an unfortunate and hard fact of life—especially after the exclusion of blacks for so long from free enterprise here—that gestures such as these all have economic and social costs which could be quite severe in the short run. In the longer run they amount to very little for the recipients. Economically they do more harm than good.

For this reason the economic aspects of De Klerk's speech are of substantial importance and require rapid implementation. Deregulation must be continued at a cracking pace so that blacks are able swiftly to benefit from their own informal commercial activities. State corporations need to be privatised, not only to provide tax revenues and once-off sale profits to government, but to foster a share-owning democracy.

Deregulation of the financial system is as important as that of the commercial system. For, among other benefits, it will provide further conduits for black savings to be channelled into the financing of black housing.

The shortcomings of the education and health systems, which have been created partly by apartheid and partly by a past tendency towards collectivist solutions, need to be addressed urgently. It is not logical that white schools and hospitals should be under-used while the equivalent black institutions are overcrowded and inadequate. They required bold and creative solutions, not just more money.

If De klerk moves swiftly with reforms such as these, much of the economic sting will be drawn from the political and constitutional negotiations. For blacks will have a better perspective of the fruits and freedoms of free enterprise. The inevitable hollowness of the heroic redistribution of resources from whites to blacks will become more evident. The unrealistic economic expectations will be moderated.

What is becoming increasingly clear is that when negotiations over a new dispensation get under way, the ANC is going to have no monopoly on moral fervour and economic righteousness. It is going to have to negotiate from a standpoint weakened by the desire of both the West and Soviet Russia for a negotiated settlement; by harsh economic reality which it has been avoiding; and by increasing censure from abroad if violence and intimidation persist.

Moreover, the ANC will increasingly now come under the influence of a new and—for it—strange phenomenon: it will become the focus of newspaper analysis, comment and criticism. Nothing tests the devotion to democracy as much as that. It will give the West and the whites here something of the flavour of the ANC's commitment to freedom of expression.

New-found freedoms, as well as the austerity and rising unemployment that curbing inflation is going to make inevitable, will give the ANC substantial opportunities to exploit violent protest in front of seductive world television cameras. It should weight very carefully the likely judgment of its benefactors if it gives way to this temptation.

The need for violent protest has been removed. There can be no justification now for the disruption of university gatherings because radical black students cannot express their views.

If the ANC allows this sort of thing to continue, it will progressively alienate its support.

Last Friday, De Klerk not only gave greater freedom to the expression of black aspirations, and restored to his own party and people the freedom to confront, persuade and understand the political motives of black fellow

countrymen, he gave all community leaders the opportunity to seek responsible government and rising prosperity in a new and more equitable society.

It is not an inconsiderable challenge to which they must not respond.

#### \* MK's Hani Interviewed on Tactics, Armed Struggle

34000449A Johannesburg THE NEW NATION  
in English 9-15 Feb 90 pp 6-7

[Interview with Umkhonto we Sizwe's Chris Hani; first two paragraphs are introductory paragraphs]

[Text] As the political map changes in Southern Africa in general and South Africa in particular, so will there be changes in tactics.

One of the main players in the South African scene, Umkhonto we Sizwe [Spear of the Nation, ANC's military wing] (MK) deputy commander Chris Hani tells us his views in this interview made shortly before the unbanning of the ANC [African National Congress], the SACP [South African Communist Party] and other organisations.

[THE NEW NATION] Could you provide some insight into the NEC's [National Executive Committee] perspective on the road ahead? The NEC has said very generally in the statement following its meeting that it remains committed to all the usual forms of struggle. But presumably the changed conditions in South Africa do affect its perception of the precise mix of the three methods of struggle.

[Hani] In the NEC, that is the recent session of the extended NEC, we spent a lot of time looking at our perspectives, looking at the Harare Declaration, and we also felt that De Klerk was a different type of National Party leader—he is a product of what I would call the most serious crisis facing the National Party. He is leading a party which is no longer as powerful as it was under PW Botha or under Vorster. In other words, he is leading a bruised party. It is seriously divided. And he has got to reckon with this problem. And it is quite clear that there is no end in sight in terms of this crisis. It is not a crisis that this government is able to solve.

Undoubtedly, the ANC has grown in stature, acceptability, strength. It is an ANC which is drawing support not only from its traditional constituencies. It is an ANC now which is courted by homeland leaders, by leaders of business, Nafcoc. It is an ANC which is reinforced now by the released leaders, Walter Sisulu and others.

Now the present position we are enjoying in terms of support, and the crisis that engulfs the NP [National Party] is the result of struggle—a combination of all forms of struggle. And definitely with the MDM [Mass Democratic Movement] playing the leading role in the past four or five years the achievements of the MDM



have been immense. They have certainly emerged out of the SOE [State of Emergency] here, quite buoyant, full of energy and I think it would be safe to say that they have demonstrated the failure of the SOE.

I think the biggest disappointment for the NP has been the failure to organise a collaborationist group. I am not now referring to individuals, there are many individuals, but they have no social base.

In the South African context they have not even managed a Muzorewa.

But instead we are witnessing a desertion by those who have all along been regarded as the stooges, the puppets. The most eloquent example is the Transkeian situation. The emergence of Holomisa and their distancing of themselves from the regime.

So I think the ANC is succeeding in having this big umbrella of organisations—even organisations which are outside the usual formations of the MDM. And I think this was clearly spelt out by the CDF [Conference for a Democratic Future]. But the ANC is looking beyond the CDF by bringing in more groups into this umbrella.

Why this strategy of bringing in more groups?

Everybody is speaking about negotiations. I think it is realistic for the ANC to prepare for negotiations, given the international climate, the tendency by the big powers to pressurise parties in a conflict to come together and talk.

Now, for us, in the event of negotiations, our biggest draw card is going to be the unity, the unity of the oppressed, and the unity of the democrats, even beyond the oppressed. In other words, we feel that in this period we are creating and building a new South Africa, even in the process of struggle.

Now we want to take this question of negotiation away from the clever initiatives and manoeuvres of individuals. We want to put it squarely in the hands of the people. The people must know that negotiations is an arena of struggle. They must know that negotiations are not going to be possible through offers from the ruling class. If negotiations do come they must come because you are not sitting there waiting for them. But you are struggling, you are struggling to erode the capacity of the system to continue ruling...the armed struggle has made significant contributions to the present political chemistry in our country.

[THE NEW NATION] Could you explain why? A lot of journalists are discounting that now.

[Hani] I think the present political landscape is as a result of the ANC accepting in its strategies armed struggle as part of those strategies. And I am convinced that we have scored certain successes.

Our armed struggle has been a great mobiliser in terms of the youth. It has given pride to the oppressed that look

"we are no longer turning the other cheek, we have to resist, we have to hit back, even if we are picking up a stone or a molotov cocktail."

And inculcated into the minds of the people, especially the young people, the need to fight back, the need to defend the people, the need if you like, to join the struggle gun in hand. I am not going to plead, I am not going to beg for mercy, I am going to fight back, even if at the moment I just have a...

So thousands of young people were influenced by this example, example of defiance, and readiness to pay the supreme sacrifice.

Secondly, it has brought about insecurity amongst the whites. If armed struggle was ineffective, SA would not have militarised itself in the way it has done. They have had to build bases along the borders, they have had to patrol, they have to pay substantial amounts—billions in fact—for defence. Defending against what if armed struggle has been ineffective? They have had to work out strategies against the neighbouring countries to prevent MK forces from coming in. They have had to create counter-insurgency units, they have had to dehumanise themselves by setting up murder squads, because of that basic fear.

Armed struggle has been responsible for failures of some of the enemies strategies. Armed struggle contributed a lot to the abortive municipal elections...and collaborators in the African townships have been frightened by the very fact that they knew that military action would be taken against them for collaborating. While it is true that political methods are the primary weapon, but in the event of stubbornness, armed struggle had played the role of clearing some of the worst collaborators. It has taught our people that it doesn't pay to collaborate.

[THE NEW NATION] There is a feeling that the potential that MK had in the past no longer exists. So it is important to say what the armed struggle can contribute today, what is its potential?

[Hani] My reply would be that the tendency has been to look on this thing on a comparative basis—the ANC has been able to do ABCD a year ago, two years ago. There is a feeling that the level of MK capacity is going down because it has not risen to expectations. People forget that MK has achieved what it has achieved against the background of considerable difficulties, enjoying in fact no rear base one can speak of, ... having to struggle to infiltrate even three cadres at a time. And MK has been affected by the developments in Southern Africa: the negotiations leading to the independence of Namibia, the abandonment of camps in Angola and the need to establish camps elsewhere. I am not looking for mitigating factors.

But despite all that we are an army which has had a steady growth...at the moment MK has got soldiers, and has got material, and still commands a lot of sympathy and support amongst the oppressed youths in Soweto,

kwa-Mashu, Gugulethu and other places—who sometimes feel let down if MK doesn't intervene.

The problem of MK is also the problem of the slow development of the underground of the ANC, and the movement is painfully aware of these problems. A lot of attention is being paid to the development of that underground.

[THE NEW NATION] Why do you think there has been such difficulty building that underground?

[Hani] I think there has been some slowness in the building of the underground for a number of reasons. I think there was a basic misconception here. Our people tended to feel that their primary role was to work and be active in the MDM. And they felt that the question of the underground and the armed struggle belonged to those guys in exile. I think this was the basic misconception which has got to be corrected. An underground must be built by those people inside the country, who know the conditions, who are aware of the activities of the enemy, including the security organs of the system, who can monitor even the individuals who are involved in that underground, because the underground is always a target of infiltration and surveillance by the enemy. So there is a need for our people to do a rethinking on this question of building the underground, with its combat forces.

And I believe that given these attitudes of our people—that it is the task of the people outside to build the underground—we have achieved a lot. Because we have had to send cadres into the country, in most cases without reception, and these cadres have had to build reception for themselves. And I think the achievements were considerable given those disadvantages.

Our people inside the country in fighting for the task to mobilise thousands into active struggle, neglected a basic area of struggle under conditions of a fascist or police state: the need to have underground structures which are unknown to the enemy. Because I think we revolutionaries must have foresight always to feel, that even at a given time we have some space for mobilisation that it is in the nature of a totalitarian regime to resort to repressive measures, which would require clandestine work. And I think that lesson was not absorbed by us. All the time people kept popping up and being chopped and exposing all the cadres, some of the best cadres in terms of overt work.

[THE NEW NATION] But is there time to correct this?

[Hani] Well, I don't know but I feel strongly that this should be corrected. We shouldn't be caught in the euphoria of the rhetoric, the sweet rhetoric of De Klerk. Because we don't know his agenda (I wish I did). De Klerk is the leader of the NP, an NP committed to the ideology of white domination, and he is not just somebody who has emerged from nowhere.

He has always been a senior member of the NP. Those who have been monitoring his activities in the NP say he

has got a reputation for being a verkrampste. Well, we don't say people don't change. But the point I want to make is that the NP can't preside over serious changes in our country. Certainly, it can't prescribe the genuine changes, the democratic changes because the NP is responding to the pressures of a struggle. It has no strategy of change, serious change, democratic changes. The restructuring and rearranging are being done in order to give it more time to refurbish apartheid.

I think personally the NP is committed to weakening and dividing the national liberation movement. And I think they are still committed to a policy of the stick and the carrot. I think what we have achieved is to deprive the NP of any coherent strategy. Hence the confusion, the groping for answers.

And we must also remember that they have been deprived of coherent answers before because the struggle has actually nullified or neutralised all their strategies. You know, racist domination is at the crossroads.

[THE NEW NATION] But what if they cross over a little bit more in the right direction. What if De Klerk does unban the ANC, releases all political prisoners? Can he not grab the initiative?

[Hani] If De Klerk unbans the ANC, stops all political trials, lets say if for instance he responds positively to our Harare Declaration package in terms of creating the climate, I think unbanning the ANC will cause more troubles for De Klerk in the following way.

He will have unleashed an avalanche in the sense that the ANC will have at its disposal most of its experienced leaders at a number of levels—national, regional—with all the experience they have gained over decades of struggle. And you can't just unban the ANC. You will be expected to do something more. What is the next step. Unban the ANC and so what? The ANC continues with the struggle.

It steps up the mass struggle, works together with the MDM and the trade unions to demand for the transfer of political power, for a democratic South Africa. The unbanning of the ANC does not bring about a democratic South Africa. The regime will have to sit down and give consideration to MK, the military wing of the ANC. Members of MK are members of the ANC. And I am sure that the ANC won't call off the armed struggle because it has been unbanned. MK is not merely there because the ANC is a banned organisation. It is an answer to the violence of the regime.

So I believe that the armed struggle will continue even if the ANC is unbanned. Because the regime will still use violence, the regime will resort to its military and security forces. The regime will still have to answer a state of armed conflict between itself and the ANC. And that the state of conflict won't disappear because the ANC is unbanned, because the ANC is legalised. Do you think overnight now the regime will stop beating up workers, shooting workers, dispersing demonstrations? Will it

stop raiding our homes? Will it stop using its security laws to ban people and to detain people? So the ANC will be placed in a position where it will still be required to answer back to the violence of the regime.

So the unbanning of the ANC opens a Pandora Box for the regime. The regime can't just unban the ANC and mark time and think that is the end.

[THE NEW NATION] But internationally, do you think it could get sanctions lifted by unbanning the ANC and meeting other reform demands?

[Hani] I think there will be pressures to lift sanctions if the ANC is unbanned. I think pro-SA lobbies will work hard in America, Britain and other countries. They'll say: "Look, De Klerk has taken a positive step towards creating a climate for negotiations, why do we punish him further." The ANC faces a challenge in terms of its international work. We say that nothing should be relaxed until there is a democratic transfer in SA. It is going to be an uphill struggle. So we need to work hard to consolidate our support network throughout the world. To ask: why do we leave a task unfinished? Is the struggle not for democracy? Why do you lessen pressures on this fellow? Your pressures have been responsible for releasing Mandela (when he is released), releasing the seven, unbanning the ANC, lifting of the restrictions, and creating a space for political activity. Why don't you push the struggle to the final end—to a democratic SA? I think that should be the approach.

There must be a similar approach to our people at home—to say, you can't stop halfway.

In fact, this is a time for more serious sacrifices. And I believe seriously that we as the ANC should continue all forms of struggle, even when we are unbanned. And of course, we as a leadership will have to pause, to sit down to discuss whether there is no need for mass mobilisation, for mass action at the present time, and a bit of this. We have got to look at the situation.

We must be firm in principle and flexible in tactics.

For instance, one would say—although there is no position on this—why should we attack a man like Holomisa, when Holomisa is actually articulating good positions. Is there a need to conduct military operations in Transkei. We have got to ask ourselves that sort of question. There were good reasons for attacking the Transkei under Matanzima, who was a despot and a leading quisling.

[THE NEW NATION] So you can suspend armed struggle in areas where you have clearly won the ground?

[Hani] When we have won a space for democracy and considerable support in that area and less harassment (probably there will not be no harassment at all—but less harassment). There are certain things we should look into, for instance, where you feel there is growing sympathy from the black police, there would be a need to consider—this has not been discussed in the movement—but we would need to consider, is it correct to

continue harassing black police. I'm not sure, but these are some of the problems that might come up because of the struggle. What are the implications of the emergence of a few Rockmans in our struggle?

A movement is faced with these problems at a particular period. Our leadership is saying, if there is the unbanning of the ANC, that look you guys in the army, let us wait for De Klerk—this is just a hypothetical question—for a month or two and see what is the next step. I am not saying they will do that, but let's remember that MK remains under the political leadership of the ANC. But the point I want to make is that we need to strengthen MK even during that period for instance, where the ANC would say: you guys cool it for two weeks. We would use that period to rebuild ourselves, to have weapons, to stock weapons.

Because you see, De Klerk and the SADF have not yet been transformed into lambs.

[THE NEW NATION] You have mentioned that De Klerk will try to divide the ANC and that you have got to convince people not to stop halfway, particularly cadres who are homesick. This poses a difficult problem to the leadership.

[Hani] It is a time of hardwork on our part. We face the enormous task of educating our cadres politically. We must build our cadres on the question of strategy and tactics. We must convince our cadres through their struggle, through their sacrifice, through their patience, through their remaining in the camps and being loyal, we have achieved certain victories, that they have come a long way, that they need even to train better, that for the emergency of different phases in our struggle we must even prepare some of them for the task of political mobilisation, both overt and covert. We must prepare them for the role of addressing rallies—some of them. Others we must prepare them for the role of the political underground, the role of agitators. Naturally, some of them must be prepared for the role of building units in the country.

We must put before our cadres very frankly the perspectives of a whole range of a struggle under the present conditions in SA. Our cadres must accept that there is a new—I'm not sure how permanent it will be—atmosphere in our country today, a situation which allows for some open political activity. And that should be fully utilised. We must also teach our cadres that there is a need to fight and talk and if talks fail we must go back and fight. I think we must struggle very hard for our comrades not to feel, that sitting down with our enemy is betrayal. That when the enemy asks for negotiations it's because he is feeling the pressures of your struggle—and it is not going to be easy—but I think some of the leaders of the ANC must spend time explaining these tactics to our cadres.

And we must tell our cadres that we must also improve their quality because as far as I'm concerned, having fought for democracy they are going to be the core of a



new South African army, a core of a new SA security force, and that they have got a duty to make our leaders negotiate. I think what faces MK today is to use this space, to make it strong, and to bring about qualitative operations so that when Mandela and Sisulu—and the entire leadership—are given a mandate by the entire membership to go and talk, they must talk from a position of political and military strength. I think that is what faces us.

I am also not worried about us seen not to be operating, if only we are doing the groundwork. It is important to do the groundwork. And sometimes people will have to accept the fact that we might decide to spend some time building ourselves. Our people must accept the situation. They might not get bomb blasts and ambushes because we have got to do the groundwork and build ourselves.

A revolutionary movement is never in a state of waging a permanent offensive. There are periods of an intensive offensive, but there are periods of a lull.

[THE NEW NATION] Was there any decision in the NEC meeting on the return of exiles? The Harare Declaration does not ask for the return as a precondition for creating a climate for negotiations. The return of exiles has been more logically connected to a mutual cessation of violence.

[Hani] We have always felt in the ANC that we shall never make a demand for the return of exiles. Our promise is that when we finally succeed in having the ANC unbanned and legalised, we shall go back to our country and continue our struggle. We don't think it depends on the regime to say come back.

[THE NEW NATION] Would the ANC accept something like one stage further than the Harare Declaration—perhaps talks about talks—prior to the preconditions being implemented?

[Hani] I think there is no avoiding talks about talks. Because before you go to the negotiating table there are certain issues you have got to settle, issues of procedure, issues on how we begin. And I think at the moment when that regime accepts that package of preconditions it is going to be important for the regime to meet the ANC to say that you guys know that we have implemented the climate, how do we go about negotiations?

[THE NEW NATION] But would you demand the whole package being implemented, or a good part of the package being implemented?

[Hani] We demand that whole package. Because that regime has got to demonstrate a lot of goodwill, precisely because our people don't believe that regime in the light of its track record.

**\* Possibility of ANC External Wing Fighting on 34000450A Johannesburg THE STAR in English 6 Feb 90 p 14**

[Article by Craig Kotze: "ANC's External Wing May Fight On"]

[Text] When the dust settles on State President F W de Klerk's historic and generally applauded announcement in Parliament last week, little of practical significance in the war between the security forces and their former enemies may have changed.

The PAC [Pan Africanist Congress] and the ANC [African National Congress] have, at least for the time being, pledged to continue their "armed struggle", while the South African security forces have said they will still combat terrorism and maintain the law as its stands.

In practical terms, this means that any hand grenade attack, AK-47 rifle volley or limpet mine and bomb explosion still fall outside the law and will be countered. Police may still, in terms of the law, take preventive action to stop the commission of what is still seen as a crime—still making armed members of the PAC or ANC "legitimate targets".

Police have already indicated that the problem of maintaining law and order in this regard will be covered by the Terrorism Act, Explosives Act and the Firearms Act. An appeal has been made to members of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the ANC's armed wing, to hand over their arms and explosives.

**Treason**

Significantly, acts of treason—which had led to the banning of the ANC in the first place—will also still be illegal and will directly affect the approach towards the "armed struggle".

Although security sources say the unbanning of the PAC and ANC will affect their approach towards the organisations, they still perceive a threat from them.

"Our emphasis will shift from the political side to Umkhonto we Sizwe. We will now have to be even more alert to prevent its members from entering the country under the auspices of legitimate political activity," said one source.

According to University of Pretoria strategist Professor Mike Hough, the issue will present an important policy challenge to the organisation—the choice between continuing international goodwill and moral authority and the risk of alienating thousands of ANC members and fighters who still believe in the violent overthrow of the South African Government.

Confronted with these choices, the situation could well develop into the ANC maintaining its internal underground network and continuing its attacks while it mobilises openly and legally.



"The unbanning will not be sufficient for the ANC to suspend its armed struggle or to cease it. Much depends on whether they decide to implement the Harare Declaration option. In any case, it will be important to them to maintain the armed wing. Should there be a negotiating deadlock, they will still have it available as an option.

#### Pressures

"A precedent already exists in the form of what happened in Namibia for them to be legal inside the country and still fight from the outside. Much will depend on the Frontline states," Professor Hough said.

The ANC would find itself being pulled apart by opposite pressures in deciding on the issue—that from its own members and that from the international community.

"They will try to avoid a repetition of all the attacks on soft targets in recent years—certainly the United States will take a dim view of this. The latest attacks have not enjoyed much publicity anyway.

"But the ANC cannot afford to cease the armed struggle—that could precipitate friction which is already said to exist within the organisation.

"The ideal situation for them would be one in which the armed struggle continued, they operated legally within South Africa and sanctions were still in place. That way they would have the best of both worlds," said Professor Hough.

#### \* ANC Reaffirms Commitment to Religion

3400448C Johannesburg THE NEW NATION  
in English 9-15 Feb 90 p 20

[Text] Despite adherence by millions to different religions, the commitment to uphold the equality of people and human dignity underpins the role of these religions in the establishment of a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa.

Established in 1987 the inter-Faith department of the African National Congress (ANC) crystallised this common commitment among the several religions striving for this common goal in South Africa.

This commitment to a common goal undermines the attempts, by some theologians, to encourage divisions among the religious people, under the guise of avoiding domination by other religions, in the process of working for a society free from racism, oppression and exploitation.

In a paper titled: "An Inter-Faith Perspective" presented during a conference held at Arusha, Tanzania, in 1987 under the theme "The World United Against Apartheid For Democratic South Africa" the ANC emphasised that different religions subscribes to "a strong feeling of community and a sense of justice."

The liberation movement acknowledged the important role played by these religious groupings in the struggle for justice in South Africa. These included Hindus, Muslims, Jews, Parsees and Christians.

"All these groups, without exception, have a strong bearing on the liberation struggle."

The ANC attributed this to their opposition to the apartheid system which "does not accord every person true worth and value."

"Sharing with Jews and Christians the belief that human beings are made in the image of God and share a common human lineage, Islam believes in the strictest equality of all people and fundamentally opposes all forms of racism and racial discrimination."

The movement traced the origin of crisis, which contradicts the conviction of these groupings, to colonialism emanating from the economic and social forces prevailing in the Western world.

This was taken a step further when the apartheid government used Christianity to "provide a perverted understanding and expression of religious truth to justify apartheid, and help lay the foundation for the brutal and merciless oppression and exploitation of the black majority."

On the international front the importance of the relationship between the churches and the liberation movements was also highlighted twenty years ago when the "Programme To Combat Racism" under the auspices of the World Council of Churches (WCC) decided to give financial support to these organisations.

Within South Africa the church's reaction to apartheid brutality, highlighted in the Sharpeville massacre of 1960, prompted the formation of the Christian Institute, meanwhile the University Christian Movement was instrumental in the formation of the SA [South African] Students Organisation (Saso), according to the ANC.

The ANC's commitment to maintain its relationship with religion has always been affirmed by the past and present leadership.

"Ours is a national movement which contains within it different philosophical and religious tendencies, but all of which adhere to a common resolve to bring about a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa on the basis of the Freedom Charter," ANC president Oliver Tambo explained.

The movement has had meetings with the national and international leadership of various denominations. These meetings included a meeting between Pope John Paul II and Oliver Tambo.

Tambo met the pope on March 2, 1982.

Some of the most important meetings between the churches and the ANC were held in Lusaka, Zambia, where the ANC had its headquarters.

One of them was the historic "Lusaka Consultation" attended by international delegations and was initiated by the WCC in May 1987.

Summing up the significance of the contact the Methodist Church in United Kingdom leader Rev Dr Albert Mosely said it "marked the beginning of a new phase in the relationship between the Churches of the world and the liberation movements."

"It exploded the myths about the liberation movements put out by the South African government and circulated by the international press. Church representatives discovered that the leaders of these movements are men and women who are deeply committed to changing the situation in as peaceful a way as possible," Mosley added.

#### \* ANC-COSATU Alliance Seen as Possibility

34000455A Durban THE DAILY NEWS in English  
13 Feb 90 p 10

[Article by Drew Forrest: Major shifts and realignments can be expected in South Africa's labor movement following the lifting of bans on the African National Congress and South African Communist Party]

[Text] President de Klerk's watershed February 2 announcement will lead to intensified political pressures on the black trade union movement and an ANC-Cosatu [African National Congress-Congress of South African Trade Unions] alliance is a distinct prospect, believes labor analyst and Wits University sociologist Professor Duncan Innes.

Unionists suspicious of the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP) can be expected to seek independent political bases, perhaps through the creation of a Labor Party, he adds.

"Some say the unbanning of the ANC will enable Cosatu to redirect its attention to the shop-floor—I don't agree," said Professor Innes, editor of the Innes Labor Brief.

"Returning political organizations have no formal structures here. They know they have black union backing and will try to mobilize them to support their aims."

Labor sources say Government moves have thrust two issues to center stage: the future of the ANC's labor wing, the 40-year-old SA [South African] Congress of Trade Unions (Sactu), and the role of the SACP.

Although ever banned, Sactu was forced into exile when its leaders, mostly ANC members, were jailed, banished or died in detention in the 60s.

It is known to have told activists to organize workers into Cosatu, and now enjoys largely symbolic support—notably among Cosatu's "populists". With Cosatu it

shares the principles of non-racialism, political unionism and shop-floor mobilization.

Sactu president Mr Stephen Dlamini said this week from Lusaka he expected Sactu and Cosatu to merge, but clearly viewed his organization as the senior partner. Any amalgamation would have to bear Sactu's name, he said.

Some local unionists fear a repeat of recent developments in Namibia, where former exile John ya Otto, installed as general secretary of National Union of Namibian Workers at a controversial AGM last year, has enforced policy favoring Swapo over the labor movement.

Sactu's role has been intensely debated within the MDM [Mass Democratic Movement], unionists say. One argument, that the movement could be useful on the international front, had been weakened by the discrediting of its Eastern European government contacts.

Within Cosatu, the majority view was that it had no further role and should disband, with Sactu members being absorbed into local unions, the sources said.

What of the SACP, unbanned after 40 years? "Many unionists who look to a socialist future see the need for a strong SACP to promote workers' interests" was one union man's comment.

"They see it being independent of, but not a counter to the ANC—their alliance is pretty solid."

Professor Innes believes that despite the SACP's recent enforcement of democratic freedoms, including full trade union rights, elements within the union movement will remain hostile to it.

The party's critics include those fearful of inroads into union independence and ultra-leftists scornful of its apparent retreat from revolution.

These were likely to seek independent political homes, either by creating a Labor Party or through alliances further to the left, Professor Innes said.

"Some people would like to set up a 'workerist' party," he said. "At least two international revolutionary organizations are active in trying to take over the ground vacated by the SACP."

#### \* Rift Between PAC, ANC Reportedly Widening

34000450B Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English  
5 Feb 90 p 4

[Text] Harare.—The split between rival South African Black nationalist movements in exile appears to be widening as they prepare to respond to President F W de Klerk's call to join him at the negotiating table.

Despite urgent pleas for unity from senior Black African leaders such as President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia,

the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) are still slinging mud at each other.

The ANC, the senior of the two movements battling to end South Africa's apartheid race laws, is based in Lusaka and the PAC, a splinter group formed in the late 1950s, has its headquarters in Dar es Salaam.

Both were legalised by Mr De Klerk on Friday after 30 years underground and in exile.

In the most far-reaching address by a South African President since the National Party came to power in 1948, Mr De Klerk announced that ANC leader, Nelson Mandela, would be released from jail soon and declared that "the time for negotiation has arrived".

The latest round of invective between the ANC and PAC was sparked by an attack on the hardline PAC late last month by Mr Thabo Mbeki, the ANC's chief Foreign Affairs spokesman.

He told a university audience in Dar es Salaam that the PAC was "a diversion from the main course of the struggle" and had allowed itself to be manipulated by hostile forces. "Pretoria bombs us, it raids us in neighbouring countries, it hangs our members. The PAC has never been attacked, where are its members?" Mr Mbeki asked.

The PAC hit back through its executive secretary Mr Joe Mkwana, who accused Mr Mbeki in a letter released in Harare on Friday of making his attack "at the most inopportune time".

He said the PAC had led the way in the armed struggle against apartheid and rejected Mr Mbeki's charge that it was controlled by hostile forces. He also accused the ANC of being repeatedly infiltrated by South African security agents.

Name-calling between the two movements reflects long-standing ideological differences dating back to the mid-1950s, when the ANC adopted its landmark freedom charter of guiding principles.

PAC founder Mr Robert Sobukwe and his allies objected to the ANC's inclusion of Whites and Asians in what had once been an all-Black organisation, and challenged the non-racial basis of the Freedom Charter.

"We stand for a government of the Africans for the Africans by the Africans," Mr Sobukwe said. The PAC also objected to the rising influence of communists and leftwingers in the ANC.

The PAC movement now says it too is non-racial, and its Foreign Affairs spokesman, Mr Gora Ebrahim is of Asian origin. However, PAC supporters still chant the chilling anti-White slogan "one settler, one bullet" at rallies.

For years both movements have been recognised by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the non-aligned movement, though the larger ANC has always had pride of place.

Some influential African parties such as Zimbabwe's Zanu (PF) [Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front], which also began as a breakaway faction, have always kept the door open for the PAC, partly for sentimental reasons.

The split between ANC and PAC appears to have deepened since last August, when the ANC won a major diplomatic victory over its rival.

The ANC's Mr Mbeki persuaded the OAU to endorse the "Harare Declaration" which set out an ANC-inspired blueprint for a negotiated settlement in South Africa.

Now the PAC accuses the ANC of selling out to Pretoria by its readiness to talk.

"Some leaders of the ANC are tired of the armed struggle. They have become traitors selling out on the revolution," PAC information director Mr Walter Toboti said in Dar es Salaam on Friday.

The PAC says it will only negotiate once the South African Government has been militarily defeated—a position likely to leave it on the sidelines if talks start with the ANC and other more moderate groups taking part.

There have been some verbal hints that the PAC may soften its stand in response to the fast-moving situation inside South Africa, but no firm sign of a new policy.

The ANC view is that the PAC is too insignificant inside the country to be taken seriously.

"How do you unite with people who are struggling on radios and newspapers in foreign capitals and yet command no forces on the ground?" Mr Joe Modise, the ANC's military commander, said in a recent interview. Now both are legal, the real strength of the rival movements is likely to be tested.—Sapa-Reuter.

#### **\* Future Role of United Democratic Front Explored**

34000454B Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL  
in English 9 Feb 90 pp 45-46

[Text] Will the United Democratic Front (UDF) disband and fall in with the ANC [African National Congress], now that it's legal? After all, the UDF has always proclaimed allegiance to the Freedom Charter and hailed Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo as "our leaders." It has maintained the distinction between it and the previously banned organisation—mainly to evade prosecution.

UDF national treasurer Azhar Cachalia says: "The matter must obviously be discussed, but disbanding won't be automatic." There seems no reason for disbanding UDF affiliates such as civic organisations, housing action committees and so on. But the issues are somewhat different when it comes to the Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC) and its Natal counterpart.

Cachalia argues that UDF activity, since its formation in 1983, "resulted in a quantitative and qualitative leap forward in the struggle which brought government closer to unbanning the ANC." The way in which the ANC, UDF and Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions] operate at this stage, he added, is through "consultation on major issues... When the ANC is back, debate will centre on what role the party will play." There is, however, "no question" of the UDF seeking a place for itself at the negotiating table, if and when it comes to that.

At an executive committee meeting on Monday night, the TIC resolved to continue until there was "clarity" on aspects of President De Klerk's dramatic announcements on February 2.

For example, says TIC president Cassim Saloojee, there's still the question of whether normal political functioning is possible while the emergency remains. This meant that the ANC was "quite rightly" being cautious about returning. According to Saloojee, one cannot ignore the fact that the emergency and the SA [South African] Defence Force are being used against current protests relating to the education crisis.

Clarity is also needed on the question of which exiles can return without the threat of prosecution. Therefore, says Saloojee, "there is no question, at this stage, of us disbanding, even though we are applying our minds to the matter." A meeting with the ANC is "due" at which the question will be discussed; it will also have to be subject to "deep discussion with the TIC's constituency."

While admitting the importance of the unbannings, Saloojee says there are still "serious misgivings about government's intentions." De Klerk has "restored the situation pre-1960, when the ANC and SA Communist Party operated legally; he has not taken us to the promised land."

For the moment, therefore, it seems the message from the ANC to internal organisations is: be cautious and carry on with your work.

#### **\* Black Consciousness Movement's Political Program**

34000449B Johannesburg SOWETAN in English  
9 Feb 90 pp 8, 10

[Text] We, the people of Azania, engaged in the struggle for the reconquest of our land, under the guidance and leadership of the Black Consciousness Movement of

Azania, basing ourselves on the spirit of "Towards A Free Azania—Projection: Future State" adopted at the 1975 Congress of the Black People's Convention at King Williams Town, hereby commit ourselves to:

#### **Establish a Democratic State in Azania**

(a) Destroy the racist settler-colonial state and build a democratic state where colour, race, religion, sex or tribe shall not be a point of reference.

(b) Abolish the constitution of South Africa, the Bantustan system and all other racist institutions and draw a constitution according universal adult suffrage to all Azanians in a unitary state.

(c) Strive for the broadest unity of the Azanian people at all levels.

(d) Guarantee freedom of association, movement and assembly and the concomitant right to free expression and to worship or not to, provided such right is not exercised to promote racism, fascism, sexism, tribalism, discrimination or any formation that is inimical to social justice, stability and progress of the Azanian people.

#### **Introduce a Just Legal System**

(a) Guarantee equality before the law for all citizens regardless of colour, race, sex or social standing.

(b) Ensure fair trial and access to legal defence for all citizens by setting up legal advice bureaux with qualified lawyers to interpret all legal matters to every citizen requesting it and if necessary, represent such citizen in legal proceedings.

(c) Release all political prisoners and rehabilitate all criminals.

(d) Repeal all discriminatory laws and dismiss all racist judges, magistrates and warders.

#### **Build a Strong, Socialist, Self-Reliant Economy**

(a) Let the ownership of the land, sea and air space be vested in the state.

(b) Distribute the land to organised groups for farming, commercial, housing, sporting or any other purposes in accordance with a Central National Plan.

(c) Strive for the introduction of co-operative farms on existing farmlands and assist these with farming equipment and methods.

(d) Organise villages into co-operative farming units and provide these with modern farming methods, machinery, agricultural advisors, veterinary services, dams, fertilisers, seeds, marketing services, etc. for purposes of improving living standards in the countryside and bridging the gap between the urban and rural areas.

(e) Establish agricultural produce factories in the farming areas.



(f) Nationalise all heavy industry, major commercial undertakings, multinational monopolies and syndicates.

(g) Expand heavy industry in order to benefit all other sectors of the economy and to combat industrial dependence.

(h) Nationalise all banks and insurance companies in order to streamline and regulate economic activity, growth and development.

(i) Assert complete state control of foreign trade, diversify the economy and strive for self-reliance in economic development programmes.

(j) Improve land, sea and air communication throughout the country in order to advance the nation's trade.

(k) Control the prices of all domestic products and limit the import of luxury goods.

(l) Put under state control all mining and fishing industries.

(m) Trade with all friendly countries irrespective of their political systems.

(n) Put all energy-producing undertakings and related industries under the control of the state.

#### **Ensure Security and Peace of the Nation**

(a) Wage a war of national liberation against the settler-colonial regime and create conditions of peace and security.

(b) Dismantle the racist and oppressive army and police forces and replace them with the politicised people's armed forces and police to protect the people's power, national independence and territorial integrity.

(c) Remove all foreign bases and installations on Azanian soil and abrogate all existing military treaties with foreign powers.

#### **Safeguard Social Rights**

(a) Rigorously combat unemployment and uphold the right and duty of all citizens to work.

(b) Institute a 40-hour working week and guarantee an uninterrupted rest period of at least 36 hours for every worker.

(c) Establish a national minimum wage, establish machinery to monitor and ensure an equitable wage structure and guarantee equal pay for equal work irrespective of race or sex.

(d) Guarantee paid annual leave, maternity leave and sick leave for all workers.

(e) Arrange suitable working hours for all working mothers with small children.

(f) Establish a state-controlled insurance scheme to cater for the unemployed, workers who are sick, retired or injured at work.

(g) Guarantee the right and encourage all workers to organise themselves into trade unions.

(h) Ban child and migratory labour and ensure all workers the right to be decently housed with their families.

(i) Guarantee the right of workers to participate in the management of enterprises.

(j) Guarantee all workers, including civil servants, the right to participate in political activities.

#### **Develop Culture, Education and Technology**

(a) Abolish all institutions and practices which promote racist and settler-colonialist culture.

(b) Open all educational, cultural or sporting institutions to all people irrespective of race.

(c) Introduce free compulsory universal education for all children up to and including secondary school and build adequate schools throughout the country.

(d) Tailor educational curricula to serve the cultural, intellectual, social and industrial needs of the people.

(e) Lay special emphasis on vocational, technical, scientific and technological education.

(f) Implement scholarship and bursary schemes to assist students through colleges and university education.

(g) Build adult educational centres throughout the country and eliminate illiteracy.

(h) Build and expand creches and day-care centres throughout the country to alleviate the burden of working parents.

#### **Adequately Provide for the Health and Welfare of All**

(a) Put all hospitals, clinics, pharmaceutical enterprises and trade in drugs under state ownership.

(b) Build health centres in all localities and improve health services, especially in the rural areas.

(c) Put emphasis on preventive medicine and cultivation of healthy living habits.

(d) Encourage research in traditional medicine and herbs and integrate these into the national health system.

(e) All medical and para-medical personnel shall be state servants.

(f) Provide all medical services free of charge.

(g) Implement a comprehensive social service scheme to adequately cater for the aged, disabled, sick and others requiring care.

(h) Let all employed people contribute to the national welfare scheme.

(i) Rehabilitate all drug addicts and alcoholics.

#### **Provide Adequate Housing**

(a) Open all residential areas to all without regard to race, language, colour or religion.

(b) Build decent and adequate family houses for all in both rural and urban areas.

(c) Charge reasonable rates and rents.

(d) Improve roads to cater for all residential areas and rehabilitate the environment.

#### **Follow a Foreign Policy That Respects National Independence and International Friendship**

(a) Establish diplomatic relations with all friendly countries irrespective of their political systems on the basis of mutual respect and non-interference in the internal affairs of each other.

(b) Recognise the equality of all nations, big or small.

(c) Recognise the right of all nations to self-determination and in this respect, co-operate with all progressive countries, organisations and international agencies to advance the cause of freedom and independence for all the oppressed of the world.

(d) Strive for the unity and advancement of the African people throughout the continent.

(e) Co-operate with all countries and organisations fighting against racism, Zionism, colonialism, imperialism, super-power domination and interference.

We shall ceaselessly and resolutely struggle by all means necessary for the attainment of the objectives contained in this programme.

#### **\* AZAPO Delegation Visits Libya, Seeks Support**

34000459C Johannesburg SOWETAN in English  
20 Feb 90 p 2

[Text] A delegation from Azapo [Azanian People's Organization], including its president, Nkosi Molala, and deputy president, Lybon Mabaso, is currently meeting senior officials of the Libyan Government, the organisation's publicity secretary, Mr Muntu Myeza, told Sapa yesterday.

"The delegation, which left at the weekend, is discussing the latest developments in South Africa and is also seeking further support from Libya for the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa."

#### **\* Inkatha Reportedly Spreads Violence to Transvaal**

34000451B Johannesburg THE NEW NATION  
in English 2-8 Feb 90 p 17

[Text] Attacks on Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions] members on the East Rand must not be seen in isolation but against the background of a clear strategy on the part of Inkatha's United Workers Union of SA (Uwusa) to build a presence in the Transvaal.

Although this strategy began to emerge soon after Cosatu's inauguration in November 1985, it has found its clearest expression in the killings at Haggie Rand in Germiston. This is according to National Union of Metalworkers of SA (Numsa) regional secretary, Rolly Xipu.

Some of the first attacks by Uwusa members were recorded in the Springs area where a leading member of the Food and Allied Workers Union employed at Jabula Foods, was attacked and killed.

A Numsa member was also shot dead at Steel Pipe near Elandsfontein. Recently there have also been reports that Inkatha has held meetings in hostels in the Benoni and Boksburg areas where Zulu speaking workers have been ordered to resign from Cosatu unions. Workers have also been told not to kill Zulu speaking colleagues in the event of clashes in factories.

Since the attack on Jabula workers, Numsa organisers, shop stewards and the union's general membership have been threatened, attacked and killed.

Organisers from the Benoni local have been warned off factories in the area, potentially one of Numsa's strongest regions.

And there are fears that if left unchecked, the conflict could spiral out of control.

According to Xipu, the pattern of Uwusa attacks and threats suggests that Numsa has been singled out for action in the East Rand.

The recent wave of attacks against Numsa members at Haggie Rand in Germiston started in September last year.

One of the Cosatu union's most active members at the factory, Msimbu Ntenga, was shot and killed after Uwusa supporters were allowed off from work earlier than normal. They requested that they be allowed off ostensibly because of fears that they may be attacked.

The same workers failed to report for duty on September 12 as well and attacked three other Numsa members. All suffered bullet wounds. According to Xipu, the assailants were identified and arrested. Each was fined R250 for attempted murder.

Another two Numsa members were shot dead on October 13 and December 3 respectively.

And on January 8, a fourth Numsa member was killed. Altogether 10 members have either been injured or killed since September last year.

This has forced some Numsa members to leave the Germiston factory in fear of their lives.

According to Xipu, the killings started after Numsa members embarked on an overtime ban in protest against an "unfair" grading system and following the worker summit decision.

Uwusa members refused to join the overtime ban and posted notices on company boards criticising the decision.

The Haggie Rand killings have raised concern within Numsa. Xipu says the union has even gone as far as initiating contact with Uwusa to set up meetings where the violence could be addressed. But several attempts to contact Uwusa at its regional offices in Germiston have been unsuccessful.

Initial attempts to get management to address the conflict were unsuccessful. According to Xipu, management's response was that the conflict was not an internal matter and therefore did not need its intervention.

Management also cancelled a meeting with Numsa after refusing to allow shop stewards from Haggie Rand's Jupiter factory near Johannesburg to attend. This, together with a number of other incidents, has led to allegations that the Germiston management sought to strengthen Uwusa's position on the factory floor.

Management threatened to withdraw its participation in meetings to resolve the conflict citing these allegations as one of its reasons.

At last week's meeting, the union raised a number of questions, among them:

- Why had the workers, convicted for attempted murder, not been acted against?
- Why has management not implemented adequate security measures at the company following an attack on a Numsa member at the factory gates? This is after management was informed that guns were being kept in lockers inside the factory.

Workers also pointed to a contradiction in management's position on the conflict. They cite the case where Numsa members, who had left Haggie Rand because of the violence were visited by men posing as insurance agents.

According to Xipu, these "insurance agents" were in possession of identity cards used by the workers who had resigned.

These cards could only have been made available by Haggie management, Xipu explained.

He pointed out that when questioned about the "insurance agents," management indicated that it had ordered an investigation into the violence. This, said Xipu, contradicted earlier claims made by management that the conflict was an external matter and it therefore did not wish to get involved.

In an attempt to resolve the conflict, Xipu has invited Uwusa to inform Numsa if it had any information linking any of its (Numsa) members to instances of violence.

In the meantime, Haggie Rand is said to be processing stop orders for Uwusa. According to Numsa, the company would not say what Uwusa's strength is at the factory. But union information indicates that there are no more than 20 to 40 supporters of the Inkatha union.

Steel Pipe near Elandsfontein, where Numsa is organised, is also said to be processing Uwusa stop orders.

Numsa has in the meantime indicated that it remained open to talks on the dispute at Haggie Rand's Jupiter plant where 331 strikers were dismissed last year.

#### \* KwaZulu Training Arm Creates Businesses

34000447C Johannesburg THE STAR in English  
2 Feb 90 p 13

[Article by Jabulani Sikhakhane]

[Text] The KwaZulu Training Trust (KTT), the training arm of the KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation, helped create an average of three new small businesses every working day in the financial year to last November.

Chairman Dr Oscar Dlomo says in his annual review that KTT trained 3,094 people—790 fewer than the previous year. He says this reflects KTT's commitment to quality training. The investment in each person trained rose from R998 to R2,234.

Research shows that out of every 10 unemployed people trained by KTT, two established their own business, with another four getting jobs as wage-earners.

Of every 10 employed people trained, six opt for self-employment.

He says that a further 515 people who were unemployed found jobs in the formal economy after receiving training from KTT, while 959 existing entrepreneurs received training and advice in running their business operations.

Dr Dlomo says KTT has embarked on a campaign to generate income in every one of its strategic business units and that the results are encouraging. In the year under review KTT increased its income by 46.2 percent.

Income from course fees rose 80.9 percent, whereas funding from the Training Trust Education Fund increased by 79.9 percent to R5.1 million.

KTT has set itself a target of training 25,000 people by the end of 1993.

Of these, 6,000 are expected to be successfully integrated into the economy as entrepreneurs, farmers and technicians.

#### \* Thousands Challenge Sebe's Rule in Ciskei

34000448B Johannesburg THE STAR in English  
13 Feb 90 p 13

[Article by Dominic Jones; "Crisis as Thousands Challenge Sebe's Rule"]

[Text] Ciskei is facing its worst crisis yet as thousands of unhappy citizens take a stand against President Lennox Sebe's rigid rule.

From the coast to the far northern reaches of the homeland, bitter residents are renouncing their Ciskeian citizenship, saying they want to return to the South African fold.

In response, Ciskei police have unleashed the full might of their armoury on the rebellious communities.

Nearly 200 people have been arrested and scores have been assaulted. Homes have been destroyed and property damaged. Helicopters and armoured vehicles were used in a raid on a peaceful meeting and on a village where the homes of a headman and chief were torched.

A meeting last Sunday of 100 Chalumna residents to discuss vandalism at a school ended violently in a police attack.

"They sjambokked us, shot teargas at us and dragged many people to the vans. Fifty-two were detained, including schoolchildren and pensioners," said a community representative.

A young woman wept as she told how police stormed into her home and dragged her husband away.

"He asked them for their papers, then they kicked him and beat him with a baton. I ran after them but one of them punched me in the stomach and I fell."

#### Emergency

Over half the homeland's population is now under a state of emergency, understood to have been imposed on February 2, just minutes after President de Klerk announced the unbanning of the ANC [African National Congress] and other political organisations.

The urban centres of Mdantsane and Zwelitsha are the main targets of the regulations.

Ciskei's Deputy Director-general of Foreign Affairs and Information, Mr Headman Somtunzi, denied that the emergency was called after Mr de Klerk's speech or that it was designed to suppress ANC-aligned groups and trade unions organising in the two townships.

Mr Somtunzi confirmed the emergency only after press inquiries last Friday afternoon. They followed a tip-off that President Sebe had been so stunned by the unbannings that he called a state of emergency, fearing an uprising.

The drama now unfolding follows on the heels of President Sebe's recent refusal to enter into debate on relinquishing Ciskei's sovereignty.

But the rebel yells of his subjects grew louder each day, with the unbanning of popular political organisations only fuelling their optimism.

"The ANC must open a branch here and we will all join," said an enthusiastic young activist.

He is one of an estimated 40 000 Chalumna residents who returned their Ciskei National Independence Party membership cards to the government last month.

Refusing to carry the cards is an open rejection of Ciskeian rule because, without them, residents cannot pay taxes and lose all claim to basic social services.

Ironically, it is these services, or lack of them, that are at the heart of the dissension.

People living in Chalumna's sprawling 21 villages say they must suffer lower pensions, overcrowded and understaffed clinics, too few schools, unhygienic water supplies and a long list of broken government promises they say makes South Africa a paradise.

A barefoot Chalumna pensioner, drawing long on a hand-made Xhosa pipe, spits venom at Ciskei's tax system: "South Africa doesn't tax the women, the pensioners and the unemployed, but here in Ciskei even paraplegics are taxed."

#### Fears

These sentiments are rapidly becoming echoed across the homeland, from coastal Chalumna through trouble-torn Balasi and rumbling Keiskammahoe to the arid dust-bowl of tragic Thornhill.

"The government is trying to address these problems but it is going to take some time," said Mr Somtunzi.

There are grave fears that President Sebe will try to cure his homeland's headache by attempting a similar move to that against the people of Nkqonkwini in October last year.

Ciskei troops stormed the defiant villagers, bulldozing homes, arresting and allegedly assaulting scores of men, women and children and forcing the villagers to seek refuge in church halls in King William's Town.

In a tersely worded statement, Black Sash field worker Larry Field challenged the president "to prove his right to rule".



"If President Sebe is so convinced of his popularity he should call an independently controlled referendum on the subject of independence."

Replying, Mr Somtunzi said a referendum now would be a "backward step" for Ciskei.

**\* Statistics Show Steady Immigration Increase**

34000451C Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English  
7 Feb 90 p 11

[Text] There has been a progressive and steady increase in the number of immigrants to South Africa, the Central Statistical Services (CSS) said in Pretoria yesterday.

The CSS said that from January to October 1989, 9,232 people immigrated to South Africa compared with 3,991 emigrating—a gain of 5,241 people.

In 1988 there had been 10,400 immigrants, while 7,767 people left South Africa. This indicated a gain of 2,633 people. However, in 1986, 1987, there had been a loss of 6,717 and 3,221 people respectively.

The spokesman said these statistics spoke for themselves.

"There has been a 70 percent increase in the number of immigrants coming into South Africa from the years 1986 to 1989," the chairman of Elliot International (Removals), Mr Tom Ansley said yesterday.

Mr Ansley said that according to statistics, worked out by his company, there has been a decrease of 60 percent in the number of emigrants, leaving in the same years.

"We have seen a substantial decrease going back to 1986 when there were more people leaving than entering the country," Mr Ansley said.

"In fact there has been a remarkable reversal. Each year there has been a progressive increase in the number of immigrants and a decrease in the number of emigrants."

Mr Ansley said there was no doubt that recent political developments had contributed to this phenomenon.

"In fact we will have to revise our predictions for 1990 in light of the announcements by the State President, Mr F. W. de Klerk on Friday. We will probably have an even bigger increase in people coming in and a bigger decrease in those leaving," he said.

Mr Ansley's predictions for 1990 were a 50-percent increase of immigrants and a 20-percent decrease in emigrants. He expects these figures to be even greater now.

The director of Stuttafords international operations, Mr David Bradford agreed that there had been a "steady and increasing flow" of immigrants which was "confidence building."

Stuttafords is part of the Laser group which also controls Pickfords, Frasers and Van Nimwegan international removals.

Mr Bradford said there had been an assortment of people coming to the country—ex-South Africans, technical people who had been recruited from Europe and professional people.

He said often South Africans who had "moved in haste, repented at leisure."

He said they found it hard to adjust in the new countries, such as Australia and Europe. The majority of immigrants were from the United Kingdom and Europe but that now there were a lot of people from the "iron curtain" coming to South Africa.

"There are a variety of technical people, artisans, professional and business people and also some who actually come to retire here," he said.

**\* Defense Cuts Could Mean Trouble for De Klerk**

34010071D Pretoria PATRIOT in Afrikaans  
19 Jan 90 p 5

[Text] Unrest is on the rise in South Africa's security forces since the government announced that the planned new Defense Headquarters in Pretoria, at a price of 250 million rands, has been shelved.

That announcement was the latest in a series of blows suffered by the security forces since Mr F.W. de Klerk became state president last year. The plan to not continue with construction of the Defense Headquarters was made after millions have already been spent on preparatory work. Now no one knows who will pay for it.

The Defense Headquarters has fallen victim to the government's plan to cut 2.5 billion rands from its defense budget.

According to unconfirmed reports, dozens of senior Defense Force officers are also retiring early as part of the program of cutbacks.

Political observers note that Mr De Klerk apparently singled out the Defense Force for the primary cuts. In the meantime, budgeting for education and social services for nonwhites is continuing uninterrupted, and will probably have to be increased in order to meet growing needs.

The news about the Defense Headquarters is in keeping with earlier steps by Mr De Klerk when he reduced the power of the State Security Council and announced that he is abolishing the National Joint Administration system. The latter was primarily responsible for combating unrest in the black and colored residential areas.

In the meantime, there is still bitterness among the police concerning the government's refusal to allow the former counterinsurgency unit, Koevoet, in South Africa. After that unit was initially promised that it

would be headquartered in South Africa if SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] came to power in South-West Africa, it was decided by the "highest authority" that the unit would have to stay in South-West Africa. The members of the unit, mostly Wambos, fear that they could be killed by SWAPO after independence.

According to the *Witdhoeck* newspaper *DIE REPUBLIKEIN*, the former commander of the unit, Maj Gen Hans Dreyer, recently visited the northern area of South-West Africa in order to try to calm down dissatisfied members of Koevoet.

The Koevoet issue adds to the frustration already being felt for some time by policemen concerning the government's handling of the unrest situation and demonstrations by front organizations of the ANC [African National Congress]. Policemen are still dissatisfied because in their view they are not permitted to act while the government is allowing national laws to be violated.

In political circles, it is pointed out that the security forces have enjoyed a particularly intimate relationship with the government for more than two decades. The police had especially close ties with Mr John Vorster during his years as prime minister, while the Defense Force was in a position of trust towards Mr P.W. Botha.

That long relationship was broken off with the accession of Mr F.W. de Klerk to the presidency. Observers expect even more bitterness and frustration among members of South Africa's armed forces in the months ahead.

#### \* ARMSCOR Strategy Following Defense Cuts

34000453C Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL  
in English 9 Feb 90 p 87

[Text] Independence for Namibia. Peace talks in Angola and Mozambique. It's great news for regional stability but not for SA [South Africa]'s armaments industry.

And the local industry is not suffering alone. Defence contractors and arms manufacturers in the US and Europe have been hard hit by the global easing of tensions in the past year. In SA, the R10bn-a-year electronics industry, in particular, is facing a tough adjustment after the sweeping cuts announced last month by the SA Defence Force (SADF).

Though the cuts are unlikely to stem the growth in SA's electronics industry, there is little doubt there will be a major shift in business from military applications to the commercial sector and a greater emphasis on exports.

State-owned Armscor [Armaments Corporation of South Africa], the procurement agency for the SADF as well as the holding company for about 20 subsidiaries, has begun rationalising its operations substantially. The company's 26 000 employees will be cut by 10% this year.

The strategy of the trimmed-down Armscor over the next five years, according to human resources director Peet van den Heever, will be to maintain the viability of the SA armaments industry and remain technologically innovative in selected niche markets. Thus electronics technology, which is an increasingly important component of defence systems, could escape the most severe cutbacks.

Armscor is estimated to have spent more than R500m on defence electronics systems last year. This does not include electronics "embedded" in high-technology equipment such as aircraft, artillery and specialised vehicles. Several Armscor subsidiaries, including Kentron, Atlas Aircraft Corp and Eloptro, are involved in the development and manufacture of electronics equipment.

"Armscor intends looking after its existing clients, particularly the SADF, but will diversify its products and market base," Van den Heever says. He adds that replacing imports and boosting exports in collaboration with private industry are a priority.

However, contractors in the private sector still fill the bulk of Armscor's electronics needs. Grinaker Electronics, Altech and Barlow Rand's Reutech are among Armscor's largest electronics contractors. These companies, as well as many smaller electronics suppliers, are expected to increase efforts to diversify their business away from defence contracts.

Anglovaal's Grinaker Electronics has already diversified into underground communications for mines and electronics systems for toll roads and other applications. It also has increased exports substantially. MD Sybrand Grobbelaar says that even though the company's Armscor business has grown in the last few years, it had declined as a percentage of total turnover. He does not expect the defence cuts to reduce profits, adding that the Armscor contracts have helped raise the quality of design and reliability of its products—all of which is ensuring strong sales in the domestic commercial and export markets.

The full extent of the defence cuts will not be known until the Defence budget is tabled in parliament on March 14. But government is understood to be considering a 20% cut in defence spending, from about R10bn last year to R8bn. The SADF has already cancelled 11 weapon and equipment projects and a further 49 are expected to be scaled back or suspended. The SADF is by far Armscor's largest customer and provided the group with revenue of more than R2bn last year. Other buyers include the SA Police, the prison Service and, to a much lesser degree, the private sector.

In the last 10 years Armscor has become one of SA's largest exporters of manufactured goods. Market research firm Business & Marketing Intelligence estimates that Armscor's exports of military electronics equipment generated about R150m last year. But Armscor's Van den Heever points out that exports are a small part of the group's revenue. He acknowledges that

growth in this area will not be easy. "There is a worldwide downturn in the military market. Many countries are experiencing defence cuts and are trying to sell products all over the world. It's very competitive."

**\* Gold Use Expands in Strategic Applications**

34010071E Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans  
17 Jan 90 p S1

[Text] New uses for gold are continually emerging.

In its latest Metal Bulletin, the Mineral Bureau reports that the Japanese Mitsubishi Metal Corporation is now producing the metal in leaf form to serve as a background and frame for pictures.

At its gold gallery, Mitsubishi sells Italian Renaissance pictures in three sizes, containing one kilogram, 500 grams, and 100 grams of gold.

The smallest is postcard-size, and sells for 270,000 yen (5,000 rands).

This represents the cost of the gold, production costs, and taxes.

The Yamazaki jewelers group has in turn been asked by a religious sect to produce a bust of its founder.

The idea has caught fire, and the company is now accepting orders from a variety of customers.

The Bulletin also reports that most U.S. fighter aircraft and those that are used to transport VIPs are protected against heat-seeking missiles by a thin layer of reflective gold.

In addition, U.S. spacecraft are using millions of micro-networks to carry out calculations to protect personnel and equipment.

In order to improve reliability, the micro-networks are wired with fine gold wire, more than 1,200 kilometers of which was used in 1988. They also have gold-plated contact points.

**\* Helicopter Enhances Air Strike Force**

34010071A Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans  
16 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by Jan Taljaard: "Prototype Compares Well With Russian Havoc and U.S. Apache: Rooivalk Is a Hit"]

[Text] With the introduction of the Rooivalk attack helicopter, South Africa becomes a member of a select group, which probably includes only the designers of the Russian Mi 28 Havoc and the U.S. Apache.

The prototype of the Rooivalk was introduced yesterday at Atlas headquarters in Kempton Park. The helicopter has completed its ground tests and will begin flight tests next week.

Production of the helicopter will not begin immediately.

Besides the fact that the Rooivalk will probably cost significantly less than the estimated \$12 million (around 33 million rands) for the comparable Apache, it also has systems that alone will attract a great deal of interest on the foreign market.

Mr Kobus Eksteen, chief executive officer of ARM-SCOR [Armaments Corporation of South Africa], revealed yesterday that the helicopter, as well as the systems built into it, will possibly be marketed internationally.

Nose sensors in the front of the Rooivalk also revealed yesterday that these systems could possibly consist of sophisticated night-vision equipment and target-tracking systems.

Similar systems are very expensive abroad—the Apache system costs an estimated \$900,000—and there is great demand for them. A locally developed missile system for destroying tanks is probably another part of the systems that will be marketed separately.

The Rooivalk thus lends the South African air strike force its first opportunity to actually take advantage of the so-called "third-dimension battlefield"—the air space between 0 and 30 m above the ground.

In this "third dimension," a helicopter like the Rooivalk can provide much better close ground support for troops than fixed-wing aircraft, with its relatively high speed and wide rotating circle.

The bad news for the pilots in the Air Force and the good news for taxpayers is that the Air Force is in no hurry to buy the helicopter. Maj Gen James Kriel, chief of Air Staff Operations, said at the presentation that the threat against South Africa has lessened considerably since the Air Force realized for the first time in 1976 that it needed an effective attack helicopter.

However, it is good to know that a weapon like the Rooivalk will be available in case circumstances change, he said. Still, further development of the Rooivalk will not be accorded the same priority as in the past.

Atlas began development of the Rooivalk in 1984 after the Air Force indicated its need for a new attack helicopter. Subsequently, Atlas introduced the Alpha XH-1 in 1985, which was to serve as an intermediary in the development of a full-fledged attack helicopter.

The Alpha is based on the fuselage and propulsion system of the Alouette III, and in 1986 the XT<sup>2</sup>-1 came out. This helicopter, which at first glance looked like a Puma with armored wings, was used to develop sub-systems for an attack helicopter.

Around 600 engineers, designers, technicians, and trained specialists worked on the project during development of the Rooivalk.



**\* Night Vision System Similar to Apache's***34010071B Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans  
16 Jan 90 p 2*

[Text] One of the biggest surprises during the presentation of the Rooivalk yesterday was the helicopter's nose sensors, which themselves indicate the possible presence of highly sophisticated night-vision equipment and guided weapon systems.

Although Atlas and ARMSCOR [Armaments Corporation of South Africa] did not want to say much, nor did they permit a look at the cabin of the Rooivalk, the sensors on the nose of the Rooivalk are comparable to the same type of sensors on helicopters such as the U.S. Apache or the Italian Mangusta.

According to the Americans, it was precisely these systems on the Apache that largely contributed to the military success of the recent night attack in Panama, when the Apache had its baptism of fire.

These sensors are part of the systems that allow the pilots to use infra-red technology to "see" at night and that make target tracking and weapon guidance possible using lasers, among other things.

As with the Apache, TV cameras can also peer through the openings in the nose, while the image in the cabin can be enlarged for the pilot and weapon operator to improve their vision of targets and potential dangers.

In the Apache, the system is known as the PNVIS/TADS (Pilot Night Vision System and Target Acquisition Designation Sight). PNVIS uses infra-red imagery and is based on the principle that all objects emit infra-red waves of differing wavelengths.

In contrast, a system like TADS can consist of various integrated systems. In the Apache, it consists, among other things, of a laser source that uses its beams to read the distance between the helicopter and targets and to guide the extremely expensive Hellfire missile to its target.

It is unlikely that South Africa—or most other Western countries—will ever use a system as expensive as the Hellfire missile system, but the Rooivalk is clearly a suitable platform for use of the system. It will in turn permit it to once again compete against the Apache on the international arms market.

However, the Rooivalk's system for target tracking can also be used to fire wire-guided anti-tank missiles, such as the European HOT and the U.S. TOW system.

**\* Helicopter's Weapons System Rated World-Class***34010071C Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans  
16 Jan 90 p 2*

[Text] In the words of Maj Gen James Kriel, chief of Air Staff Operations, the Rooivalk is regarded at this stage of

its development more as a platform for a variety of weapons than as an aircraft with a group of predetermined weapons.

Whatever the case, the first look at the provisional weaponry of the prototype shows that the Rooivalk is a helicopter that can compete with the best in the world with its current and provisional weaponry.

Not only does it have sensors that will make it possible to use the most sophisticated weaponry; the launch tubes for wire-guided missiles, unguided 68 mm rockets, and the Kukri air-to-air missile on its armored wings also indicate that it will be able to hold its own in any theater of combat. It is especially the launch tube for four wire-guided missiles under each armored wing that is significant. This is the first time that such a system has been seen locally, while it is regarded worldwide as the most effective system for eliminating tanks.

Probably only the Hellfire laser-guided missile system of the Americans and the vaguely comparable AT 6-Spiral of the Russians are more effective, but at the same time those two countries are also the only ones that can easily afford such systems.

Almost all other countries—in the West and in the East Bloc—use wire-guided systems, such as the American TOW (tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided) or the comparable European HOT system.

These systems consist of a missile that is fired at a target and then guided by the weapon operator towards the target using sensors and wires. In the case of the Rooivalk, the sensors are in the nose.

Unguided rockets continue to comprise a significant part of the arsenal of all attack helicopters throughout the world, and the 68 mm rockets in the Rooivalk have already been thoroughly tested in combat by the pilots of Mirage jet fighters, for example.

In contrast to the U.S. Cobra attack helicopter, which supports the weight of the Sidewinder missile only with difficulty, the Rooivalk, with an estimated power output of nearly 3,400 brake horsepower, has more than enough power to carry and use the comparable Kukri missile.

That missile is used in the air-to-air role, and is exceptional in that it is coupled to a helmet visor that allows the weapon operator to aim the missile at a target simply by looking at it.

Then there is the nose-mounted GA 1 20 mm gun, which was developed locally and has been tested over the last few years in combat in Namibia and Angola. With a firing speed of 600 cartridges a minute and a muzzle speed of 720 m per second, this gun compares outstandingly with others of its type.

However, the GA 1 weighs only 39 kg, in contrast to the comparable French GIAT at 47 kg and the German Rh 202 at 75 kg. And weight, or rather the lack of it, counts for a lot in a helicopter.



This lack of weight leaves the Rooivalk, with its maximum takeoff weight of more than 8,000 kg, with room for more weapons and protective armor.

However, it is unusual that the gun, and obviously its ammunition as well, hangs right under the front end of the Rooivalk. In a combat situation, the Rooivalk will quickly fire its ammunition, which means that the helicopter's center of gravity will shift. This will in turn have an effect on the handling of the helicopter.

In contrast to this, the Americans shifted the Apache's 30 mm gun and ammunition more to the center of the helicopter, so that firing ammunition will not cause a change in the center of gravity.

But as can be seen from several other more visible improvements in the Rooivalk compared to other attack helicopters, Atlas's engineers have perhaps already built the solution into their helicopter.

#### \* Fewer Colored Recruits Report for Service

34000436B Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English  
13 Jan 90 p 5

[Text] Fewer Colored recruits have reported for two years' voluntary national military service this year.

Only 1800 recruits out of an expected 2500 have reported at two South African Cape Corps [SACC] Battalion, the intake center this year.

Intake coordinator Maj Sampie Hendricks said 1300 recruits had so far been accepted.

Of these there were 120 matriculants, while the majority had been schooled to Standard 7.

The senior staff officer at the Castle, Col Jakes Jacobs, said when looking at this year's lower reporting rate, it had to be remembered there were now an additional two training units for Colored soldiers in the country.

All would try to claim as many recruits as possible.

Prospective recruits could still report for service at two SACC in Eerste River before Tuesday.

#### \* Lively Trade With Denmark Despite Sanctions

90EF0248A Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE  
in Danish 28 Jan 90 p 10

[Article by Jorn Mikkelsen: "Boycott With Loopholes"; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] The first punitive sentence in Denmark for trade with South Africa was pronounced recently. However, the law has got quite a few loopholes, and opinions on its value are sharply divided.

Fate and a persistent chief of police willed it that Ole Beck, director of Beck Kartonnage in Ronne, would be

the first person in this country to be sentenced under the four-year-old law prohibiting trade with South Africa.

Chief of Police Johan Evensen personally conducted the case which last Monday at the court in Ronne resulted in Ole Beck being fined 5,000 kroner. According to the judgement, the director supplied cartons for the packing of fish for two years to a firm in South Africa via a West German partner in Bremerhaven, who received a fixed commission for his trouble. Beck Kartonnage made a total of 268,000 kroner on the deal.

Ole Beck says that he was aware of the fact that his fish cartons went to South Africa, but that he did not believe that it was illegal since they were shipped via West Germany which does not boycott the apartheid regime.

The judgement does not appear to have made any major impression. Ole Beck refers to it as being "ridiculous," adding that "there are people in Bornholm who are very petty-minded." He is now debating with himself whether it is worthwhile to appeal it. At the West German partner firm of Wilhelm Lubbers, they have not even heard about the judgement.

"We are very busy. But if it is true, we shall probably hear about it when we meet with Beck in mid-February," says a spokesman, Mr. Fritsche.

Since the boycott law became effective in 1986, the police have received nearly 30 notifications of violations. Most of them came from the South Africa Committee but were rejected by the police, whose administration of the law has been somewhat of a mixed bag.

A silversmith in Jutland was informed that he would no longer be allowed to deliver a silver spoon to a South African family when they had a christening, as he had done for several generations. FDB [the Danish Cooperative Stores] found out that a shipment of apples officially coming from Zambia actually consisted of South African Cape apples. And a Copenhagen porno wholesaler had to suspend his export of pictures.

However, only in the case against Beck Kartonnage did the police take action in the court.

#### World's Most Severe Legislation

The Danish legislation against South Africa is among the most severe in the world, if not the most severe of all.

The law prohibits export and import of everything except medications, printed publications and electronic pictures. The latter exemption was added last year to enable reporters to work and to enable Andre Brink, among others, to receive his royalties.

Another law prohibits Danish enterprises from making new investments in South Africa. However, investments are permitted with a view to "maintaining a profitable operation." In practice, this is interpreted in the way that Danish enterprises are permitted to invest what it takes

to maintain the productive apparatus, but they are not allowed to increase the turnover.

Only four Danish enterprises are now left in South Africa: The East Asiatic Company, F.L. Smith, Novo, and Sophus Berendsen. Most recently, Lovens Kemiske Fabrik [the Lion's Chemical Works] pulled out because the production became unremunerative. In 1985 there were twice as many Danish firms in South Africa.

In 1988, the turnover of the five enterprises, including Loven [the Lion] amounted to 400 million kroner, the same volume as in 1987. The enterprises had a total of 882 employees, which was 90 less than the previous year, and a total capital stock of approximately 5.2 million kroner.

The enterprises must each year submit a report on their activities to the Ministry of Industry in Copenhagen.

### Cheating

Since the law took effect, the official Danish-South African trade has declined drastically by 94 percent. Everything is included in the statistics. If a Danish ship needs to have a gadget for its engine sent down by air and the aircraft makes an intermediate landing in Johannesburg, the gadget is included in the trade statistics.

However, that does not mean that there are neither any Danish goods in South Africa nor South African goods in Denmark. On the contrary.

The supermarkets of the major cities in the apartheid state still stock all kinds of Danish everyday necessities. The underlying reason is that there is a reexport of goods from the border states to South Africa. Swaziland, Lesotho, and Botswana have a customs union with South Africa, and goods move freely within the union.

In a report of October 1988 from the Danish ambassador in Zimbabwe, Henning Kjeldgaard, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen, it was said that the customs union made it "almost no problem" to circumvent Western sanctions by setting up firms for the reexport of South African goods in Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland.

That is also the reason why a couple of Danish containers of BUKO cheese, which is exported to Botswana, appeared in a supermarket in Johannesburg, as recently ascertained. Six months ago, South African newspapers advertised B&O television sets, even if B&O in Struer discontinued all trade with South Africa many years ago. How the sets came to end up in South Africa is lost in the clouds of dust on the African highways.

If director Ole Beck of Ronne in Bornholm had desired to circumvent the Danish boycott law, he would merely have had to find a partner of cooperation in one of the three above-mentioned neighboring states. His fish cartoons would then have been beyond the reach of the law.

Figures of the official Danish trade with the nearest frontline states do not admit assumptions of any major organized evasions of the boycott law. Individual cases, however, always attract attention, and, apparently, there is always a way for those who want to evade the law.

### Goods to Denmark

After the law took effect, the Danish import of fruit and vegetables from Zambia suddenly increased explosively from zero to 4.7 million kroner. A Zambian Government examination showed that trucks from South Africa, officially in transit through Zambia on their way to Zaire, unloaded the fruit in the capital of Lusaka, where the shipments got new customs papers and were flown to Western Europe.

The traffic was stopped last year through effective Zambian Government efforts. However, in his report of 1988, Ambassador Kjeldgaard of Zimbabwe described how it may also be done:

"South Africa exports fruit and vegetables to other European countries—typically Great Britain and the Netherlands—where the goods are provided with the labels of other countries, including Zimbabwean, whereupon they are reexported to Denmark," it said in the report.

Rumors over several years that coal supplies to Danish power plants were mixed with South African coal in Antwerp were never substantiated. However, according to the representative of the Black antiapartheid movement ANC [African National Congress] in Denmark, Aaron Mnisi, the matter is at present the subject of an intensified investigation.

A couple of Jutland fruit dealers were recently exposed purchasing old South African fruit at the fruit exchange in Hamburg and transporting it across the border into Jutland. Plant inspectors exposed the traffic.

A Jutland firm inadvertently purchased South African wall units in West Germany but discovered the country of origin and dropped the deal.

### Is Boycott of Any Avail?

There are greatly varying opinions on the effect of the Danish boycott legislation.

Henrik Guttermann, a reporter who has a thorough knowledge of conditions in South Africa, is of the opinion that the boycott is hardly felt. He finds that the policy of sanctions may actually cause repercussions.

"On account of the boycott, South Africa is in the process of making itself self-sufficient in the area of electronics, just as they made themselves self-sufficient in the area of arms production. That reduces our possibilities of exerting any pressure," says Henrik Guttermann.

He also points to the fact that the same South African electronics industry is now well on its way to getting a foothold in the new East European market, where one is not as particular. South Africa advertises for skilled labor in the GDR, among other places, and during an recent official visit to Hungary, Foreign Minister P. Botha launched a sales promotion for South African computer technology. The Western boycott forces South Africa to blaze new trails, and they seem to have much success, says Henrik Guttermann.

The representative of the ANC in Copenhagen, which, in contrast to the situation in other Nordic countries, does not have official Danish recognition, is of a different opinion. Denmark only grants indirect aid. It is done via the Relief Organization of the Danish National Church, which grants funds, for example, to ANC schools in Tanzania, and the ANC office at Landgreven in Copenhagen receives an annual grant of 500,000 kroner via the budget of the International Liaison Committee.

"The Danish sanctions have, to a large extent, contributed to the political development that is taking place in South Africa. It is not a question of the volume of trade. It is a question of the support granted by Denmark as an independent and internationally highly respected society in the struggle against apartheid," says Aaron Mnisi.

Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (Liberal Party) has made it clear that the Danish boycott legislation will only be repealed when the apartheid system has been abolished.

#### Denmark-South Africa

Thousands of kroner	Import	Export
1986:	828,714	422,894
1987:	28,068	104,827
1988:	47,361	100,399
1989 (first half year):	402	44,502

Source: Danmarks Statistik

Officially, the Danish trade with South Africa is declining drastically. However, there are ways out....

#### \* SACTU Official Says Union May Disband

34000459B Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 20 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by Alan Fine]

[Text] Lusaka—The SA [South Africa] Congress of Trade Unions (Sactu) has implicitly accepted that after exiled SA political organisations and individuals have returned home there will be no further reason for its existence.

ANC executive member and, Sactu general secretary John Nkdimeng said his organisation accepted Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions] was the

dominant trade union force in SA. Despite the importance of Sactu's history, Sactu would have "no problem" integrating into existing Cosatu structures, he said.

Sactu is a union federation allied to the ANC [African National Congress] which operated openly in SA in the 1950s and early 1960s. Although it was never banned, its leaders were among those imprisoned or driven into exile during the government clampdown on the ANC.

Nkdimeng said Sactu had played an important role in the formation of Cosatu, through advising its supporters who were to become part of Cosatu and through lobbying other union leaders who had been hostile to Sactu.

Today, he said, Cosatu policy coincided with Sactu's views almost entirely.

Nkdimeng said Sactu had played an important part in ensuring that the feasibility committee, which in 1984 and 1985 brought together the future components of Cosatu, did not break down into irreparable divisions.

Nkdimeng said Cosatu, by building a large scale organisation and surviving, had done more than Sactu had been able to do. He said Sactu recognised this, and did not intend going home and trying to supplant Cosatu as some reports had suggested.

He was aware that some believed Cosatu should change its name to Sactu, and he would have no problem with that. However, he did not believe the name was an important issue, and it was up to Cosatu members to decide.

He said many individual Sactu officials may wish to become involved in the trade union movement in SA.

Nkdimeng said he was uncertain whether he would spend his future in the trade union movement as his ANC responsibilities were extremely onerous.

#### \* NUMSA Officer Puts Natal Violence Into Focus

34000446A Johannesburg THE NEW NATION in English 2-8 Feb 90 p 5

[Interview with NUMSA (National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa) Education Officer Alec Erwin]

[Text] [THE NEW NATION] What are the implications of the violence for the country as a whole?

[Erwin] The extent of the Natal violence makes it a problem of national proportions.

Vigilante-type forces may be encouraged by what is happening in Natal, and the violence and lawlessness could well spill over into other regions.

The Natal situation could serve as an example to vigilantes and such forces who see that it is possible to destabilise a place for a long time to their advantage.



We must defeat the forces wanting to use warlords and vigilantes for their own ends.

It is in the interests of all people who believe in a stable and just society to see that peace is brought about in the area.

[THE NEW NATION] What are the prospects for peace, both at local and regional levels?

[Erwin] At a local level, there are functioning peace initiatives. In the Pietermaritzburg area, the situation is greatly improved. Peace initiatives are also meeting with success in Camperdown, Mpumalanga, Shongweni and KwaNdengezi, and are being pursued in a number of different areas.

But all local initiatives are vulnerable to being destabilised.

This is why there is an urgent need to resolve police conduct and get political agreement between all organisations involved.

Only then will we be able to establish peace in the way envisaged in the UDF [United Democratic Front]-Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions]-Inkatha peace document which was agreed on in July last year, but due to problems has not been implemented.

This agreement is the stepping stone to peace, and will then pave the way to dealing with wider socio-economic issues.

While socio-economic conditions such as overcrowding are conducive to violence, these conditions do not necessarily cause violence themselves and that is why a political agreement is necessary first.

The chances of the regional peace initiative being started again are also reasonably good, and we hope we can remove all obstacles preventing the implementation of last year's July agreement.

[THE NEW NATION] The SAP [South African Police] have been criticised for being biased in dealing with the violence. How does the JWC see the role of the police in the violence, especially as law and order minister Adriaan Vlok seems to be trying to start his own peace initiatives?

[Erwin] Real steps have to be taken to get the SAP to have credibility with all sides.

Our argument is that there can be no lasting local or regional peace initiatives if the police are still conducting themselves in an undisciplined way.

It is vital that the police bring to justice the perpetrators of the violence.

Otherwise a peace agreement can be reached in a particular area but it will disintegrate when it becomes clear that police are not going to discipline those who break the agreement.

There is also evidence and widespread allegations of SAP members actually destabilising peace agreements.

The police will have no conduct themselves as a police force and not a political organisation before they can win any credibility.

[THE NEW NATION] What role has business played in ending the violence, especially as the situation has affected the economy in the region?

[Erwin] Business has done very little over the past three years despite numerous requests for assistance. However, in some areas businessmen have begun to assist and this is welcome.

All parties initiating peace talks must guard against forcing or rushing agreements. Such agreements require wide consultation in the area, as all parties have to support an agreement if it is going to succeed.

We urge business to continue holding talks between us, Inkatha and local communities. In many areas workers are directly affected by the violence.

We particularly urge businessmen to pressurise the police into acting as a police force.

**\* Pact With SATS Termed Victory for SARHWU**  
34000451A Johannesburg THE NEW NATION  
in English 2-8 Feb 90 p 16

[Text] Last week's agreement between Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions]'s SA [South Africa] Railway and Harbour Workers Union (Sarhwi) and the SA Transport Services (Sats) was a major political victory.

This is how regional delegates, interviewed by NEW NATION, saw the end of the 13-week strike.

"It was a political victory because it forced an essentially racist Sats to proceed towards the recognition of the first non-racial union in its fold," union leaders said.

The only recognised unions in Sats are organised along racial lines.

In terms of the agreement, Sats will be forced to recognise the union for the purpose of the all-important wage talks in April, even if recognition talks run into problems.

Although Sats has gone to extreme lengths to explain that it has not made any major concessions, the agreement guaranteeing recognition by April, represents a significant shift from its position prior to the recent strike.

Not only did Sats refuse to meet the union, it also turned down a request by a group of workers who asked for a meeting with bosses in terms of a provision in the Sats Conditions of Service Act of 1988.



In terms of this provision, workers can demand a meeting with bosses to discuss substantive issues in the event that they are not represented by a recognised union.

Last week's agreement effectively removes fears that Sats would, as in 1988, agree to recognition in principle and then drag the process out indefinitely and so keep Sarhwu out of wage talks.

The agreement also means that Sarhwu will for the first time participate in wage talks with Sats. And while Sats was relieved that the R1,500-a-month minimum was "off the table," the respite will be short-lived.

Sarhwu has indicated that it will put the demand back onto the table in two months time.

Sats will be hard pressed to make a substantial offer, given the fact that by the time the demand gets to the negotiating forum, it would be more than six months since it was first tabled.

Railway bosses will also have to take into consideration the fact that black workers received increases of only nine percent in 1984 and 12.5 percent in 1986 and 1987 respectively. Wage increases were frozen in 1988. And in 1985, the government informed workers that they would have to forfeit 33 percent of their annual bonus. Many failed to get a bonus in 1987, following the strike.

Sats will also find it difficult to argue against Sarhwu's demand for a R1,500 minimum wage, given the fact that it recorded a profit of R849-million in 1988. Sats has denied that this was an accurate reflection of its profits but Sarhwu claims that Sats used a special accounting method to hide its profits. This it did by writing off depreciation plus an amount by which inflation had increased the price of new equipment.

In this way it wrote off an estimated R1-billion rand in 1988, Sarhwu claims.

This is not how most companies in the private sector work out their profits.

And while Sats points out that the union will only be able to negotiate on behalf of workers for whom it is recognised, the parastatal will find it difficult to implement different regional rates.

In the unlikely event that it implements different rates, it would risk further industrial action in regions where workers received less.

Sarhwu will also table a range of other living wage demands, which include job security, a major source of irritation among black workers.

A new disciplinary procedure recently introduced by Sats, and which was partly responsible for sparking off the recent strike, will be the focus of Sarhwu's demand around job security.

Maternity leave, an end to racial discrimination in skills training and promotions and the scrapping of single sex hostels will also be tabled.

Workers will, in all likelihood, demand that Sats recognise June 16 and March 21 as paid public holidays.

A number of issues were removed from the list of original demands made by Sarhwu and these will undoubtedly find their way back onto the agenda. One of the most sensitive will be the re-instatement of more than 1,000 East London workers, who were dismissed after the October 1988 strike.

#### \* Firearm Demands Increase Following Unbannings

34000448A Johannesburg THE STAR in English  
6 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by Dawn Barkhuizen: "Rush on Gun Orders Following Unbannings"]

[Text] Arms dealers countrywide have had a rush of inquiries for guns following the unbanning of the ANC [African National Congress], PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress] and SACP [South African Communist Party] on Friday.

A Johannesburg arms wholesaler said he had been inundated with requests for "thousands of pump action shotguns, big hand guns or whatever I can supply".

There was also a huge demand for ammunition of all types, he said.

"People are ordering whatever they can get—prices have become irrelevant. I have orders for thousands of weapons, particularly pump action shotguns, automatic rifles and single barrel shotguns from dealers around the country.

"Big hand guns are also high on the list. We find ourselves hard-pressed to meet the demand. We have orders for thousands of weapons."

From Port Elizabeth, Mr Gerard Schultz of Custom Guns, said the number of inquiries for weapons had trebled since noon on Friday and his trade in large calibre guns and shotguns was up 15 percent.

Gun sales in Natal have spiralled over the past 10 months—but this is largely as a result of black-on-black unrest with buyers predominantly black people.

Mr Basil Wheeler, of Basil's Den in Southdale, Johannesburg, said that while his sales were not up dramatically, he had received numerous enquiries about hand guns on Saturday morning.

A northern suburbs gun dealer said several people had come into his shop on Saturday saying they needed to protect themselves because of the changing political situation. But other dealers and wholesalers, including

Mr Dan Levin of Used Gun Exchange in Johannesburg, said there had been no marked increase in trade as a result of the unbannings.

However, in recent months, the number of black people buying guns for protection had increased by several thousand percent, Mr Levin said.

This has been particularly evident in strife-torn Natal where Durban dealer, Mr Barry Miller, estimates gun sales to have increased by 20 percent in 10 months.

Most of his clients were black and Indian people—previously discriminated against by law—but now more easily able to obtain weapons.

He estimated that 80 percent of white families already owned guns.

A Maritzburg gun dealer said ammunition sales for shotguns and large calibre hand guns had increased dramatically within the last two months.

Guns can only be bought once licences have been obtained, but potential buyers can reserve their weapons on the shop shelves and take them away on receipt of the necessary papers. It usually takes between six and eight weeks to obtain a gun licence.

#### \* Slowdown in Nuclear Development Noted

34000453B Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL  
in English 2 Feb 90 p 87

[Text] Last month Gary Maude, chairman of Genmin's gold and uranium division, spoke of the "good vibes" in the uranium market.

He said nuclear power is today often considered "the lesser of two evils" now that oil and coal-burning power stations are being blamed for everything from global warming to acid rain. By comparison, nuclear energy is a clean alternative that should come back into favour if there isn't another Chernobyl or Three Mile Island this decade.

However, there appears to be little cause for immediate celebration. The spot price of uranium, which peaked at US\$48/lb in 1978, fell below \$10 in the third quarter of 1989 and is now hovering at around \$9. Most SA [South Africa] producers, though, are cushioned by long-term contracts that usually allow them to charge higher prices.

Nevertheless, over the last five years, SA's annual production has fallen from 6 000 t to little more than half that. And the bottom probably hasn't been reached yet, says John van Riet Lowe, GM of the Nuclear Fuels Corp, which refines and markets SA uranium. One encouraging sign, however, is that uranium consumption exceeded production in both 1988 and last year.

"There have been many cancellations and delays on new plants and those countries that put their nuclear programmes on hold—most notably the US—haven't

started their programmes up again," Van Riet Lowe says. "Even if the theories about the damage fossil-fuelled power stations are doing to the environment are proved, it won't make any difference to the demand for uranium for at least five years."

Van Riet Lowe maintains that the slow-down in nuclear development wasn't simply a reaction to the environmental movement. "The original projections in the Sixties and early Seventies of future energy requirements proves to be far too high."

Nuclear stations require large, strong economies and developing countries might initially turn to small, natural gas-powered stations to meet new energy requirements.

Another concern is the advantage that the corporation's most direct competitor, the Rossing mine in Namibia, will enjoy over SA producers.

"Sanctions will surely be lifted once Namibia is independent, so Rossing will enjoy greater access to world markets—though it's unclear whether they'll also be able to realise better prices," Van Riet Lowe says.

Either way, SA will be in a good position to exploit any boom in uranium prices. South African uranium is produced as a by-product of gold mining and 40% of it is extracted from surface accumulations, so it's relatively simple to recommission uranium extracting facilities.

"There will be rewards in the next century," he concludes, "but uranium certainly isn't an option for the short-term investor."

#### \* Business Reaction to De Klerk Speech Cautious

34000453D Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL  
in English 9 Feb 90 pp 67-68

[Text] The predictably optimistic business reaction to President FW de Klerk's speech on Friday has been tempered with more cautious views.

While the long-term outlook has improved markedly business leaders say stability, economic reform and real negotiations are preconditions for breaking out the champagne.

"Business has a pivotal role in ensuring the president's initiatives are followed through to a successful conclusion," says Johannesburg Consolidated Industries CE Murray Hofmeyr.

He adds that future political and economic systems will be vital in influencing foreign investors to return.

SA [South Africa] business must continue to argue the case for moving away from the obsession among some white South Africans with groups and group rights. They must also insist with equal forcefulness on the need to ensure that the process of wealth distribution is achieved

through sound economic measures and not on the basis of reward and punishment."

Ron Haywood, Deputy Director-General of the SA Chamber of Business, says the improved foreign climate could encourage overseas companies already invested in SA to proceed with expansion plans. But, while new investment will undoubtedly be a longer-term option, of more immediate concern is re-opening export markets.

"The door is now open for serious negotiations. The world will be watching and stability will be a major factor in investment decisions," he says. Haywood remains convinced economic mismanagement played a major role in the disinvestment of many US companies.

"We have been perceived as a risk area. In addition, the Sullivan Principles and US tax legislation made it too costly for many companies to stay in SA."

Wayne Mitchell, executive director of the American Chamber of Commerce, maintains De Klerk's speech has created "an aura of optimism" among US businesses still in the country.

He speculates that President George Bush may now be in a position to lift some restrictions, such as the suspension of SA Airways' US landing rights and the double-taxation legislation.

New US investment would benefit blacks. Mitchell says that with about 160 US companies left in SA (141 have pulled out since 1986), the current value of American investment stands at about \$1.6bn.

Since 1976, US companies have contributed about R700m to social responsibility programmes benefiting blacks. Last year the remaining US companies invested R83m—about 12% of their total payroll.

"Once all restrictions are lifted the debate can focus on reality, including the best use of SA's limited resource, and the ANC [African National Congress]'s views on nationalisation and the redistribution of wealth," says Anglo American executive Michael Spicer.

"We will have to look at the examples of eastern Europe and African economies to see which way SA should go. We must prevent the mirror image of 40 years of statist Nat government to form part of a future SA, as this deleterious example has cost us dearly in lost economic opportunities."

#### Nonracial Corridors

He is encouraged by the "pragmatism" of Sam Nujoma's Swapo government in Namibia, where ideological rhetoric has now made way for a level-headed approach to economic issues.

"The example of Botswana seems to carry more weight now than the disastrous one-party socialist experience of Zambia," Spicer says.

Mike Clark, CE [Chief Executive] of a soon-to-be-listed venture capital firm, New Company Investment, says SA's capital-rich financial institutions can help to "democratise" the often misunderstood free enterprise system by making more of their capital available to small entrepreneurs with lots of enthusiasm, bright ideas but no capital.

George Negota, acting president of the Black Management Forum, says the business world must "declare its corridors nonracial and ensure that blacks are also placed in decision-making positions." He calls for a united front of black business and political interests to meet the challenge set by De Klerk.

SA Chamber of Business president Leslie Boyd says that with eastern Europe now opening up to massive Western investment, care should be taken to ensure that the investment climate remains attractive and competitive. "This means that we need the right economic policies."

Pick 'n Pay chairman Raymond Ackerman says the business sector must continue with its effective, behind-the-scenes role of influencing opinion here and abroad.

"There is still pressure for sanctions, which means there is still a lot of work to do."

#### \* Johannesburg Might Be Nonracial Business Area

34010073B Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans  
23 Jan 90 p 4

[Text] The executive committee of the Johannesburg city council decided yesterday to recommend to the city council that all of Johannesburg be declared a free-trade area.

If this happens, Johannesburg will be the first city in the country where the entire municipal area is a free-trade area.

Mr Nigel Mandy, chairman of the the Johannesburg Center City Association, welcomed the decision by the executive committee yesterday evening.

"We are very pleased. This is the right step to take into a free economy. Then no one can be restricted from engaging in business wherever he wants.

"There is no restriction on blacks concerning where they can buy and work, but in certain areas they cannot own or lease business property or own a business," he said.

If the city council approves the executive committee's recommendation next week at its monthly meeting, a recommendation will be sent to Minister of Planning and Provincial Affairs Mr Hernus Kriel for a final decision.

### \* Limpopo River System To Be Studied With Botswana

34000447B Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English  
7 Feb 90 p 11

[Text] The governments of South Africa and Botswana have agreed to undertake a joint study of the Limpopo River system, Water Affairs director-general, Mr Klasie Claassens, announced yesterday.

He said an international treaty on the development of the water resources of the river system would eventually be required.

A Joint Permanent Technical Committee on water matters affecting both countries, agreed today to undertake the study to evaluate the present utilisation and availability of water in the river system above the confluence of the Limpopo and the Shashe Rivers.

"The development potential of, and the water requirements for this area, will be determined," Mr Claassens said in a statement.

"In addition, this study will identify the most cost effective method of regulating and stabilising existing water use and will promote further development."

He said both governments had recognised the international status of the Limpopo River and its tributaries, which form the border between the Republics of Botswana and South Africa.—SAPA

### \* Industrial Sector Predicts Higher Inflation Rate

34010073C Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans  
23 Jan 90 p 5

[Text] An average inflation rate of 16.1 percent is anticipated for this year by the top 100 industrial companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Last year, the rate was around 15.1 percent.

This was the conclusion of the Office for Market Research at the University of South Africa in a report released over the weekend.

The report was drawn up after the companies' executive officials were asked about their economic and political predictions for the year.

In the report, a rate of real economic growth of 1.8 percent is envisioned, compared to 2 percent last year.

It is expected that the exchange rate of the rand will fluctuate this year between 2.55 and 2.85 rands per dollar. The average should be around 2.74 rands per dollar. Last year's average was 2.62 rands per dollar.

According to them, the prime overdraft rate should be around 18 percent by December of this year, compared to the current 21 percent. However, an average price of gold of \$400 can be expected.

Furthermore, an increase in unemployment is expected, accompanied by an increase in labor unrest and strikes.

Although it is expected that the rate of economic growth will decline, expectations about the political and social climate are less pessimistic than last year.

As far as the average inflation rate for the year is concerned, it is considerably higher than what economists envision.

Mr Johan Louw, the chief economist with SANLAM [South African National Life Assurance Company], says in his latest economic analysis that a rate of inflation of just over 14 percent can be expected.

In contrast, the Office for Economic Studies at the University of Stellenbosch says in its latest commercial report that the average rate of inflation this year will be very close to 15 percent.

### \* CSIR Reveals Rise in External Income

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English  
8 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by Gerald Reilly]

[Text] Pretoria—A substantial increase in the CSIR [Council for Scientific and Industrial Research]'s external income from R166,8m in 1988/89 to a budgeted R211m in the current year was highlighted in its annual report released here yesterday.

CSIR president Chris Garbers said this was due mainly to an increase in the number of research contracts from 2,500 to above 5,000.

The CSIR was determined financial exigencies that might flow from curtailed government funding should not affect investment in state-of-the-art equipment, so reducing long-term technological capability, Garbers said.

During the year, three major investment programmes, representing a major leap in SA [South Africa]'s technological capability, came to fruition.

They were: an R80m medium-speed wind tunnel which was inaugurated by the division of aeronautical systems technology; a new R8,5m cable test facility which was inaugurated by the CSIR's laboratory for mine hoisting technology at Cottesloe, Johannesburg (it is the largest of its kind in SA and has the highest workload in the world); and a three-year R35m upgrading of the satellite application center at Hartebeeshoek.

As the CSIR's multi-disciplinary technological muscle was brought to bear on complex problems, product improvements became feasible and market opportunities were opened up, Garbers said.

Technifin, the R50m venture capital company founded by the CSIR and the Industrial Development Corporation, had completed its first year of operation.



**\* Economy of Durban Functional Region Defined**

34000454C Johannesburg *FINANCIAL MAIL* in  
English  
9 Feb 90 pp 47-48

[Text]

**Setting the Pace**

It is now widely accepted that Durban is not an enclave that ends at the municipal boundaries. People who have moved to its edges in search of jobs since the pass laws were scrapped will have a crucial effect on the region.

Even Durban City Council now accepts the idea of a Durban Functional Region. This is defined as a rough semicircle of just under 3 000 km<sup>2</sup>, from Umkomaas in the south, Cato Ridge in the west and to Salt Rock in the north.

The private sector is taking a hard look at the state of this region. In 1988 the Tongaat-Hulett group decided that a co-ordinated vision and plan of action was needed to take the region into the future.

It set up a planning forum, including experts in various fields, and commissioned a major study.

The first of four reports, released last week, spells out that planning is urgently needed to avert a catastrophe, naming unemployment levels, housing and violence as particular problems.

It found that the regions' population had more than trebled over the past two decades to more than 3m.

By the end of the century the population is expected to be between 5m and 6.5m. This could result in a labour surplus of up to 1.8m people.

Individual income distribution is unbalanced. Whites make up 11% of the regional population yet account for 53% of the income. Indians received 25% of the income while forming 18% of the population.

The figures for coloureds are 2% and 2%. Africans represent nearly 70% of the population and account for 20% of the income.

Assuming that the size of the average household remains stable, another 380 000-460 000 houses will be needed in the next 10 years.

What can be done? Tongaat-Hulett chairman Chris Saunders says that, apart from the usual political, social and economic developments needed, there has to be participative and joint decision-making. "The region can derive legitimacy only from the extent to which it is able to incorporate the principles of true democracy.

"There will have to be a genuine coalition between the haves and have-nots."

How this is to be achieved is being studied and further reports will look at ways of meeting demands of the region.

**\* Agricultural Exports Suffer Severe Setback**

34000453A Johannesburg *FINANCIAL MAIL*  
in English 2 Feb 90 p 85

[Text] All is not well down on the farm. There are early indications that this year's maize crop will be well below last year's. In fact, maize export earnings could drop to zero this year—from R1,3bn last year.

Seasonal and regional droughts, a late-starting summer planting season and adverse international markets have all contributed to the change in farmers' fortunes.

Other crops are also being affected. Altogether, SA [South Africa]'s export earnings from farming could plummet by R2,3bn, down from a huge R5,8bn last year (*Leaders* December 8).

But while agriculture's contribution to the trade surplus will probably be well below last year's, the sector should still be considerably better off than it was in the drought years of the mid-Eighties.

Nevertheless, the setback is severe. The wheat crop has already suffered a disastrous reduction—from last year's record 3,5 Mt (leaving 1,2 Mt for export) to less than 2 Mt. This may necessitate wheat imports of 200 000-400 000 t this year. Thus last year's export earnings of R420m could become an import bill of R100m-R200m this year.

In the case of wool, international market conditions have swung sharply against SA farmers. To date, only 59% of the current season's clip has been sold at the Wool Board's auctions in Port Elizabeth. This could mean a drop from last year's R890m export earnings to about R550m—or less.

Largely due to drought in the western areas—and late, unseasonal cold spells in the north—maize plantings have dropped by about 420 000 ha to a projected 3,41m ha—well below the 4,3m ha of five years ago.

So last year's 11,2 Mt crop, the second-highest on record, could be followed by a crop of around 7 Mt—or less, depending on the crucial February and March rains.

"With local consumption expected to grow by 10% this year, a 7 Mt crop would just about meet local market demand," says SA Agricultural Union economist Koos du Toit. "And, if good follow-up rains do not fall in the next two months, the crop could fall to below 7 Mt." Should this happen, maize imports could once again become necessary.

Danie Schoeman, GM of the National Maize Producers Organisation, says good rains fell in some areas over the past week, but other areas remain "very dry." Schoeman

says Nampo is "now looking at an average crop yield of about 2,1t/ha over the 3,4m ha planted—leading to a projected 7,14 Mt crop. But I must emphasise that the final crop size is purely guesswork at this stage."

Maize Board economist Johan Willemse says the board's "scenario" prices for the current season show that farmers will receive about R237/t for a 7 Mt crop. At least for those farmers who do bring in a crop, this price compares well with last year, when the average producer price was about R210/t.

Should a 7 Mt crop be realised, maize farmers should gross about R1,66bn, compared with last year's earnings of R2,3bn. Though farmers stand to earn about R640m less, the ramifications go far wider. Farm creditors should expect smaller repayments, while Sats, for one, will lose out on last year's R500m income from transporting the huge crop.

However, wheat farmers should feel the effects of the early summer drought the most: their R1,24bn in earnings last year could fall to about R740m this year.

SA's wool producers, who have been riding the crest of a boom in international demand for their product, are watching carefully the negative developments in the world market. Last year, wool farmers grossed about R990m, of which about 90% was from exports, but this year the tide has turned.

"To date, the current wool season has yielded sales revenue of only R313m, compared with R588m last year," says the Wool Board's Ona Viljoen. "This is a drop of almost 47%. Not only are prices about 15% below last year's, but demand has come down sharply."

The result is that the board has been forced to utilise its R113m stabilisation fund to "buy in" farmers' unsold clip. With the board still in hock for R193m through its disastrous foreign exchange losses, the question being asked is how long can it afford to buy in wool—without sharply dropping producer prices.

The signs are not good. Agricultural Development Minister Kraai van Niekerk says the current unfavorable market conditions could continue for another 18 months.

A combination of circumstances have led to the market's collapse. These are China's political problems (imports have been suspended temporarily); Japan's overstocked position, which has caused it to stop buying; expectations that the Australian dollar may fall, leading to cheaper prices for importers; large wool stocks building up in Australia and the general fall in commodity prices.

Fortunately, other sectors are looking slightly better. While sugar production may be down, following dry conditions in Natal, world prices are up. And climatic conditions for citrus production are favourable.

## Angola

### \* FAPLA Faces Disaster in Southeastern Offensive

90EF0211B Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese  
20 Jan 90 pp 16-17

[Article by Jaime Nogueira Pinto]

[Text] One week ago, we said that one of the reasons for FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola]'s general offensive against Jamba was to interrupt Jonas Savimbi's visit to Portugal that was to begin 13 January. We emphasized that it was not the only, nor the primary objective, which was actually strategic-military, but that in the choice of timing for this offensive, the occasion of Savimbi's visit was taken into account. In that respect, we also called it a Pyrrhic victory, since the only accomplishment was a delay, rather than a cancellation. But it would be preferable to wait a bit more for the consolidation of the military situation and Savimbi's visit to Portugal for the facts or the political consequences of the facts to establish the correctness or error of these considerations beyond all doubt.

In the best speculative way, and because in the desire to bring over Savimbi on the planned date, some people from the host group tried to convince him to come at the last minute, even for a lightning visit (which led to the delay in the official announcement and even the contradictory statements on the arrival or nonarrival of the UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] leader on 13 January), various hypotheses were raised to explain the delay: Savimbi had not come because the visit would be a failure; Savimbi had not come because Mobutu did not want him to; Savimbi had not come because his security was not guaranteed....

From the beginning, the UNITA president's visit was considered "high risk" in terms of security. Without imputing criminal intentions to anyone in particular, neither would anyone deny that the UNITA leader's disappearance would objectively benefit many people.

But the reason for the delay was the military situation. And any person with an average understanding of what Angola is, who Savimbi is, and what a military offensive is, would understand that in a political-military resistance movement like UNITA, the chief cannot leave the terrain at a critical moment. So precisely on the day of Savimbi's anticipated arrival in Portugal, 13 January, fighting broke out on the banks of the Lomba and the Cuzumbia. The FAPLA forces had been resupplied between 8 and 9 January (with difficulty, however, since the resupply column, departing from Cuito Cuanavale, had suffered five UNITA attacks) and on 9 January had been heavily supplied.

On 12 January there were various air attacks on the Mavinga road, and the various tactical groups of government troops undertaking the offensive, where they continued to follow the strategic direction laid out by Soviets, performed reconnaissance operations to cross the Lomba and establish a bridgehead there. In addition, with three FAPLA brigades (the 19th, the 35th, and the 53rd) having departed from the southwest, the "Che Guevara" battalion advanced 20 km to the Kelly, attempting to proceed on an east-west line to the liberated zones in the south.

It was a situation that was neither critical nor desperate, but was serious. And it thus required the UNITA leader's presence.

At this time, the latest news from the front indicates that the FAPLA forces are blocked at the confluence of the Kuzumbia and the Lomba, without having crossed the Lomba; the UNITA defenses are capable of withstanding the attack; and most importantly, with the arrival of the regular rains, it will become more difficult every day not only to cross the river, but also, in case of failure and the need to retreat to the point of departure (Cuito Cuanavale), the weather is critical for decisions to be made.

It was also within the framework of the delay in Savimbi's visit (of which we were aware on Tuesday, 9 January, as was President Mario Soares) that Cavaco Silva departed for the United States. Angola was on the agenda of his conversations with Bush.

In the days preceding his departure for the United States, the Prime Minister was attentively following the evolution of the military situation in southwest Angola, asking that he be kept up to date by the military information sector.

Which made even more sense considering Luanda's disinformation in having given to believe in Lisbon that the Mavinga offensive had been successful and that the people—and their road—had fallen into the power of FAPLA.

This had not occurred. For that reason, on discussing the situation "tete-a-tete" with Bush, in a meeting at which only the Prime Minister's diplomatic attache and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft were present, Cavaco Silva referred to a situation that had maintained its basic lines: the United States, deeply involved in supporting Savimbi and insisting on the formula of "free and fair elections" in Angola; and Portugal, curiously solicited by the parties involved to play a mediating role, advocating, in a certain sense, Luanda's cause, or at least that of Jose Eduardo dos Santos. He had asked Washington for three things: Washington's recognition of the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] government; the end to military assistance to UNITA; and a high-level reception (president, vice president, secretary of state) for Jose Eduardo dos Santos' visit to the United States next February.

Cavaco Silva had transmitted this message and would have interceded and requested more understanding for Jose Eduardo dos Santos' position, although this time in a more delicate manner, trying not to be hostile toward UNITA.

The Portuguese prime minister's position is not easy if one considers that on the one hand, he does not want to lose the trust that he had won in Luanda; but on the other hand, neither can he ignore the pragmatic consideration that it is not worth the trouble to think or speak of peace in Angola without Savimbi and UNITA. And that domestically, not only do the majority of Portuguese sympathize more with UNITA than with the MPLA, but that sentiment is particularly strong among PSD [Social Democratic Party] voters, activists, and deputies. And that is also the position of the United States, which in the international and Atlantic context is more than ever Portugal's principal ally.

Without further speculation on these points, we think that they will soon become clear and that the best strategic line should be to closely consider the situation where it is actually occurring, and for the Portuguese Government's behavior to reflect the fundamental objectives, which appear to be quite clear: that Portugal is interested in an Angola with stable peace and an open economy, because we have nothing to gain politically with the war and because what we have most to give to Angola in terms of national collaboration—people, their work, and their experience—can only function in a climate of political stability and a free economy. Because never has anyone emigrated to a communist country and never has any new country—regardless of what North and South America say—been created with “cooperative types.”

Everything leads one to believe that this offensive, decided upon in the middle of November and prepared with great numbers of chosen personnel and materiel (a large number of military doctors went to Cuito Cuanavale, whose road was widened; officials volunteered for this “decisive attack”; the planning and logistics were performed with a care never before observed by FAPLA), brought great hope to the political powers of Luanda for, if not finishing UNITA, at least handing it a powerful defeat.

Luanda's hopes grew with the apparent success of the initial battles, to the point that, we now believe, they brought in and maintained on stand-by in Luanda journalists who would travel to the south as soon as Mavinga fell....

If expectations were great, even greater could have been the consequences of failure, on the political level. In this respect, the announcement that the MPLA Central Committee meeting had been interrupted could mean that the confusion would already be at the level of the party's highest body. Jose Eduardo dos Santos' sympathizers, who took him for a “man of peace” forced by others to continue the war, would be able to say that this time,

with the failure of the military solution, the current president would finally have his hands freed of the “radicals” and convince them that only with concessions and negotiations could they alleviate the pressure and survive.

It is significant, however, that at the very moment when the impasse and the failure were occurring in the southwest, Luanda had once more sent Daniel Chipenda to Portugal to contact Portuguese businessmen, emigrant cadres, and groups—real or fictitious—of exiled politicians.

The MPLA's difficulty in achieving peace is not (or no longer is) only in finding a cosmetic formula for political democratization and economic liberalization.

The MPLA's problem is called civil war. The regime has created a national and popular discontentment that has found armed expression and leadership in UNITA and in Savimbi. They have not fought the Russians, Cubans, and FAPLA for 15 years only to surrender or accept amnesty or plates of lentils from undersecretaries or deputies, in a legal-political arrangement capitalized upon by the government. They would not accept it if Mavinga had fallen, because UNITA is maintaining its guerrilla resources throughout the entire Angolan territory. Much less would they accept it now, when alone they have soundly defeated FAPLA, supported by the Soviets in the way of tactical leadership and air resources. And while none of their allies have failed them, neither have they intervened militarily.

Thus, the Angolan people's only hope for rapid pacification is in the MPLA's acceptance of the Gbadolite accord and of its essence: a cease-fire and the undertaking of direct negotiations, with no preconditions, between the two rival movements. The cost, now more than ever, is subterfuge and chimera.

#### \* Politics Overshadows Military Offensive

90EF0211C Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese  
20 Jan 90 p 17

[Article by Carlos da Matta]

[Text] Between Mavinga and Cuito-Cuanavale, the noise of the cannons and columns of assault vehicles is greatly diminished, while in the center of the country Kuanza-Sul again occupies its traditional strategic position in the Angolan war. But it is on the political front that everything will be decided.

Located on the north-south axis and the point of contact between Mbundus and Ovimbundos, where the MPLA [People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola] and UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] recruit the majority of their internal supporters, that province has never escaped its reality of experiencing insecurity across almost its entire area.

The UNITA commandos operating here extend their activities to the south of the vicinities of Malanje and



Bengo. In this case, the road that connects the Longa and Kuanza rivers has always been an object of special interest for the two sides, and the two respective bridges have attained a strategic value that is easy to understand.

The UNITA attack on Cabo Ledo, which victimized workers of a mixed Portuguese-Angolan enterprise (Paviterra), is a result of this situation. The zone is in the heart of the oldest—and least important—area of oil exploitation and it was not the first time that it had been "visited" by the rebels.

About halfway along the road from Luanda to Porto Amboim, when it is reached, it causes insecurity that seriously affects road traffic on one of the rare 200-km stretches where it still exists, and will deprive many Luanda residents who go there in search of seafood.

An operation with international repercussions, the death of civilians always has negative domestic effects and places the one who caused it in a bad political position, a factor that will soon become decisive.

In the southeast, things are different. There is no economic importance and the population is scant. However, it is a military zone of great practical importance for UNITA because of its proximity to Jamba, and psychological importance for the MPLA because it challenges the central power.

Diplomatic observers say that after the meeting in Moscow of the Soviet, Cuban, and Angolan military chiefs of staff, operations were suspended, but in Luanda it is said that UNITA retreated on the ground and that "Savimbi's propaganda tour was ruined." UNITA, in turn, proclaims a great victory, while agreeing, however, with the negative impact on their leader's overseas trip.

But there are sources who do not believe in the military explanation as a factor in the delay. "Savimbi went to Kinshasa at a time when his radio spoke of intense combat. However, at that time and with the start of the rains, the battle had already wound down." What they think is that the trip was not considered opportune by the Zairian mediator, "who was dissatisfied with seeing the Lisbon becoming a center on the issue," if even because his proposals had been rejected by Luanda, diplomats and African heads of state were asking themselves about his effectiveness, and rumors of new direct intervention on the part of the chancelleries of Washington and Moscow were becoming more insistent.

To speak with Mobutu and return to Jamba would be a way for Savimbi to reaffirm his confidence in the mediator without compromising the trip to Portugal that could still take place this month.

There is a smell of change at the political level. For those familiar with the turns and twists of Angolan politics, the Angolan president's speech at the end of last year already revealed that something was being prepared. His opening speech at the Central Committee confirmed it:

through "civic associations, legal guarantees of participation and the electoral law," there could be an opening or even a transformation of the system in the works. The language used to analyze the evolution of Eastern Europe is unprecedented, and throughout Angola people speak or at least ask themselves whether the announced pluralism of ideas is not a form of transition to democracy.

It would be important to confirm whether or not Jose Eduardo dos Santos will meet with democratic leaders. If the answer is affirmative, the long-hoped-for "internalization" of the problem could be within reach and the institutional mechanisms to end the war put into place. What many Angolans ask themselves is whether the president wants to come to the third MPLA-PT [Labor Party] Congress with peace formalized and a new road opened to society or whether it will be from that date on (the end of 1990) that one will feel one's hands to be more free.

#### \* MPLA To Study Political Reforms

90EF0211D Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS  
in Portuguese 21 Jan 90 p 15

[Article by Carlos Ferreira]

[Text] The Central Committee of the MPLA Labor Party [MPLA-PT], in its last ordinary session, has decided to submit to the third Party Congress the alteration in the nature of the worker class' party, and the adjustment of its program and bylaws in function of the long discussion held within the highest body of what was until now the "revolutionary vanguard of the Angolan people."

Among other issues, the MPLA-PT Central Committee intends that a deeper study of the plan for the construction of socialism in Angola's particular situation be discussed, keeping in mind the events that in the present historical stage should bring together a national consensus.

The Directing Committee of the Party that until now has defined itself as Marxist-Leninist has also oriented itself toward the deepening of political and legislative measures that guarantee the greater participation and representation of all citizens, regardless of their political-ideological convictions and religious beliefs.

#### New Members of the Central Committee

The expulsion of a member from the Central Committee, Luis Sebastiao Mateus, was also recorded, for behavior leading to loss of the prestige and respect that a leader should maintain.

On the other hand, Paulo Jorge and Mendes de Carvalho were elected effective members of the Central Committee.

As we had already predicted, this election of two long-time participants in the MPLA movement leads to believe that a spirit of unity, maintained since 1956 by its founders, is being reborn, and that it should lead in

the third Congress to the transformation of the Party into a national front, within which all Angolan patriots, regardless of their ideology, would fit.

Meanwhile, the status of the single party "in this historical stage" was reaffirmed, according to the political options orienting the People's Republic of Angola.

#### \* Opening of Civic Association Announced

90EF0211A Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS  
in Portuguese 20 Jan 90 p 14

[Article by Carlos Ferreira]

[Text] The creation of the ACA (Angolan Civic Association) was announced at a small ceremony that took place yesterday at the University of Angola Cultural Center in the former Casa das Beiras.

Lacking the presence of the principal news media, as well as the participation of the ACA's founding members, some of its members stepped forward to clarify the Association's objectives. The Association's Membership Commission, represented by E. Bonavena (jurist and writer), Xavier Jaime (physician, instructor at the School of Medicine and member of the Party's National Youth Committee), and Aguiar dos Santos (journalist), announced that the Association would never be a mouthpiece for the Party. They stated, rather, that there is a need for a counterbalance to the hegemonic tendencies of state power. The ACA promised that whenever necessary, it would provide resources in defense of human rights, and based its creation on article 22 of the Constitution, which allows associations of various types.

Although there has been no official announcement, this constituted a strengthening of the idea of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos' efforts in favor of greater democracy within Angolan society.

It is believed that, in addition to the officials that have appeared in public, there are important figures from the country's political and social spheres behind them, and that at the time of the announcement they will certainly be present.

They include, as far as we have been able to discover, figures like Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, former MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] president and one of its founders, and Joao Vieira Lopes, a respected physician, who was also a member of the MPLA leadership.

In any case, it is apparent that the Angolan Civic Association reflects a common thought among citizens whose political posture reminds one of the so-called Active Revolt faction of the MPLA, which became prominent in 1972.

In its bylaws, which it distributed, the ACA's Membership Commission states specifically that it is an organization of a nongovernmental nature, open to all factions and sectors of national thought and to all those who,

regardless of their political, philosophical, or religious positions, agree to the bylaws, which have as their foundation a respect for liberty and mankind.

The Angolan Civic Association has as a sponsor cleric Manuel das Neves.

#### Mauritius

#### \* Aneerood Jugnauth 'Battles' With Arvind Boollell

90EF0236B Port Louis LE NOUVEAU MILITANT  
in French 7 Jan 90 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Open Warfare Between Sir Aneerood Jugnauth and Dr. Arvind Boollell"]

[Text] The new year has started badly for the MSM/PTR [Mauritius Socialist Movement/Labor Party] alliance. Relations between the two partners in the government alliance are more and more strained, and there is nearly open warfare between the prime minister, Sir Aneerood Jugnauth, and the son of the Labor Party leader, Dr. Arvind Boollell. Sir Aneerood Jugnauth called Dr. Arvind Boollell a "political idiot" and declared that he would take the field to answer his opponents blow by blow. In this open Jugnauth-Boollell conflict, the Labor Party did not disassociate itself from Dr. Arvind Boollell. On the contrary, the leaders of the reds will meet next Tuesday to draw up a strategy to follow.

It all started with Dr. Boollell's sensational statement last December in the journal LE NOUVEAU VIRGINIE. During that interview, the son of the Labor Party leader made a concerted attack on certain government actions. He referred to a Balkanization of Mauritian society while also mentioning the broadening gap between the rich and the poor. Dr. Boollell even stated that the PSC [Police Service Commission] violated the country's constitution with regard to recruitment and promotions within some government departments.

Reacting violently to these statements, Sir Aneerood Jugnauth, in an interview in his paper THE SUN (31 December), accused Dr. Boollell of having created problems. Without however mentioning his name directly.

"My only disappointment is that within the alliance itself, there is someone who from time to time lifts his head and creates problems where there were no problems before. I am even more disappointed when I think about all that I have done to protect him in his moments of difficulty. He is waging a truly cowardly campaign against me personally."

In an interview granted to the 5-PLUS magazine of 5 to 12 January 1990, Sir Aneerood Jugnauth did it again, this time naming Dr. Arvind Boollell and adopting a threatening tone. "I believe that I have already said it: his place is not among us. You cannot govern a country by systematically using demagoguery, as was done before 1982. Arvind Boollell thinks of himself as being very

smart, while in my opinion he is nothing but a political idiot. I will not say more about him for the time being. But when the time comes, he will hear about me. He is not losing anything by waiting." Later on, within the framework of the same interview, Sir Aneerood Jugnauth stated that he would take the field to "respond especially" to the attacks of his opponents. According to the prime minister, one of the main weaknesses of the late Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam was that he never responded to the attacks. "I do not have that kind of temper. I will take the field to respond to my opponents. Blow by blow!" he told 5-PLUS.

According to information gathered by LE NOUVEAU MILITANT, it will be February before the prime minister leads a series of public meetings throughout the country. It is said within circles close to Sir Aneerood Jugnauth that "the prime minister will be on the field immediately after his return to the country, following his visit to India and Malaysia."

The Labor Party refuses to make any comments at this stage. A Labor Party spokesman stated yesterday morning that the leaders will meet on Tuesday morning and that this issue will be the main item on the agenda. "The prime minister is making a major mistake in acting like a sponger. He has been overtaken. He is cut off from the country's realities, hence his violent reaction," he said to LE NOUVEAU MILITANT.

The leadership meeting on Tuesday will set a list of meetings and regional conventions that the Labor Party intends to hold over the coming weeks. "The year 1990 will be crucial for the Labor Party because we will have to renew our executive committee next March at the time of our annual convention, and beyond that prepare ourselves for the 1992 general elections," he stressed.

#### \* Kowlessur on Reappearance of 'Brown Sugar'

90EF0236A Port Louis WEEK-END in French  
28 Jan 90 p 39

[Unattributed article: "The Superintendent's 'Bad Trip'"]

[Text] The WEEK-END article on the strong return of "brown sugar" was not received with joy at the central barracks. As a matter of fact, in response to questions from LE DEFI on this "sudden reappearance" of "brown sugar," the superintendent of police, Mr. Bhimsen Kowlessur, stated that at the present time "a well-orchestrated attempt is being made by some people to discredit the police force." And he added: "The so-called inability of the police to thwart drug trafficking and the alleged cases of police brutality symbolize this action."

But there is worse: the superintendent alleged that there are "some drug lords who, through the intermediary of some press organizations, are trying to sow doubt among the people. Through those press agencies in which they have an interest."

Questioned also on the allegations of protection from on high that some traffickers enjoy, Mr. Kowlessur insisted "that this is a false rumor launched by those who are currently conducting an antipolice force campaign."

The superintendent concluded his statement with a flourish, stating: "Those people are trying to portray the island of Mauritius as a Colombia, but as long as I am police superintendent this attempt will be doomed to failure."

And yet, LE DEFI announced that the superintendent did not completely deny the news concerning the reappearance of "brown sugar" and confirmed that the daily number of drug arrests has increased in recent days.

In fact, the strangest of all is that the superintendent had to wait for the questions from the satirical weekly to refer to the press campaign supposedly aimed at discrediting the police. For once, the police public relations office, which is so prompt at developing clarifications, was forced into inaction! And yet, this same Mr. Kowlessur, who was given a full-page interview in the last issue of WEEK-END, did not consider it advisable to talk about this campaign and of the drug lords "who are trying to sow doubt among the people." Why did he hide this "truth" from the people?

Even so, LE DEFI itself, which is far from a so-called opposition or antigovernment paper, referred in the same issue to "the sudden reappearance of 'brown sugar' in Cassis" and quoted an official at the Terre-Rouge rehabilitation center who confirmed "the current upsurge of this drug in our country."

More worrisome: Eshan Khodabux's journal alleged that "a big cargo of 'brown sugar' was unloaded at Mauritius during the first week of January, around the 6th, from a cargo vessel whose name starts with an F. This cargo, in both meanings of the word, came from Sri Lanka. Among the crew were three Mauritians. We have learned that on the day it berthed, this cargo was not subjected to the procedures established by the port authorities. There is even talk of the complicity of some port officials."

#### Nanuck Confirms

Questioned by the same weekly, former policeman Nanuck said that he was aware of this transaction and added that he had already informed the prime minister in two letters. According to the former policeman, drug sales have started up again in Pailles, Cassis, Roche-Bois, Cite Barkly, La Cure, Stanley, Rose-Hill, and Cite Montagne Longue. According to Nanuck, "other bases are said to be operating in Plaine Verte, specifically on the following streets: Diego Garcia, Lenepvue, Ruchpaul, and Gorah Issac." It is even said that a former top man has taken up business again.

LE DEFI even added that "nothing good will come out of the activities of two individuals living in the southern



part of the country and close to the big merchants, who have made repeated visits to Bombay over the last few weeks."

If that is what Mr. Kowlessur calls "the press campaign aimed at discrediting the police," then we have no choice but to continue it...in the highest interest of our fatherland and of all the current and future victims of the merchants of death.

We, as journalists, have shouldered our responsibility. Those who do not want to or cannot shoulder theirs may have to answer to other Rault Commissions. In any case, neither we nor the Mauritian public, still traumatised by the "brown saga," wish this!

P.S. What is the police superintendent waiting for before taking action against the drug "lords" whose identity he knows so well. We thought that following the tremendous post-1986 crackdown there were no longer any drug "lords" on Mauritius.

## Mozambique

### \* Chissano Speaks Out Against Multiparty System

90EF0243D Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese  
12 Jan 90 p 1

[Text] The burning and polemic issue of the choice each country should make concerning its government, between, for example, a multiparty system and a single-party system, was one of the subjects dealt with at length by the chief of state of Mozambique at the popular rally held on Tuesday in Maputo. He said that the multiparty system, given the present conditions in our country, might undermine the national unity which we want to consolidate.

According to President Joaquim Chissano, both the single-party system and the multiparty system have advantages and disadvantages, depending on the specific conditions in each country. The highest leader of the Mozambican people announced that this issue will be discussed by all concerned, conscientiously and in depth, in order to decide on the path which will best serve the interests of the country in each phase of its development.

Joaquim Chissano explained that throughout history, the peoples of each country have sought to adopt the forms of political and social organization which would guarantee ever greater participation by the citizens in the process of making decisions and the administration of their countries. He said that the organization of these individuals in political parties is one of the expressions of this search for the mechanisms of democratic participation in national life.

"There is much talk today about the single-party and multiparty systems, and some people say that the political systems which allow more than one party are superior to those in which there is a single party," he said.

The chief of state refuted this concept, emphasizing that either of the systems, with a single party or many parties, offers both advantages and disadvantages, based on the specific situations in the countries involved. In his view, the basic thing is to be able to analyze the results of the choice of one system or another, so that the choice made will guarantee greater democracy, the strengthening of national identity, national cohesion and unity, and the principle that sovereignty lies with the people.

In his speech, which was addressed not only to the thousands of citizens present at the rally on Tuesday, but also to the other citizens throughout the territory of Mozambique, the president did, however, admit that the multiparty system allows the citizens to make choices, opting for one of several national policy concepts. The chief of state said that the multiparty system makes it possible to draft positions on the various matters of national interest in an atmosphere of discussion which is open but, unfortunately, not always honest.

The existence of a number of parties also makes it possible, as was also said, to strengthen the influence of public opinion on the government leaders, but this is not always done honestly, because of a desire to destroy the party in power on the part of those who are in the opposition, simply for that reason. This happens even when a leader in government power is acting properly. President Joaquim Chissano said that the opponent will always claim that the government in power is not acting properly, in the hope that it will fall.

This influence of public opinion on the men in government, the chief of state said, is the phenomenon which basically leads some people to say that the multiparty system has greater democratic potential than the single-party system.

Continuing with his explanation on this current and burning issue, the highest leader of the Mozambican people emphasized that the important thing is not only to have the possibility of choosing from the varied range of concepts set forth by the different parties, but also to establish whether this advantage of pluralism can only be achieved with a multiparty system. In the opinion of the Mozambican chief of state, the main thing is for the people to be organized in such a way as to define and decide what path best serves the interests of the country at each stage of its development.

He said that given the specific conditions in our country, we must have the consequences of adopting the multiparty system clearly in mind, remembering that we are still in a phase in which the consolidation of national unity is a basic task for all the people.

Chissano emphasized that under these conditions, the existence of several parties might make the execution of this strategic task of vital importance difficult, and the continued existence of many factors which divide the people might easily be exploited to win sympathy and votes.



### Eliminating Shortcomings

Continuing to discuss the political system, the president recalled at a certain point in his address that there are still serious shortcomings in our country, and it is basic that we manage to unite all the citizens in an effort to overcome them and to create better conditions of life for ourselves. The existence of a number of parties, he said, might make the focusing of activity on the solution of the serious problems facing the people difficult, by diverting attention to the struggle for power.

"We are an underdeveloped country, and because of this we must learn to act in all cases in such a way as to avoid the dispersal of human, material, and financial resources, so that we can focus on the tasks of development. We are a society experiencing serious difficulties, and one in which the majority of the people still do not know how to read or write. This greatly limits communication among us, and will make us vulnerable to the activities of unscrupulous individuals who may profit from the illiteracy, ignorance, and shortages of food and clothing to manipulate society with deceitful promises," Joaquim Chissano said.

The views expressed by the president, in his search for democratic forms which we have not yet tested in our specific situation, may lead the country to adopt rigid models which, instead of speeding up development and broadening democracy and freedom for the citizens, might direct the country toward anarchy and confuse the working people.

He urged the need for an opportunity for all citizens to express their ideas, saying that this possibility has value when it exists within a process which makes it possible to combine efforts and consolidate the independence of the country and the sovereignty of the people.

Chissano said that in the history of Mozambique, Frelimo [Mozambique Liberation Front] and its party have at every step been able to create the conditions for the ever more profound exercise of democracy in our country.

### Beyond Personal Difficulties

The president of the Republic said that in his view, the citizens must be able to look beyond their own personal difficulties, so as to be able to analyze the reality in the country objectively and to choose the paths which best serve the country. He said that these opinions, which he emphasized are personal, are not taken into account in the draft project for revision of the Constitution, but that this point as such should be discussed.

"In the process of discussing the Constitution, we will all have the opportunity to say what we think. Whatever may prevail, it will be a consensus resulting from this popular consultation which we will initiate," the president said.

An important point noted by the chief of state is the need, in discussing this situation, to take as a basis the

concrete reality in our country, and not that being experienced in other countries, for example in Europe.

Chissano explained that it does not work to import European models into our situation, pure and simple, without analyzing them. He listed a series of African countries which, after having had multiparty systems, decided in the end to establish single-party systems.

He said that we cannot attempt to imitate European nations which already have had hundreds and hundreds of years of complex experience and development. He recalled that many of the nations in Europe are states which began as monarchies or empires, with kings, emperors, and feudal lords, and only later achieved the development they have today. It was in times now long past that these countries built castles, monasteries, bridges, and roads, before they became republics.

### \* Text of Constitutional Revision Draft

90EF0259A Maputo NOTICIAS (SUPPLEMENT)  
in Portuguese 10 Jan 90 pp 1-9

[Undated draft of revised Constitution]

[Text]

### Preamble

At 0000 hours on 25 June 1975, the Central Committee of the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) formally proclaimed the total and complete independence of Mozambique and its organization as the People's Republic of Mozambique.

It was the culmination of an age-old process of resistance to colonial domination and of victory in the armed struggle for national liberation headed by Frelimo, the legitimate representative of the Mozambican people, which united all patriotic sectors of Mozambican society around the same ideal of freedom, unity, and justice.

The Constitution that was proclaimed at the time established Frelimo's decisive role in the formation of the Mozambican state. Under its leadership, the exciting process of democratic life then began. Power became based increasingly on the expression of the people's will.

The state which we created made it possible, for the first time in their history, for the Mozambican people to exercise political power on a national scale, organize and manage economic and social life, and develop the content of democracy.

Experience with the functioning of the state institutions and the democratic experience of the citizens make new definitions and developments imperative.

After 15 years of independence, the Mozambican people, exercising their inalienable right to sovereignty and determined to consolidate the unity of the nation and to

dignify Mozambican man, adopt and proclaim this Constitution, the basic law of the People's Republic of Mozambique.

The basic freedoms and rights enshrined in the Constitution are victories won by the Mozambican people in their struggle to build a society of social justice in which equality of the citizens and the imperative of law are the pillars of democracy.

We the Mozambican people, determined to further develop the ordering of political life in our country in a spirit of responsibility and of plurality of opinion, have decided to organize society in such a way that the will of the citizens will be the highest value in our sovereignty.

#### **Title I: Basic Principles**

Article 1—The People's Republic of Mozambique is an independent, sovereign, unitary, and democratic state of social justice.

Article 2—Sovereignty resides in the people.

The powers of the state issue from the people. The Mozambican people exercise political power through periodic universal suffrage for the selection of their representatives, through referendums, and through permanent democratic participation by the citizens in the life of the nation.

As forms of association for citizens with affinities and similar interests, social organizations play an important role in the fostering of democracy and of citizen participation in public life.

Article 3—The People's Republic of Mozambique esteems the Mozambican people's heroic struggle and their age-old resistance to foreign domination and accepts as a national heritage the decisive role of the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) in the victory over colonialism and in the winning of national independence.

That experience inspires the state in its building of the Mozambican nation, its strengthening of national unity, and its fostering of democratic participation by the citizens.

Article 4—The People's Republic of Mozambique has the following as its basic objectives:

- a) The defense of independence and sovereignty.
- b) The consolidation of national unity.
- c) The defense and promotion of human rights and of equality of the citizens before the law.
- d) The building of a society of social justice and the creation of material and spiritual well-being for the citizens.
- e) The strengthening of democracy, freedom, and social and individual stability.
- f) Development of the economy and the progress of science and technology.
- g) Affirmation of the Mozambican personality and of freely and democratically accepted cultural, social and traditional values.

- h) The establishment and development of relations of friendship and cooperation with other peoples and states.

Article 5—Mozambican citizens are those persons born in the national territory, the children of a Mozambican father or mother, and naturalized citizens.

Restrictions on the above principles and all other forms for the acquisition and loss of nationality are established by law.

Article 6—The Portuguese language is the official language of the People's Republic of Mozambique.

The state esteems the national languages and promotes their development and growing use as vehicular languages and in the education of the citizens.

Article 7—The territory of the People's Republic of Mozambique is indivisible and inalienable and comprises all of the land surface, maritime zone, and airspace delimited by the national borders.

The extent, boundaries, and regulation of Mozambique's territorial waters, exclusive economic zone, contiguous zone, and seabed rights are established by law.

Article 8—The People's Republic of Mozambique is organized into provinces, districts, administrative posts, and localities.

Urban zones are organized as cities or towns.

Determination of the characteristics of the territorial levels, the establishment of new levels, and the establishment of jurisdictions within the framework of territorial organization are established by law.

Article 9—The state's defense and security policy is aimed at preserving the sovereignty and integrity of the country and guaranteeing the safety of the citizens against all forms of armed aggression.

In the tradition of the FPLM (People's Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique), whose continuators they are, the Mozambique Armed Forces act in close union with the people.

The oath taken by members of the Armed Forces establishes their duty to respect the Constitution.

The citizens are encouraged to participate in the country's defense by joining people's self-defense organizations.

Article 10—Natural resources located in the subsoil, in internal waters, in territorial waters, on the continental shelf, and in the exclusive economic zone are the property of the state.

Also constituting the state domain are the following:

- a) The maritime zone.
- b) The airspace.
- c) The cultural heritage.
- d) Zones for the protection of nature.
- e) The national railroads.
- f) The roads.
- g) The ports and airports.
- h) Telecommunications.
- i) National energy and water resource enterprises.
- j) All other assets so classified by law.

The state determines the conditions for their use and exploitation, providing safeguards to protect national interests.

Article 11—The state promotes the knowledge, inventorying, and development of natural resources while guaranteeing ecological balance and the conservation and preservation of the environment.

Article 12—The state holds original ownership of the land and may transfer it to individuals or collective bodies, taking into account the social purpose involved.

The law stipulates the terms under which such transfers of property are made, establishes rights to the land in favor of users and direct producers, and prevents the right of ownership from being used to promote situations of economic dominance or privilege to the detriment of the majority of the citizens.

Article 13—The state's economic policy is aimed at laying the foundations for development, improving the living conditions of the people, and ensuring the correct exploitation of natural resources and their use to benefit the people.

Article 14—The state ensures that economic activities are in accordance with the public interest.

The state promotes the planning and development of the national economy through direct action or by encouraging activities which contribute to a solution of the people's basic problems and a reduction in social and regional inequalities.

State investment must serve as an incentive in the promotion of development.

Article 15—The state exercises control over economic sectors which are crucial to the nation's economic sovereignty and to the independence of political power.

Article 16—The People's Republic of Mozambique regards agriculture as the basis for the growing satisfaction of the people's needs.

In the area of rural development, the state encourages production by the family sector and encourages individual peasants and workers to organize themselves in collective forms of production.

Article 17—The state recognizes the contribution of small-scale production to the national economy and supports its development as a means of making the best use of the people's abilities and creativity.

Article 18—Private property is recognized and guaranteed as provided by law.

Private property cannot be used to the detriment of the interests established by the Constitution and by law.

Article 19—Foreign capital operates within the framework of the state's economic policy.

Article 20—Taxes are created or amended by law and are determined on the basis of criteria of social justice and with due regard for the ability of the taxpayers.

Article 21—Labor is dignified and protected, and it is the driving force behind development.

The state upholds the fair distribution of income from labor.

Article 22—The People's Republic of Mozambique promotes an educational strategy aimed at the eradication of illiteracy and at the mastery of science and technology by its citizens.

The state organizes the education of the citizens through a national education system.

The instruction provided by collective bodies and other entities is provided in accordance with the law and is subject to state control.

Article 23—The state promotes the development of national culture and national personality and guarantees free expression of the traditions and values of Mozambican society.

The state disseminates Mozambican culture internationally and engages in activities to ensure that the Mozambican people benefit from the cultural achievements of other peoples.

Article 24—Medical and health assistance for the citizens is organized through a national health system that benefits the entire Mozambican people.

To achieve the objectives of the national health system, the conditions governing the provision of medical and health assistance are established by law.

The state promotes participation by citizens and institutions in improving the health level of the community.

Article 25—The state guides and promotes physical culture and sports as a means of educating and training the citizens.

Article 26—The People's Republic of Mozambique recognizes and esteems the sacrifices made by those who gave their lives in the struggle for national liberation and in defense of sovereignty and the Revolution.

The state provides special protection for the orphans and other dependents of those who died while carrying out their missions and for those who became physically handicapped in the struggle for national liberation and in defense of sovereignty and the Revolution.

Article 27—The family is the basic unit of society. The family develops and strengthens patriotic values in the new generations.

The state protects marriage as an institution which guarantees pursuit of the objectives of the family.

As part of the development of social relations based on respect for human dignity, the state establishes the principle that marriage is based on free consent.

Article 28—Motherhood is dignified and protected.

The family is responsible for the child's harmonious development.

The state and the family provide for the child's complete education by training him in the values of national unity, love of the fatherland, equality among men, and social solidarity.

A child may not be discriminated against because of his birth or subjected to abuse.

Article 29—The state promotes and supports the emancipation of women and encourages their growing role in society.

The state recognizes and esteems participation by the Mozambican woman in the struggle for national liberation and in all spheres of society.

Article 30—The state encourages and promotes initiative on the part of young people, as the worthy continuators of revolutionary traditions, on behalf of the strengthening of national unity and the reconstruction and defense of the country.

Young people played a decisive role in the struggle for national liberation, and they have a basic responsibility in the building of the new society.

Article 31—The People's Republic of Mozambique is a secular state in which there is a separation between the state and religious institutions.

The activities of religious institutions conform to the laws of the state.

The state esteems those activities by religious denominations which are aimed at promoting a climate of social understanding and tolerance and at strengthening national unity.

Religious denominations have the right to pursue freely their religious aims and to own and acquire goods for achieving their own objectives.

Article 32—The People's Republic of Mozambique, a nonaligned country, establishes relations of friendship and cooperation with other states on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, equality, noninterference in internal affairs, and reciprocity of benefits.

The People's Republic of Mozambique accepts, complies with, and applies the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity.

Article 33—The People's Republic of Mozambique struggles for the unity of African peoples and states on the basis of their freedom, dignity, and right to economic and social progress.

The People's Republic of Mozambique seeks to strengthen relations with countries committed to strengthening national independence and recovering the use and control of natural resources for the benefit of their respective peoples.

The People's Republic of Mozambique joins with all states in the struggle to institute a just and equitable economic order in international relations.

Article 34—The People's Republic of Mozambique supports and makes common cause with the struggle by the peoples for national liberation.

The People's Republic of Mozambique grants the right of asylum to foreigners persecuted because of their struggle for peace, democracy, national and social liberation, and the defense of human rights.

Article 35—The People's Republic of Mozambique maintains relations of friendship and cooperation with political and social forces throughout the world on the basis of the defense of national interests, progress, and peace.

The People's Republic of Mozambique esteems the relations forged with states, peoples, and organizations during its struggle for independence.

Article 36—The People's Republic of Mozambique pursues a policy of peace and uses force only in self-defense.

The People's Republic of Mozambique upholds the principle of general and universal disarmament by all states.

The People's Republic of Mozambique advocates transforming the Indian Ocean into a denuclearized peace zone.



## Title II: Rights, Duties, Freedoms, and Guarantees

### Chapter I: Rights and Duties of Citizens

Article 37—All citizens of the People's Republic of Mozambique are equal before the law, enjoy the same rights, and are subject to the same duties, regardless of color, race, ethnic origin, place of birth, religion, level of education, social position, civil status of their parents, or occupation.

Article 38—Every citizen is entitled to life. He or she is entitled to physical integrity and cannot be subjected to torture or cruel or inhumane treatment.

Every citizen is entitled to respect, a good name, a good reputation, defense of his or her public image, and the privacy of his or her personal life.

Article 39—Men and women are equal before the law in all areas of political, economic, social, and cultural life.

Article 40—All acts aimed at committing an offense against national unity, impairing social harmony, or creating divisions, situations of privilege or discrimination based on color, race, sex, ethnic origin, place of birth, religion, level of education, social position, civil status of one's parents, or occupation are punishable by law.

Article 41—All citizens have the right and the duty to participate in the process of expanding and strengthening democracy at all levels of society and the state.

Citizens over 18 years of age have the right to vote and to be elected unless they have been legally deprived of that right.

The right of suffrage is personal and constitutes a civic duty.

Article 42—All citizens enjoy freedom of opinion, assembly, and association.

Enjoyment of the above-mentioned rights is regulated by law and can be restricted only when their exercise would jeopardize public order or individual rights, freedoms, and guarantees or when the use of force is involved or proposed.

Article 43—Social organizations have the right to pursue their purposes, establish institutions designed to achieve their specific objectives, and own property for the conduct of their activities.

Article 44—Citizens have the right to appeal to the courts against acts which violate their rights as recognized by the Constitution and by law.

Article 45—Citizens have the right to present petitions, complaints, and protests to any authority for the purpose of demanding restoration of their violated rights.

Citizens have the right not to obey illegal orders or those which violate their rights.

Article 46—Citizens may resist administrative acts which violate their rights as established in the Constitution and all other laws.

Article 47—All citizens have the duty to respect constitutional order.

Acts contrary to the Constitution are punishable by law.

Article 48—Participation in the defense of independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity is the duty and honor of all citizens and continues the heroic traditions of the People's Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique.

Every citizen has the duty to perform military service as provided by law.

Article 49—The state is responsible for damage caused by illegal acts by its agents in the exercise of their duties, without prejudice to the right of appeal as provided by law.

Article 50—Citizens are free to practice or not to practice a religion.

Article 51—The state recognizes and guarantees the right to own property.

Expropriation is permissible only in cases of public necessity, usefulness, or interest as defined by law, and fair compensation is required.

Article 52—The state recognizes and guarantees the right to inherit as regulated by law.

Article 53—Labor constitutes a right and duty of every citizen, regardless of sex.

Every citizen is entitled to freely choose his or her occupation.

Compulsory labor is prohibited. Excepted from this provision is labor performed in accordance with penal legislation.

Article 54—Every worker is entitled to fair remuneration, rest, and vacation time as regulated by law.

A worker is entitled to protection, safety, and hygiene at the workplace.

A worker can be dismissed only in situations and under the conditions provided by law.

Article 55—Every worker is entitled to join and participate in union organizations.

The exercise of union rights is guaranteed and regulated by law.

The right to strike is regulated by law.

Article 56—Every citizen has a right to freedom of scientific, technical, and artistic creation.

The state protects the rights inherent in intellectual property, including copyright.

Article 57—In the People's Republic of Mozambique, education constitutes the right and duty of every citizen.

The state promotes the extension of that right and equal access to it by all citizens.

Article 58—All citizens are entitled to medical and health assistance as provided by law and have the duty to promote and protect health.

Article 59—The state promotes and encourages the creation of conditions in which the citizens can exercise their right to assistance in case of disability or old age.

## Chapter II: Guarantees of Rights and Freedoms

Article 60—Individual rights and freedoms are guaranteed by the state and must be exercised in accordance with the Constitution and the law.

Article 61—In the People's Republic of Mozambique, no one can be arrested and brought to trial except as provided by law.

Defendants are presumed to be innocent until a final verdict is reached.

Article 62—No one can be punished for an act that was not a crime at the time it was committed.

Penal law is applied retroactively only when doing so benefits the defendant.

Article 63—The state guarantees access by the citizens to the courts and guarantees defendants the right of defense and the right to legal aid and support.

The state takes steps to ensure that no one is denied justice because of a lack of funds.

Article 64—Domicile and correspondence or other means of private communication are inviolable except in cases specifically provided by law.

Article 65—Citizens are free to circulate within the national territory and to travel abroad unless they have been legally deprived of that right.

Article 66—Confinement pending trial is allowable only in those cases provided by law, with the respective maximum periods of confinement being established by law.

A citizen being confined pending trial is to be brought before the appropriate legal authority within the period established by law, and that legal authority is the only authority empowered to decide concerning the validity and continuation of confinement.

Article 67—In case of illegal arrest or detention due to an abuse of power, the citizen is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.

A writ of habeas corpus is requested from the court, the relevant procedure being established by law.

Article 68—Extradition can take place only by court order.

Extradition for political reasons is not authorized.

A Mozambican citizen cannot be expelled or extradited from national territory.

Article 69—Individual freedoms and guarantees can be suspended or restricted temporarily only by virtue of a declaration of a state of war, a state of siege, or a state of emergency.

The duration of a state of siege or a state of emergency cannot exceed 6 months.

Regulations governing the state of war, the state of siege, and the state of emergency and legal guarantees protecting the rights of citizens that are to be safeguarded are fixed by law.

## Title III: Organs of State

### Chapter I: General Principles

Article 70—The representative organs are chosen through elections in which all citizens are entitled to participate.

The election process is regulated by law.

The election law establishes the organization of electoral districts and ensures that there is a plurality of candidates.

Article 71—The organs of sovereignty are the president of the Republic, the People's Assembly, the Council of Ministers, and the courts.

Article 72—The central organs of state are the organs of sovereignty, all government organizations, and central institutions responsible for seeing that the national interest prevails and that the state's unitary policy is achieved.

Article 73—In general, the central organs are responsible for duties related to the exercise of sovereignty, the regulation of matters falling within the scope of the law, and the formulation of national policies.

Specifically, the central organs are exclusively responsible for representation of the state, the definition and organization of the territory, national defense, public order, border control, the issue of currency, and diplomatic relations.

Article 74—The central organs exercise their functions directly or through appointed directors or administrative agents who supervise the central activities carried out within a specific territorial area.

The representative of central authority at the provincial level is the provincial governor.

The form, organization, and authority of that office are determined by law.

Article 75—In the territorial subdivisions established by law, the local organs of state ensure that the citizens participate and reach decisions concerning matters of interest to their respective communities.

## Chapter II: President of the Republic

Article 76—The president of the Republic is the chief of state, symbolizes national unity, represents the nation internally and internationally, and sees to the correct functioning of the organs of state.

The chief of state is guarantor of the Constitution.

Article 77—The president of the Republic is elected by universal, direct, secret, and personal suffrage.

Candidates for president of the Republic must be Mozambican citizens between the ages of 40 and 65 years who are in full possession of their rights. They must be nominated by a minimum of 5,000 voters, and it is compulsory that that number include 200 residents of each province.

The president of the Republic serves for a term of 5 years, and he can be reelected no more than twice.

Article 78—The president of the Republic is head of the government and commander in chief of the Armed Forces.

The president of the Republic is in charge of security, the police forces, and the paramilitary forces.

Article 79—In the exercise of his duties as chief of state, it is the duty of the president of the Republic to:

- a) Address the nation in messages and communications.
- b) Report to the People's Assembly annually concerning the general state of the nation.
- c) Decide whether to hold referendums concerned with amendment of the Constitution or with matters of fundamental interest to the nation.
- d) Call general elections.
- e) Dissolve the People's Assembly under the terms provided in the Constitution.
- f) Appoint the presiding judge and the assistant presiding judge of the Supreme People's Court and the presiding judge of the Administrative Court.
- g) Appoint, remove, and dismiss the attorney general and the deputy attorney general of the Republic.
- h) Pardon prisoners and commute sentences.
- i) Confer honorary titles, decorations, and honors in accordance with the law.

Article 80—In directing the work of the government, it is the duty of the president of the Republic to:

- a) Convene and preside over sessions of the Council of Ministers.
- b) Appoint, remove, and dismiss the prime minister.
- c) Create ministries and committees of a ministerial nature.

d) Appoint, remove, and dismiss:

- (1) Ministers and deputy ministers.
- (2) Provincial governors.
- (3) Rectors of universities.
- (4) The governor and deputy governor of the Bank of Mozambique.
- (5) Secretaries of state.

The formulation of government policies by the Council of Ministers is carried out in sessions presided over by the president of the Republic.

Article 81—In the field of national defense and public order, it is the duty of the president of the Republic to:

- a) Declare a state of war and its cessation, a state of siege, or a state of emergency.
- b) Conclude peace treaties.
- c) Decree a general or partial mobilization.
- d) Appoint, remove, and dismiss the chief of the General Staff, the commanders of the branches of the Mozambique Armed Forces, and other officers as provided by law.

Article 82—In the field of international relations, it is the duty of the president of the Republic to:

- a) Direct foreign policy.
- b) Conclude international treaties.
- c) Appoint, remove, and dismiss the ambassadors and diplomatic envoys of the People's Republic of Mozambique.
- d) Receive the credentials of the ambassadors and diplomatic envoys of other countries.

Article 83—It is the duty of the president of the Republic to promulgate laws and have them published in the **BOLETIM DA REPUBLICA**.

The president of the Republic may return a law, accompanied by an explanation of his reasons, to the People's Assembly for reconsideration.

If, upon reconsideration, the law is approved by a two-thirds majority, the president of the Republic must promulgate it and have it published.

Article 84—Upon assuming office, the president of the Republic takes the following oath:

"I swear on my honor to devote all my energies to the defense, promotion, and strengthening of national unity and the achievements of the Revolution and to the well-being of the Mozambican people, to ensure respect for the Constitution, and to do justice to all citizens."

The president of the Republic assumes office in a public ceremony that is held in the presence of the elected deputies and the representatives of the organs of sovereignty and attested by the presiding judge of the Supreme People's Court.

Article 85—The president of the Republic determines who will replace him in case of temporary incapacity or absence and who will represent him in carrying out specific activities. If his period of incapacity exceeds 45 days, his temporary substitute will be the chairman of the People's Assembly.

Article 86—In case of the president of the Republic's death, resignation, or permanent incapacity, his functions are performed temporarily by the chairman of the People's Assembly.

The chairman of the People's Assembly assumes his duties as acting president of the Republic in the presence of representatives of the organs of sovereignty, and the ceremony is attested by the presiding judge of the Supreme People's Court.

Election of the new president of the Republic must take place within 45 days, and the acting president of the Republic is prohibited from being a candidate.

The new president of the Republic's term of office will continue until the next regularly scheduled elections.

Article 87—The permanent incapacity of the president of the Republic is verified by a medical board as provided by law.

The declaration of incapacity is received by the Standing Committee of the People's Assembly.

Article 88—During the period when the office of president of the Republic is vacant, the Constitution cannot be amended.

The acting president of the Republic ensures the functioning of the organs of state and the other institutions but cannot exercise the duties referred to in article 79, paragraphs b), c), d), and e); article 80, paragraph d); article 81, paragraph d); and article 82, paragraph c).

Article 89—The president of the Republic's policy-setting actions take the form of presidential decrees; all other decisions falling within his constitutional authority take the form of executive orders. Decrees and executive orders are published in the BOLETIM DA REPUBLICA.

Article 90—The president of the Republic enjoys immunity from civil and criminal proceedings with regard to his acts in the exercise of his duties.

During his term of office, the president of the Republic is not answerable in court for acts not related to the exercise of his duties.

### Chapter III: People's Assembly

#### Section I: People's Assembly

Article 91—The People's Assembly is the highest legislative body in the People's Republic of Mozambique.

The People's Assembly is elected by universal, direct, secret, and personal suffrage.

Through laws and policy statements of a general nature, the People's Assembly determines the rules which govern the functioning of the state and economic and social life.

The makeup of the People's Assembly is established by law.

The deputies in the People's Assembly are elected for a term of 5 years.

Article 92—It is the duty of the People's Assembly to legislate on basic matters concerned with the country's internal and external policy.

Specifically, it is the duty of the People's Assembly to:

- a) Judge the unconstitutionality and illegality of legislative and policy-setting acts by the organs of state.
- b) Delimit the borders of the People's Republic of Mozambique.
- c) Subdivide the territory.
- d) Approve the election law and the referendum procedure.
- e) Propose the holding of referendums on questions of national interest.
- f) Ratify the legislative acts of the Standing Committee of the People's Assembly.
- g) Sanction the suspension of constitutional guarantees and declarations of a state of siege or a state of emergency.
- h) Ratify the appointment of the presiding judge and assistant presiding judge of the Supreme People's Court and the presiding judge of the Administrative Court.
- i) Deliberate concerning the activity reports presented by the Council of Ministers.
- j) Deliberate concerning the State Plan and Budget and the related report concerning its execution.
- k) Formulate the basic tax policy.
- l) Ratify and denounce international treaties.
- m) Grant amnesties and pardons.
- n) Elect the chairman and members of the Standing Committee of the People's Assembly.
- o) Approve the procedural rules of the People's Assembly and the regulations governing deputies.
- p) Create committees of the People's Assembly and regulate their operation.

Article 93—The People's Assembly evaluates the government program presented by the prime minister at the start of each legislature.

The prime minister may present a program reformulated to take into account the conclusions of the debate.

If, following debate, the People's Assembly rejects the government program, the president of the Republic may dissolve the Assembly and call new general elections.



Article 94—The right of proposing laws belongs to:

- a) The president of the Republic.
- b) The committees of the People's Assembly.
- c) The deputies.
- d) The Council of Ministers.

Article 95—The People's Assembly elects the chairman of the People's Assembly from among its members.

The chief of state convenes and presides over the session at which the chairman of the People's Assembly is elected.

The chairman of the People's Assembly is installed in office by the chief of state.

The chairman of the People's Assembly is responsible to the People's Assembly.

Article 96—The People's Assembly meets in ordinary session twice a year and meets on other occasions when an extraordinary session is requested by the president of the Republic, the Standing Committee of the People's Assembly, or at least one-third of the deputies in the People's Assembly.

Article 97—The People's Assembly can deliberate only if more than one-half of its members are present.

Decisions of the People's Assembly are reached by a vote of more than one-half of the members present.

Article 98—The legislative acts of the People's Assembly take the form of laws, while its other decisions take the form of resolutions. Its laws and resolutions are published in the BOLETIM DA REPUBLICA.

Article 99—No deputy in the People's Assembly can be arrested unless caught in the act of committing a crime, nor can he be brought to trial without the consent of the People's Assembly or its Standing Committee.

Deputies in the People's Assembly are tried by the Supreme People's Court.

Article 100—Deputies in the People's Assembly cannot be sued, arrested, or tried in court for opinions expressed or votes cast in the exercise of their duties as deputies.

Excluded from this provision is civil and criminal liability for insult, defamation, or slander.

Article 101—A deputy in the People's Assembly may resign his seat.

Removal of a deputy from his seat and his voluntary resignation are regulated by law.

Article 102—The People's Assembly is convened and presided over by the chairman of the People's Assembly. If the chairman of the People's Assembly is absent or incapacitated, his duties are performed by members of the Standing Committee of the People's Assembly as provided in the procedural rules of the Assembly.

Article 103—It is the duty of the chairman of the People's Assembly to:

- a) Ensure that the decisions of the People's Assembly are carried out.
- b) Sign the laws passed by the People's Assembly and submit them for promulgation by the president of the Republic.
- c) Sign and have published the resolutions of the People's Assembly.
- d) Represent the People's Assembly within the country and internationally.

## Section II: Standing Committee of the People's Assembly

Article 104—The Standing Committee of the People's Assembly consists of the chairman of the People's Assembly and deputies elected by the People's Assembly from among its members.

The makeup of the Standing Committee of the People's Assembly is established by law.

The Standing Committee of the People's Assembly is convened and presided over by the chairman of the People's Assembly.

Article 105—It is the duty of the Standing Committee of the People's Assembly to:

- a) Approve laws and resolutions in the interval between sessions of the People's Assembly.
- b) Express its opinion on a state of war before the latter is declared.
- c) Sanction the suspension of constitutional guarantees and declarations of a state of siege or a state of emergency in cases where it is impossible to convene the People's Assembly.
- d) Authorize the president of the Republic to make state visits.
- e) Coordinate the activities of the committees of the People's Assembly.
- f) Be in charge of relations between the People's Assembly and similar assemblies and institutions in other countries.
- g) Prepare and organize the sessions of the People's Assembly.

Article 106—The Standing Committee of the People's Assembly cannot legislate concerning the following:

- a) The definition of nationality.
- b) Delimitation of the national territory.
- c) The election law.
- d) Referendum procedure.
- e) The organization of the courts and the status of judges.
- f) The rules governing a state of war, a state of siege, or a state of emergency.
- g) The creation of taxes.
- h) The designation of the national currency.

- i) The rules governing expropriations in the public interest.

The legislative acts of the Standing Committee of the People's Assembly are ratified by the People's Assembly during the session following their adoption.

Article 107—Legislative acts by the Standing Committee of the People's Assembly take the form of laws, and all other decisions take the form of resolutions. Laws and resolutions are published in the BOLETIM DA REPUBLICA.

#### Chapter IV: Council of Ministers

Article 108—The Council of Ministers is the government of the People's Republic of Mozambique.

In its work, the Council of Ministers complies with the decisions of the president of the Republic and the resolutions of the People's Assembly.

Article 109—The Council of Ministers is convened and presided over by the prime minister acting on behalf of the president of the Republic.

The makeup of the Council of Ministers is determined by law.

Article 110—The Council of Ministers is responsible to the president of the Republic and the People's Assembly for its conduct of internal and external policies and renders them an accounting of its activities as provided by law.

Article 111—The Council of Ministers is responsible for the administration of the country, guarantees territorial integrity, oversees the Armed Forces, ensures public order and the safety and stability of the citizens, promotes economic development, implements the state's social action, develops and strengthens legality, and conducts the country's foreign policy.

The defense of public and constitutional order is the responsibility of the appropriate organizations, which operate under the control of the government.

Article 112—Specifically, it is the duty of the Council of Ministers to:

- a) Guarantee the rights and freedoms of the citizens.
- b) Ensure public order and social discipline.
- c) Prepare draft laws to be submitted to the People's Assembly and draft decisions to be submitted to the president of the Republic.
- d) Guarantee the defense and consolidation of the state domain and the state's assets.
- e) Direct and coordinate the activities of the ministries and other organizations subordinate to the Council of Ministers.
- f) Analyze the experience of the local executive organs and regulate their organization and operation.
- g) Prepare the State Plan and Budget and execute it following approval by the People's Assembly.

- h) Promote and regulate economic activity and the activity of the social sectors.

- i) Guarantee the correct functioning and development of state-owned institutions and enterprises and their expansion in keeping with the needs of the economy.
- j) Promote development of the cooperative sector and support for production by the family sector.
- k) Guarantee conditions for the exercise of private enterprise.
- l) Direct labor policy and social welfare policy.
- m) Direct the social sectors of the state, especially as regards education and health.
- n) Define and promote housing policy.
- o) Prepare for the conclusion of international treaties and enter into, ratify, accede to, and denounce treaties.

Article 113—It is the duty of the prime minister, without prejudice to any other duties assigned to him by the president of the Republic and by law, to assist and advise the president of the Republic in leading the government.

Specifically, it is the duty of the prime minister to:

- a) Assist the president of the Republic in drawing up the government program.
- b) Advise the president of the Republic concerning the creation of ministries and committees of a ministerial nature and the appointment of members of the government and other government leaders.
- c) Draw up and propose to the president of the Republic the government's working plan.
- d) Ensure that the members of the government carry out the decisions of the organs of state.
- e) Convene and preside over meetings by the Council of Ministers for the purpose of dealing with the implementation of policies already adopted and other decisions.
- f) Coordinate and supervise the activities of the ministries and other government institutions.
- g) Sign decrees and resolutions of the Council of Ministers.
- h) Supervise the technical-administrative functioning of the Council of Ministers.

Article 114—In his relations with the People's Assembly, it is the duty of the prime minister to:

- a) Present the government program and the draft State Plan and Budget to the People's Assembly.
- b) Present the government's reports.
- c) Explain the government's position and its activities to the People's Assembly.

In the performance of these duties, the prime minister is assisted by such members of the Council of Ministers as he may appoint.

Article 115—The members of the Council of Ministers are responsible to the president of the Republic and the

prime minister for implementation of decisions by the Council of Ministers in their areas of competence.

Article 116—Policy-setting acts by the Council of Ministers take the form of decrees. All other decisions by the Council of Ministers take the form of resolutions.

Its decrees and resolutions are signed by the prime minister and published in the BOLETIM DA REPUBLICA.

#### Chapter V: Courts

Article 117—The purpose of the courts is to guarantee and strengthen legality as an instrument of juridical stability, guarantee respect for laws and regulations as a social practice, and ensure the rights and freedoms of the citizens as well as the legal interests of the various organizations and entities possessing legal status.

The courts train the citizens in voluntary and cognizant compliance with the law, thus establishing just and harmonious social coexistence.

Article 118—In the People's Republic of Mozambique, the jurisdictional function is exercised through the Supreme People's Court and other courts established by law.

The courts punish violations of legality and decide lawsuits in accordance with the provisions of law.

The Supreme People's Court is the highest judicial organ, and its jurisdiction comprises all of the national territory.

The Supreme People's Court ensures uniform enforcement of the law in the interests of the Mozambican people.

Article 119—The Supreme People's Court functions:  
a) In sections as a court of first and second instance.  
b) In plenary session as a court of second instance and single instance in cases expressly provided by law.

Article 120—The Supreme People's Court is composed of professional judges and elected judges.

Professional judges are appointed by the president of the Republic on the advice of the Higher Judiciary Council. Appointees must hold a licentiate in law.

The number of professional judges, their status, and the length of their term are determined by law.

Elected judges on the Supreme People's Court are chosen by the People's Assembly.

Those chosen to be elected judges on the Supreme People's Court must be Mozambican citizens over 40 years of age. Other requirements are established by law.

Article 121—In cases before the court, matters of law are always decided by the professional judges.

The elected judges participate only in judgments in which the court is acting as a court of first instance.

Article 122—The jurisdiction, composition, organization, and operation of the Higher Judiciary Council and of courts at all levels are regulated by law.

Article 123—In the performance of their duties, judges are independent and owe obedience only to the law.

Judges bear civil, criminal, and disciplinary liability for actions in connection with the performance of their duties only in those cases specifically provided by law.

A career judge may be removed from his judicial post only under legally established conditions.

Article 124—Monitoring the legality of administrative acts and verifying the legality of public expenditures is the duty of the Administrative Court.

The jurisdiction, organization, composition, and operation of the Administrative Court are regulated by law.

Article 125—Specifically, it is the duty of the Administrative Court to:

- a) Judge cases concerned with disputes arising from legal administrative relations.
- b) Judge appeals brought against decisions made by the organs of state and their respective heads and agents.
- c) Audit the state's accounts.
- d) Exercise any other jurisdiction assigned by law.

Article 126—Besides the Supreme People's Court, the Administrative Court, and the judicial courts, the following categories of courts exist:

- a) Military courts.
- b) Customs courts.
- c) Tax courts.

The jurisdiction, organization, composition, and operation of these courts are regulated by law.

Article 127—Except as expressly provided in the Constitution, the establishment of courts intended to judge certain categories of crimes exclusively is prohibited.

#### Chapter VI: Attorney General of the Republic

Article 128—The attorney general of the Republic supervises and verifies legality, promotes compliance with the law, and participates in the defense of established legal order.

The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic is headed by the attorney general of the Republic, who in case of absence or incapacity is replaced by the deputy attorney general of the Republic.

The attorney general of the Republic is responsible to the president of the Republic and reports to the People's Assembly annually.

The organization, composition, and operation of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic are determined by law.

Article 129—The Office of the Public Prosecutor constitutes a hierarchically organized judicial body subordinate to the attorney general of the Republic.

In the performance of their duties, the prosecutors and agents of the Office of the Public Prosecutor must adopt an attitude of legality, objectivity, impartiality, and exclusive obedience to the directives and orders provided by law.

Article 130—The Office of the Public Prosecutor represents the state before the courts, verifies the legality and length of detentions, directs investigations in connection with criminal cases, executes penal action, and ensures the legal defense of minors, the absent, and the incapacitated.

#### Chapter VII: Local Organs of State

Article 131—The purpose of the local organs of state is to organize citizen participation in the solution of problems specific to their communities and to promote local development.

Strengthening the local organs serves to deepen the content of democracy and contributes to national integration and unity.

Local organs of state have authority to decide matters relative to their own areas of territorial action when such matters do not fall within the jurisdiction of other organs.

Local organs are constituted at the territorial levels and with the organic structure provided by law.

Article 132—Local organs consist of assemblies made up of deputies elected by citizens residing within a specific territorial area and of executive bodies appointed by these assemblies.

The executive bodies are subordinate to the assemblies.

Article 133—The deputies give a periodic accounting of their activities to the citizens they represent and to the assemblies.

A deputy's dismissal or resignation from his seat is regulated by law.

Article 134—The assemblies make binding decisions in their areas of competence, establish the committees necessary for carrying out their duties, and appoint individual deputies to be responsible for carrying out specific tasks.

The organs and institutions of the state must provide any necessary information and cooperate with the local organs with a view to the smooth execution of their tasks.

Article 135—The legal form taken by acts of the local organs is established by law.

#### Chapter VIII: Incompatibilities

Article 136—The offices of president of the Republic, chairman of the People's Assembly, prime minister, member of the government, presiding judge of the Supreme People's Court, assistant presiding judge of the Supreme People's Court, judge of the Supreme People's Court, presiding judge of the Administrative Court, attorney general of the Republic, deputy attorney general of the Republic, provincial governor, and secretary of state are incompatible.

#### Title IV: Symbol and Capital of the Republic

Article 137—The symbols of the People's Republic of Mozambique are the flag, the emblem, and the anthem.

Article 138—The national flag is based on the flag of the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo), the vanguard which united the Mozambican people in the fight against colonialism, led the armed struggle for national liberation, proclaimed national independence, and founded the People's Republic of Mozambique.

The national flag has five colors: red, green, black, gold, and white.

The colors represent the following:

- Red: The age-old resistance to colonialism, the armed struggle for national liberation, and the Revolution.
- Green: The wealth in Mozambique's soil.
- Black: The African continent.
- Gold: The wealth in the subsoil.
- White: The rightness of the Mozambican people's struggle and peace.

Arranged from top to bottom are horizontal stripes of green, black, and gold separated by white stripes. On the left is a red triangle, in the center of which is a gold star underlying a book on which are superimposed a rifle and a hoe crossing each other.

The gold star symbolizes the internationalist spirit of the Mozambican people.

The book, hoe, and rifle represent the slogan "Study, Produce, Fight."

Article 139—The emblem of the People's Republic of Mozambique has as its main components a book, a rifle, and a hoe placed above a map of Mozambique and representing, respectively, education, defense and vigilance, and the peasantry and agricultural production.

Represented below the map is the ocean.

In the center is the rising sun, symbolizing the Revolution and the new life that is being built.

Framing all of the above is a sprocket wheel symbolizing the working class and industry.



Surrounding the sprocket wheel on the right and left respectively are an eared corn plant and a sugar cane symbolizing agricultural wealth.

On the top edge is a red star symbolizing the internationalist spirit of the Mozambican Revolution.

Arranged at the bottom is a red stripe with the inscription "People's Republic of Mozambique."

Article 140—The capital of the People's Republic of Mozambique is the City of Maputo.

#### Title V: Constitutional Revision

Article 141—Initiatives to amend the Constitution must be proposed by the president of the Republic or by at least one-third of the deputies in the People's Assembly.

Proposed amendments must be submitted to the People's Assembly 90 days before the start of debate.

Article 142—In the case of a proposed amendment involving a radical change in the rights of citizens or in the organization of the public powers, the proposed amendment as adopted by the People's Assembly is submitted to public debate and made the subject of a referendum.

In all other cases, amendment of the Constitution is approved by a two-thirds majority of the deputies in the People's Assembly.

Article 143—All citizens eligible to vote are entitled to participate in the referendum.

The proposal is considered adopted if it is approved by more than one-half of those expressing an opinion.

The results of the referendum and the text of the Constitution as approved are adopted by the People's Assembly in the form of a constitutional law and caused to be published by the president of the Republic in the BOLETIM DA REPUBLICA.

Article 144—The Constitution can be amended only after a 5-year period following the previous constitutional revision.

#### Title VI: Final and Transitional Provisions

Article 145—Constitutional provisions take precedence over all other legal provisions.

Article 146—Previous legislation not in conflict with the Constitution remains in effect until amended or revoked.

Article 147—The provisions of article 68 concerning the election of the president of the Republic will take effect when the third general elections are held.

Until the third general elections are held, the president of the People's Republic of Mozambique will continue to be chairman of the Frelimo Party.

Article 148—The terms of office of the deputies in the People's Assembly will continue until general elections are held in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.

Article 149—The limitation on terms of office as provided in article 77 will take effect beginning with the elections held in accordance with this Constitution.

Article 150—This Constitution takes effect on [date not given].

#### \* Council of Ministers Studies Emergency Program

90EF0279B Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese  
14 Feb 90 p 1

[Communiqué by the Council of Ministers, released by the Office of the Prime Minister in February 1990 in Maputo]

[Text] Last Tuesday, meeting in regular session chaired by President Chissano, the Council of Ministers concluded that despite the many problems in transporting, warehousing, and distributing goods donated by the international community, "more than 80 percent of the emergency supplies are regularly distributed to the people who have been displaced and affected" by the war and natural disasters.

According to the analysis conducted by the Council, whose communiqué appears below, in some cases products are diverted as a result of decisions at the level of some provincial capital, authorizing distribution or sale of emergency goods in transit in order to cope with situations in which the supply channels have been disrupted.

The Council of Ministers evaluated the reports of the two investigating committees named in March 1989. The ministers also appointed two more committees to continue with the work already begun. Following is the full text of the communiqué released yesterday by the Office of the Prime Minister regarding the management of emergency supplies.

"In the ongoing analysis of the implementation of the Emergency Program, on 7 March 1989 the Fourth Session of the Council of Ministers confirmed the existence of a troubling number of cases of diversion and theft of goods donated by the international community, occurring both at the port-railway yards and during the transport, warehousing, and distribution process.

"Among the factors identified as facilitating the illegal activities were anomalies and shortcomings in the management of the Emergency Program and inadequate definition of the responsibilities of the various agencies involved with the program.

"It was also found that, in some cases, the diversions were the result of decisions at the level of some provincial capitals, authorizing the distribution or sale of

emergency supplies in transit in order to deal with situations in which the normal supply channels were disrupted.

"To study the situation, the Council of Ministers decided to create two committees of inquiry: one to investigate the thefts, diversions, and losses occurring during receipt of the emergency supplies, namely at the ports and railway yards; and one to investigate diversions and thefts during the distribution process and other operations for which the DPCCN [Department for Prevention of and Combat Against Natural Disasters] is responsible.

"According to their mandate, the two committees were to concentrate on identifying and channeling to the competent authorities all indictments in cases of theft and diversion and to propose measures to prevent any further occurrence or repetition and also to strengthen our management and administrative capability in this area.

"In its session of 5 February 1990, the Council of Ministers, chaired by President Joaquim Alberto Chissano, evaluated the final reports presented by the committees of inquiry.

"The Council of Ministers learned that 246 cases of diversions and theft of emergency supplies have been referred to the police authorities since 1986. Of these, 55 are still under examination, 2 have been shelved for insufficient evidence, and 189 were forwarded to the court; 67 cases have been tried and 122 are still awaiting trial. During the same period, the DPCCN also instituted disciplinary proceedings against 86 of its employees.

"The Council of Ministers examined the documentation of countless cases in which the loss or diversion of emergency supplies was aggravated by terrorist action by the armed bandits, such as destruction of transport means and the looting of the DPCCN warehouses.

"The Council of Ministers found that, despite the problems and difficulties noted, more than 80 percent of the emergency supplies are regularly distributed to the people who have been displaced and affected; this is owing to the effort and dedication of the National Executive Committee (CENE) of the Emergency Program, the DPCCN, and the donor organizations.

"The Council of Ministers noted that in recent months there has been a noticeable decline in illegal practices leading to the diversion of emergency supplies, as a result of more incisive action by the administrative agencies and the forces of law and order, as well as improvements in the work methods and internal organization of the emergency structure.

"To further the action initiated to instill greater responsibility in everyone involved and to improve the management of the Emergency Program, the Council of Ministers determined:

"1. To order further study, through the competent structures, of the cases of diversions and theft identified and under investigation, to ascertain where the responsibility lies;

"2. To instruct the Interior Ministry and Office of the Attorney General of the Republic to take speedier action on cases under examination and to bring them to trial;

"3. To instruct the ministries to institute disciplinary proceedings in cases in which government employees are involved;

"4. To instruct the Interior Ministry, the Ministry of National Defense, the Finance Ministry, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the Ministry of Cooperation to take special action to ensure a speedy end to the losses, thefts, and diversions verified by the committees of inquiry; specifically, to strengthen the measures for the protection and security of emergency supplies and other merchandise, both at the port-railway yards and in the transport, warehousing, and distribution process;

"5. That the emergency supplies under the responsibility of the DPCCN, destined for free distribution at the refugee centers, may not be distributed or sold in other locales;

"6. To hold the central and provincial organs of government, namely the ministers and governors, responsible for strict adherence to the management standards set down in the Operations Manual for the Emergency Program;

"7. To instruct the CENE/DPCCN to draw up and present an accounting, every 3 months, of the emergency supplies received in the country and of the supplies actually distributed to the people;

"8. To instruct the CENE and DPCCN to urge citizens and donors to report promptly any irregularities to the police authorities or to offices of the attorney general of the Republic;

"9. To ensure the institutional reinforcement of the CENE and DPCCN at all levels, including revision of some of their work methods, to enable them to administer the Emergency Program more properly and efficiently;

"10. To instruct the CENE and DPCCN to take the necessary action to establish and publicize uniform standards, methods, and organization throughout the country for the proper management of the Emergency Program by the individuals and institutions involved.

"The Council of Ministers hails the effort and sacrifice of all those who are working to see that the emergency humanitarian aid reaches the thousands of citizens in urgent need in various parts of the country.

"The Council of Ministers also lauds the national and international solidarity in support of some 5 million

Mozambicans who have been displaced and victimized by the war waged against us from abroad, through the armed bands, and by the cyclical natural disasters that have devastated our country in recent years.

"The Council of Ministers, having evaluated the reports submitted by the committees of inquiry and reaffirming its commitment to the proper execution of the Emergency Program, reiterates its continuing determination to see to it that all those who violate the standards in effect for the management of emergency supplies are severely punished."

"Maputo, February, 1990"

**\* Draft Registration Under Way in Maputo**

90EF0279C Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese  
10 Feb 90 p 3

[Text] Despite the initial problems occurring in the early days of January, there has been a satisfactory flow of young people to the various mobilization and registration centers in the districts of Maputo Province, particularly Boane, Manhica, Marracuene, and Namaacha districts. Lieutenant Lucas Mutonda, chief of the recruitment section of the Maputo Province Mobilization and Recruitment Center, informed a NOTICIAS reporter yesterday.

The military officer also mentioned large turnouts in three districts in the city; namely, Matola, Machara, and T-3.

Mutonda cited reports submitted by the chiefs of the district centers, who say young people have lately been appearing in satisfactory numbers to register.

There is no information as to how the current campaign is going in other districts of the province, such as Magude, Moambe, and Matutuine. However, the lieutenant said that within a few days he expected to have data available on the registrations in these districts as well.

As we learned, the initial difficulties were the result of poor mobilization by the people's organizations. At present, according to Mutonda, these organizations are engaged primarily in mobilizing young people born in 1973.

"In recent weeks, we have been seeing a trend toward young people reporting to the registration centers," Mutonda said. Considering this flow, the officer appealed to all young people to register now, to avoid the long lines and possible confusion in the final days of the campaign.

He also urged young people who should have registered in previous years to report to the centers, armed with statements from their districts explaining their failure to register earlier.

"We will register these young people if they have a justification from their districts or other legal instances," he explained.

"The strangest thing is that many of the young people who have not registered come to us when they have a problem." The officer made a point of saying that the SMO [Compulsory Military Service] is a law that applies to all Mozambicans, "so there is no need for apprehension or hesitation, because the country belongs to everyone and everyone has a duty to defend it."

The current registration campaign for Compulsory Military Service, which began on 2 January, covers young people of both sexes who were born in 1973.

**\* Economic Cooperation With Libya Reaffirmed**

90EF0279A Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese  
15 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by Bernardo Mavanga]

[Text] Serte, Libya—Yesterday evening, in the new city of Serte, about 450 kilometers from Tripoli, Mozambique and Libya began formal discussions aimed to strengthen friendly relations and to reaffirm bilateral cooperation. This was following President Joaquim Chissano's official and working visit to Libya yesterday at the invitation of President Muammar al-Qadhafi. Also yesterday, presidents Chissano and al-Qadhafi met privately for more than an hour while negotiations were proceeding at the ministerial level.

President Chissano, who was accompanied on this trip by Trade Minister Daniel Gabriel and Army Chief of Staff General Hama Thai, landed in Serte yesterday at about 1200 hours local time (1300 hours Maputo time). He was welcomed by President al-Qadhafi, other Libyan high officials and members of the diplomatic corps accredited to that country. Many others also gathered to welcome the Mozambican chief of state at Serte's military airport, particularly young students, who shouted greetings to the president.

As is customary, the reception included an honor guard passing in review, a 21-gun salute, and the singing of the national anthem of both countries, marking the beginning of the presidential visit, the first official visit that Chissano has paid to Libya as chief of state.

Even before leaving the airport for the luxurious guest house where the president and his party were installed, President Chissano expressed his wish for stronger ties of cooperation between the two countries and stressed the importance of this visit in reaching agreement and exchanging views regarding the changes that are taking place in the world.

Speaking to the press, the president noted that the world is experiencing changes that should be discussed "with the Libyan brothers." He referred specifically to events

in southern Africa and Europe and the consequent need to plan and to outline new forms of combat and new forms of cooperation.

"The changes in the Arab world call for analysis," Chissano said, noting Libya's "commitment to the positive changes that are occurring in this region of our continent."

Alluding to the objectives of his visit to Libya, Chissano stressed that Mozambique continues to need the moral, political, and diplomatic support of the Libyan people and that this occasion serves to give recognition to their recent progress. Chissano voiced his hope for better relations between countries and peoples, declaring that the changes occurring in the world should contribute to the development of a balanced, harmonious, and peaceful world.

Mozambique and Libya maintain a general cooperation accord, signed in 1982, covering fishing, agriculture, mining, and various other areas. However, the war situation which has affected our country for several years has been a major limiting factor in the development of various projects included in that accord. At present, cooperation with Libya centers on the transportation field; for example, Libya has made two ships available: the "Ponta Delgado" and the "Lily-T," to be used for passenger transport.

President Joaquim Chissano was in Libya last year to take part in the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the revolution, but this is his first official visit to Libya as chief of state.

#### \* Hamburg Official on Development Projects

90EF0279D Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese  
10 Feb 90 p 1

[Text] The investments which the FRG's Hamburg State has been making since 1988 in the development of small projects in Mozambique are showing good results, which is "proof that they are being used well," says Stefan Chrobot, Hamburg's director of foreign relations and cooperation, who ended his 1-week visit to our country on Wednesday.

In an exclusive interview with this newspaper, Stefan Chrobot said the purpose of his visit was to see how the machines recently donated by Hamburg State to IDIL (National Institute for the Development of Local Industry) are being put to use.

As evidence of the proper use of the above-mentioned investments, the official noted the extraction of copra oil at the Chitata-Maxixe cooperative in Inhambane. The oil is used in the manufacture of soap.

Several cooperatives in Maputo City are receiving support from IDIL, but Chrobot says the ultimate goal is to aid as many cooperatives as possible in our country.

The speaker reiterated that the people and government of his state were well disposed to increase their support to our country, noting that another donation from Hamburg should be arriving within a few weeks. The donation consists basically of agricultural equipment and other machinery for the Project for Development of Small Industry.

Also in aid to the development of our country, Hamburg plans to send more professional training materials to the People's Development Bank (BPD) and is offering another study grant for the advanced professional training of a BPD staff member in Hamburg.

Among the equipment that Hamburg has been supplying to the BPD for the last 18 months are calculators, copiers, tape recorders, slide projectors, etc.

The first banker to receive advanced training in Hamburg completed his internship last year.

Another project which is still under study is the supply of equipment for a tanning cooperative which produces shoe leather in Buvuma, Tete Province.

Stefan Chrobot said that South-South cooperation and the establishment of the New International Economic order, through the promotion of North-South cooperation, is the trend followed by Hamburg State.

He reiterated that Hamburg's cooperation with such underdeveloped countries as Mozambique, Botswana, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and the Western Sahara is not connected in any way with the West German Federation, since it is an initiative of the people of Hamburg State.

#### \* India To Finance Buzi Agricultural Projects

90EF0243E Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese  
8 Jan 90 p 1

[Text] A series of farm projects in the district of Buzi, in the province of Sofala, will be carried out this year with financing by the Indian Government.

A source in the district government told this newspaper that this financing has already been guaranteed, and all that is lacking is the launching of the work on this project.

According to our source, the project will benefit not only the peasants in the state sector, but the family, cooperative, and private sectors as well.

In fact, the Indian authorities will also finance the purchase of mills for grinding corn into meal and for hulling rice.

The Indian Government, this same source said, will also finance the purchase of vessels, with their respective engines, so that other farm activities, such as transporting seeds and production tools, can be carried out.

The spokesman for the district government in Buzi added that India's interest in financing these projects



developed during the recent visit paid by the Indian ambassador accredited to Mozambique to the district of Buzi, in Sofala.

He further explained that in addition to these undertakings, the local bodies will carry out other projects this year in support of the peasant population in this region.

As a result, according to our source, the populations of the localities of Ampara, Estaquinha, and Bandua will be provided with farm equipment including motor pumps and irrigation equipment, among other things.

Also in this connection, our source emphasized, the residents at the Guara-Guara Administrative Post, in Chissanguane, will be given farmland and production tools.

On the other hand, the people in this district in the province of Sofala are waiting hopefully for this work in the farm and other sectors to begin, since to a great extent improvement in their living conditions depends upon it.

The purchase of mills for the production of cornmeal, as well as vessels, with their respective engines, for transport and fishing, will boost farm, fishing, and transportation activities.

The development of the activities included within this program will at the same time ensure the settlement of thousands of families displaced by the war situation which has been promoted from abroad against our country through the armed bandits' activities.

#### \* New City, District Borders Delineated

90EF0243C Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese  
10 Jan 90 p 3

[Text] The Ministry for State Administration plans to undertake the task of delimiting the areas of the new cities established in 1986, pursuant to the decisions approved by the 15th Popular Assembly Session. These decisions provided for the creation of new districts by the provinces, the transfer of some areas in certain districts to others in the same province, and the promotion of some urban centers to the city category.

According to Jose Antinao, who works with that ministry, as quoted in DIARIO DE MOZAMBIQUE, this is an important and complex task, but also one of broad scope. Its purpose is to provide the material, political, and social conditions which will guarantee the implementation of the economic and sociocultural development plans for the country, among other things.

According to this source, the project is already under way in the cities of Nampula, Nacala, Beira, Chimoio, Xai-Xai, and Matola, under the direction of a brigade specializing in this work.

The source explained that the process of redefining the boundaries of the urban districts in the city of Maputo is

currently being implemented, because that city and Matola have been separated. As a result, the city of Maputo has been reduced from its former eight districts to five.

#### Cadre Training

The 15th session of the Popular Assembly created a total of 68 new settlements throughout the country, which will shortly be subject to territorial restructuring. This is the reason, moreover, that the Ministry for State Administration has sponsored training for the cadres who will implement this decision.

In fact, 20 technicians have just been trained in a course in toponymy financed by Friedrich Ebert, a nongovernmental organization in the FRG, under the sponsorship of the Ministry State Administration.

Participants in this course included individuals from the provincial support and control offices, the departments responsible for aid to the district areas and localities, the executive councils of the cities of Maputo, Beira, Matola, and Nampula, and some individuals from state bodies.

The newly trained technicians will carry out the work we have described in Inhambane, Maxixe, Ilha de Mocambique, Mocuba, Cuamba, Angoche, and Montepuez, Jose Antinao explained.

Twenty-five new districts have been created in the country. There were 103 already in existence. Also, of the 23 cities in the country, 11 were just recently established. In this connection, 393 administrative posts which did not exist under the former territorial division have also been created.

The Ministry for State Administration is the body which sees to proper observance of the standards pertaining to territorial organization and classification of the territorial units in the country, as well as their names.

#### \* Nampula Governor Visits Mogincual District

90EF0243F Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese  
19 Jan 90 p 3

[Text] Jacob Jeremias Nyambir, first secretary of the party and governor of Nampula, recently visited the district of Mogincual to learn firsthand about the socioeconomic situation in that zone. He visited the administrative posts in Namigi, Quixaxe, and Liupo, where he met with the local citizens.

In a meeting with members of the district committee of the party and cadres in the state apparatus, which was held in Mogincual, the district seat, the governor of Nampula was given a report on the activities carried out in the various sectors last year.

According to the report, the district marketed 1,172 tons of peanuts, 2,000 tons of rice, 4,000 tons of beans, 629 tons of corn, and 69 tons of sorghum during the 1988-89 farm season.

On the other hand, the document said that during the preceding season, the district succeeded in marketing more than 1,000 tons of cashews, as compared to the 2,000 planned.

The family sector in that district has more than 2 million cashew trees, covering an area of more than 800,000 [text missing] education and trade sectors and the communal settlements.

In fact, the report said that 87 communal settlements, in which more than 70,000 persons live, were destroyed by the armed bandits. However, the district bodies in Mogincual are currently working on the rebuilding of 23 of these rural communities.

#### \* Private Agriculture in Cabo Delgado Grows

90EF0243B Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese  
12 Jan 90 p 3

[Text] Farm activity in the private sector in Cabo Delgado has taken on new impetus since last year, with a rising wave of applications for permission to occupy land in recent months in almost all parts of the district. The production areas in this sector increased from 963.5 hectares in 1988 to 10,563.6 hectares last year. On the other hand, farm production in the state sector continues to show a considerable decline. It is estimated that the area has now been reduced by about 27 percent as compared to recent years.

According to the Cabo Delgado Territorial Plan and Program submitted for discussion at an ordinary session of the provincial government body last week, the decline seen in the state sector is due "to the traditional problems, specifically the lack of organization, inadequate management, failure to adjust enterprise size, sizable debts to the bank, and obsolete equipment."

The somber prospects for the N'Gdri Irrigation Project, of which almost no use is being made at present, and the only partial use of the Chipembe Irrigation Project constitute one of the factors contributing to the decline in the state sector in Cabo Delgado, according to the Plan and Program submitted to the members of the government body for analysis and discussion.

Again in the farm sector, the provincial government established that substantial material and technical support needs to be made available to the family sector so that grain and cotton production can be encouraged. Cotton in recent years has seen a substantial decline as a result of the destabilization caused by the armed bandits in the regions of Montepuez, Balama, Namuno, Ancuabe, and Chiure, all districts which have traditionally been heavy producers.

Moreover, a warning has been issued concerning the need for better organization in 1990 of the farm marketing and shipment process, in connection above all with the family sector surpluses, so as to prevent the lack

of production incentives from limiting the increase in the marketing indices for certain products in subsequent seasons.

The program for 1990 calls for a 3.5 percent increase in the marketing of grains. In 1989, more than 17,000 tons of corn, rice, and sorghum were purchased from the peasants.

Official sources said that this warning was provoked by the excessively serious financial and organizational problems which affected the farm marketing campaign last year. Agricom [Agricultural Products Marketing Company] is continuing to feel their effects, and must also deal with hundreds of tons of corn still to be marketed in Mocimboa da Praia.

A number of the participants in the marketing campaign last year also believe that hundreds of tons of various products, above all corn and cassava, are still in the possession of the peasants, who are constantly looking for buyers but apparently do not have storage space available and are in a weak financial position.

Moreover, the investment and construction aspect was also emphasized during the Territorial Plan and Program discussions, and special attention was devoted to the program for rehabilitating the infrastructures in the district seats and the provincial capital.

According to the Plan and Program, the lack of housing and the resulting increasing demand, mainly in Pemba, must be the focus of greater attention from the local authorities this year. The plan is to study the possibility of establishing a housing fund designed to generate new construction capacity in the housing sector.

#### \* Gaza 88/89 Agricultural Figures Given

90EF0243A Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese  
13 Jan 90 p 3

[Text] During the 1988/89 farm season, the province of Gaza produced a little more than 21,800 tons of rice, as compared to the 42,000 planned, while the plans for corn and cotton were overfulfilled by 12 and 99 percent, respectively. This information was provided by Provincial Agriculture Director Roberto Lumbela during a meeting of the Gaza provincial government held recently in the city of Xai-Xai, with Governor Francisco Pateguana presiding.

The family sector, which accounts for 90 percent of the crop area in that part of the country, made the largest contribution to farm production. It includes more than 260,000 families and produces 25,000 tons of grain, 500 tons of beans, and 200 tons of cotton annually.

In livestock production, this sector also accounts for 90 percent of the head of cattle produced for meat. The average marketed meat production total comes to 200 tons.

However, according to a report presented by the provincial director of agriculture, the family sector is being seriously affected by the terrorist actions of the armed bandits, which force the peasants to move constantly in search of relatively safe localities.

An analysis of the dynamics of plan fulfillment in meat production over the past 5 years showed that there has been a substantial decline in the herds, caused basically by theft and indiscriminate slaughter. For this reason, the farm sector in Gaza is working on an effort to establish the true facts, and has already detected some irregularities.

#### State and Private Sectors

According to Roberto Lumbela, the production of the farm enterprises located in Gaza is made up predominantly of grains and vegetable crops, with an average annual production volume of 24,000 and 2,500, respectively.

The state farm enterprises are faced with financial problems, and some have accumulated astronomical debts, on which the figures have not been made public. The farm enterprises in Chibuto, Macia, Mapapa, and Hokwe were cited as being in extremely precarious situations.

On the other hand, the activities of the production units engaged in livestock breeding are focused on the production of milk, beef, and pork. The cattle herd includes a total of about 5,000 head, and annual production comes to 50 tons and 350,000 liters of milk.

The enterprises in this sector are experiencing serious management problems, and generally speaking, suffer from a shortage of fodder resulting from the prolonged drought which has dragged on for a number of years in Gaza.

According to the provincial director of agriculture, the private farm sector currently occupies an area of 20,000 hectares. It is producing equal amounts of grain and vegetables, which total about 17,000 tons per year. In livestock breeding, this sector has a total of about 9,000 head of animals, including goats, swine, and cattle.

This official emphasized that the private farmers have tripled their grain production and have produced a substantial volume of vegetable crops as a result of the incorporation of new farm equipment.

Although it has benefited from major investments, this sector continues to feel the effects of the high cost of production factors, specifically fuels and fertilizers, as well as the tax burden.

The recent Gaza provincial government session also assessed the activities carried out by the Provincial Support and Control Office last year, and the government officials present at the session heard an address concerning the activities of the Red Cross.

#### \* Legal Occupancy of Lands in Gaza Under Way

90EF0243G Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese  
19 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by Xai-Xai correspondent Virgilio Bambo]

[Text] The process of legalizing and occupying land is continuing in the province of Gaza, our correspondent in Xai-Xai, Virgilio Bambo, reports. He adds that between January and October of last year, the provincial geography and survey departments received 418 applications covering an area of 72,000 hectares in the districts of Xai-Xai, Chokwe, Guija, Bilene, Chibuto, and Mandlakazi. Of this area, more than 4,500 hectares belong to the family sector. This information was provided by the provincial farm director at a meeting held in connection with the Land Law, in which the governor of the province, Francisco Pateguana, participated.

As was reported at that session, the principal activities in connection with the implementation of the Land Law were preceded by a campaign to publicize the legislation through talks and seminars, with individuals in the sector participating. Later, this work was extended to the districts.

Moreover, 322 legal occupation documents covering more than 58,000 hectares were drafted on the basis of the applications received. The document submitted by the provincial farm director in Gaza said that since implementation of the Regulation on the Land Law was begun, 29 favorable decisions have been issued on applications by a local authority, although these decisions are the responsibility of the central level.

According to this same source, six disputes pertaining to land occupation have been submitted. They were later turned over to the arbitration body, and some of them have been resolved. There are other cases which have not been officially submitted to the survey departments, particularly in the districts of Xai-Xai and Chokwe.

The disputes mentioned have mainly resulted from the superposition of rights to allocate land, the responsibility for which, the Provincial Farm Office insists, rests with the local bodies.

The report goes on to say that in connection with the development of the activities of the provincial geography and survey departments, state reserves were proposed and established in the districts of Xai-Xai and Mandlakazi for the principal purpose of pasturing cattle. In addition, others were established in Chibuto for other purposes, such as development projects.

According to the position defended by the farm office in Gaza, it is essential, if the activities in connection with the Regulation on the Land Law are to be successful, that it be made known to the population. It is also necessary for the officials, both in the party and in the government, to play a more active role in promoting it.

This office pointed out the importance of strict adherence to the norms which regulate who can authorize the occupation of a given plot of land, in order to avoid the development of difficulties such as those which have occurred. Superposition of authority on land occupation exists because of the confusion which still persists about who really has jurisdiction over the allocation of land.

Leading tasks in the forest and wild-animal sector in the province last year included reforestation, forest exploitation, protection of flora and fauna, and also the testing of certain exotic species.

In this connection, 103 hectares of land along the dunes and in the communal settlements of Xai-Xai, Bilene, and Chokwe were reforested. More than 520,000 casuarina and eucalyptus seedlings were produced in the forest nurseries.

An outstanding feature of this activity was the allocation of 8,000 contos by the Agriculture Office for work entrusted to the Socas enterprise and to the Mozambique Christian Council.

With regard to timber, the production total last year came to 564 cubic meters of logs, and 671 cubic meters of timber sawed into boards, studs, railroad ties, and parquet flooring. The species most extensively exploited were chanfuta, jambirre, and eucalyptus, among others.

This sector is urging strict implementation of the regulations, so as to safeguard the natural wealth and the ecosystem. In this connection, a supervisory campaign is under way. In the city of Xai-Xai, it has been given the name Operation Nothing Left. All districts are covered by a corps of supervisors, whose work has already produced rather encouraging results.

## Seychelles

### \* France Gives Aid To Tighten Airport Security

90EF0275A Victoria SEYCHELLES NATION  
in French 23 Jan 90 pp 1, 2

[Text] On 9 September 1989, a DC-10 flown by the French airline UTA exploded in midair over Chad. All 171 passengers aboard lost their lives in this terrorist attack.

Since then, the French Government has decided to help the African and Indian Ocean countries in France's sphere of cooperation to bring their airports into line with the new security standards and has allocated 100 million francs for this purpose.

Two French officials charged with this mission—Mr. Bardiaux, with the French ministry of cooperation, and Mr. Buisset, with the civilian aviation administration—were in the Seychelles this weekend. "Originally, our plans did not call for a stop here because the Seychelles are not known as an area of risk," Mr. Buisset remarked.

"But given the large number of tourists who pass through here, it was considered advisable to include Victoria airport in our activities."

They were very surprised by the quality of Victoria's facility. "Arriving from Africa, we had the impression of entering another world," commented Mr. Bardiaux. "The staff and organization are for the most part up to international levels. Our work here will involve mere adjustments."

A budget of 1 million francs could be allocated to equip the airport with three or four ultramodern detection devices requested by the Seychelles management.

"We would also be very much in favor of professional training courses in France and in the Seychelles," added Mr. Gilbert Faure, the airport's administrator. As Mr. Buisset believes, "the best equipment is of no use if the operators are not highly trained."

On returning to Paris, the French mission will prepare its report, which in all likelihood will be adopted. The airport's security contingent of some 40 people will be well assisted.

## Zambia

### \* Non-Alignment Vital After Eastern Bloc Change

34000304C Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English  
28 Dec 89 p 1

[Text] The world is now drifting towards the 1990s and that is a fact which no one can ignore. But do the people know their destiny? What has happened within the past two months makes us doubt whether there is any astrologer who would tell us what is in store for mankind.

There are revolutions all over the world but it is becoming difficult to describe any of them as revolutions or counterrevolutions. The important analysis of the contradictions in any society of who is one's friend as against one's enemy has now become a serious necessity.

Coloured shirts in form of leaders and governments have gone and come and every one is wondering whether this generation is not living in a dream world. What has happened in most countries in Eastern Europe made the majority of non-aligned countries think it was going to be a one month wonder.

But governments which had claimed to be democratic were removed as swiftly as the Victoria Falls would impound a dangerous hippo. What force is behind this movement? That is one question many countries are not prepared to answer. They have their reasons of course and no one can blame them.

But what the international community should understand and do that quickly and wisely is that sanity is being replaced by insanity. The balance of power which has kept the world out of "Chainama hospital" is no longer there.



It is now the case of small fish in Luangwa river running away from crocodiles. The question is: Will they survive? Survival is doubtful unless they remember that their strength lies in unity. There is no longer a big brother to protect them.

That is the reality of the non-alignment. But this concept has become more important now than ever before. Eastern Europe is today in a chaotic state because it was aligned without conviction. Most of the states were actually founded on sand instead of stone.

It has therefore been easy for some powerful nations to dismantle the foundations of such fragile political systems. The poor leadership in the majority of the states which have suddenly crumbled has helped to end the hopes of the paupers.

It is however timely for the majority of countries to remember that governments will only be respected by its people if they have the will and support of the people.

That support should willingly come from the citizens and not from foreigners. If the people of Eastern Europe have acted according to this cardinal point, then they have our support.

#### \* Treatment of Expatriates, Locals Contrasted

34000406B Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA* in English  
23 Jan 90 p 7

[Text] Government has been criticised for its apparent willingness to pay inflated salaries for hired labour and allowing local skilled manpower to drift to neighbouring countries for better conditions of service.

ZCTU [Zambia Congress of Trade Unions] secretary-general Cde Newsteadimba said in Kitwe in an interview yesterday it was ridiculous to spend a lot of money on expatriates when conditions for existing personnel were bad.

Commenting on the intended move by the State to launch a recruitment drive to replace teachers who have left for greener pastures, he said:

"This is a self-defeating move to our policy of trying to have local personnel in institutions."

Last week Teaching Service Commission acting secretary Cde Ferdinand Lwenje said in Lusaka the commission would try to woo teachers from Western countries.

Cdeimba observed it was a sad development especially that 600 Zambian doctors had left for greener pastures leaving most health institutions handicapped.

It was clear that the Government was prepared to pay inflated salaries and hefty allowances to expatriates and yet Zambian personnel were moaning about poor conditions of service.

In fact teachers who went on strike to press for better perks were patriotic as they wanted to remain here and

serve their country. The Government should therefore give them what was due to them, he said.

The two universities and other higher institutions of learning continued to produce graduates for the benefit of Zambia's development and it will be a waste of resources and effort to allow the same people to "defect."

If there was money to pay teachers recruited from Western countries, it would be cheaper to spend on local ones and uphold the pledge to develop "with own resources."

#### \* MP's: End State of Emergency, Detentions

34000408C Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA* in English  
6 Dec 89 p 1

[Text] Some members of Parliament yesterday criticised Government's continued enforcement of the state of emergency in the country and the subjection of Zambians to lengthy detentions without trial saying these actions were an infringement of basic human rights.

MP [Member of Parliament] for Solwezi East **Mr Humphrey Mulemba** described lengthy detentions as a dramatic experience which had led to the death of some former politicians, whose names he disclosed in Parliament but later withdrew.

"Lengthy detentions without trial must be stopped because they have disastrous effects on human life. Some of our contemporaries in the political field are dead today because of the effects of detention," he said.

The MP also urged the Government to consider doing away with the state of emergency saying its continued existence was questionable given the changed geopolitical situation that faces the country now.

He contended that the state of emergency creates difficulties for the state of the individual.

On passports **Mr Mulemba** said it was time these documents were viewed as a right and not just a privilege.

**Mr Mulemba** was contributing on the estimates of expenditure for the Ministry of Home Affairs.

MP for Chikankata **Mr Joshua Lumina** described the state of the country's prisons as dehumanising and noted that those who had been detained on political grounds came out sick because of the amount of illtreatment received.

"These people are Zambians although their aspirations may be different but they should be treated with dignity," **Mr Lumina** said.

The MP noted that Zambia was in the forefront in calling for freedom in Africa and yet people continued to be detained for long periods without trial.

"What morality have we to tell South Africa to stop detentions when we are doing the same here?" the MP asked.

Mr Lumina said time had come to remove the state of emergency which made it possible for people to be locked up for long periods without trial.

Meanwhile, Members of Parliament have called for more time to be allocated to sessions of the House to avoid rushing through business at the close of the year.

#### \* Mulikita: Political Power Must Be Controlled

34000407B Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA* in English  
29 Jan 90 p 1

[Text] Speaker of the National Assembly Cde Fwanya Mulikita has said that political power must be regulated and controlled because if that is not done it can lead to havoc.

He also said the separation of power is a device by which political power could be controlled.

Speaking at a dinner organised by the Law Association of Zambia [LAZ] at the New Savoy Hotel on Saturday on the separation of power in a one Party state, the Speaker said history has shown that absolute power tends to corrupt.

He said most of the conflicts in the world today were about or related to human rights such as the absence of power or too much of it.

He said political conflicts in the Southern African sub-region, the civil war in Angola, armed banditry in Mozambique and repression in South Africa were results of either absence of power or too much of it.

Cde Mulikita said the irresistible wind of change sweeping socialist countries in Eastern Europe is a clear expression of people reclaiming their power from dictators.

He said examples of rulers who have been corrupted by power include Pisistratus in ancient Athens, Shaka Zulu in precolonial Africa, Hitler and Musolini in modern Europe and more recently in Africa Idi Amin of Uganda and emperor Bokassa of Central African Republic.

Cde Mulikita said separation of power, apart from being important is also difficult in that it is one subject on which legal minds have differed and continue to differ and ultimately divided the world into capitalists and communists.

"There are those who believe that the proper repository of power must be the people themselves who should have the right to change the government in power if it fails to fulfil their expectations for which it was elected.

"And there are those who believe they know what the people want and that they have the right to exercise political power in the name of the people and without

control and without reference to the people on whose behalf the power was being exercised," Cde Mulikita said.

He stressed that separation of power provided a system of checks and balances necessary for the smooth running of Government functions.

He said parliament in a one Party state like Zambia where there was no opposition to criticise Government has powers to oversee the administration and to subject the activities of the executive to detailed scrutiny.

He said contrary to criticisms levelled against one party system that the legislature and the judiciary are mere rubber-stamps of the executive decisions, Zambia's one Party participatory democracy accords freedom and independence to each organ of Government.

Newly elected LAZ secretary Mr George Kunda has criticised vetting of aspiring candidates and called for its removal.

Moving a vote of thanks to the Speaker's speech Cde Kunda said that a dynamic society should encourage and accept criticism even from people who have different views from those in power.

#### \* Bank of Zambia Governor Charged With Corruption

34000406A Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA* in English  
2 Feb 90 p 1

[Text] Former Bank of Zambia governor Francis Nkhoma was yesterday charged afresh with corrupt use of official powers and having unexplained property.

Nkhoma had earlier in November last year been charged with five counts of having K370,000 and foreign currency amounting to \$239,823 and £225,688 suspected to have been corruptly acquired.

Nkhoma, 52, who appeared before senior principal resident magistrate Mr Peter Chitengi denied the charges.

It is alleged that on August 21 Nkhoma being responsible for approving a loan of \$1.5 million for Gwembe Valley Development Company corruptly solicited and received from Mr Thomas Koshy director of the company, a bank draft in favour of Barclays Bank of Zambia in the sum of \$150,000.

It is further alleged that being concerned with externalisation of funds for the central bank in the sum of \$1.05 million for Kangerlistic Company, a UK-based firm, Nkhoma corruptly received from Mr John Gordon Hood director of the company, a bank draft in favour of Barclays Bank PLC drawn on the Banque Belgo Zairoise, London in the amount of \$34,376.

Earlier Mr Koshy gave evidence to the court in camera.

It is alleged that Nkhoma had pecuniary resources amounting to £20,583 in a fixed deposit account with Barclays Bank account in London.

On August 21 he allegedly had K370,000 deposited at Barclays Bank, Kafue House branch in Lusaka.

Nkhoma denied on the same date he had £11,145 and \$15,807 cash.

He allegedly failed to surrender foreign exchange in the amount of \$15,807, and £11,145 cash and \$40,640 in travellers cheques.

Testifying in court against Nkhoma, former BOZ governor Mr David Phiri said in 1986 when he was bank chief, an agreement was made between GVDC and the bank for the company to be obtaining their foreign exchange earnings.

But in 1989, the company went back to ask for a loan.

Another witness, Mr William Mweemba, the legal counsel for Barclays Bank, said from 1973 to 1988, Nkhoma received K739,429 as the total emoluments.

He received various loans totalling K550,566 out of which he settled K250,000 from his terminal benefits.

In addition, the bank paid him £25,000 which was credited to his account in London as part of his terminal benefits.

He was receiving director's fees as well because he was still on the board.

The trial continues today.

#### \* Mobil Oil To Prospect in Mid-Zambezi in 1990

34000408B Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA* in English  
6 Dec 90 p 1

[Text] Mobil Oil Company is to begin oil explorations in mid Zambezi around Lake Kariba next year, Minister of Mines Cde Bernard Fumbelo disclosed in Parliament yesterday.

The Minister told the House that considerable interest has been shown by international oil firms to come and prospect for oil in Zambia.

He said apart from Mobile Oil, Agip (SPA) of Italy has also shown interest in the country's exploration programme by requesting data so far gathered from the drilling of lock "A" for revaluation.

It is expected that after examining the data Agip will perhaps join hands with other companies in search for oil.

On the gemstone sector, Cde Fumbelo said this was an important sector of economic development which hitherto has not effectively contributed to the economy.

He said the value of Zambian gemstone traded on the international market was estimated at between \$50 million and \$100 million a year but that only a small proportion was transacted through proper channels.

#### \* Iranian Donation of Blankets Received

34000304A Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA* in English  
19 Jan 90 p 9

[Text] Iran yesterday donated \$20,000 worth of blankets and bedsheets towards the improvement of health services in Zambian hospitals and made a pledge to make more contributions.

Ambassador Pakaein Mohsen presented the items to Prime Minister General Malimba Masheke on behalf of the Red Cross of Iran.

One of Iran's policies on aid was to support the health sector in African states and the donation was made with the conviction that the strength of the nation lay in the health of all its people.

Cde Masheke, said the gesture made Zambia "extremely delighted" as it had come at a time when the nation was in dire need of the items.

He assured Mr Mohsen that the blankets and bedsheets would be well looked after and passed on to patients of the ministry's choice. Cde Masheke said he would like the items to be quickly dispatched to needy areas.

He hailed the cordial ties existing between the two nations and observed that since they were marked "Iran donation" patients would be reminded of Iran's heartfelt concern for their health.

Later he handed the consignment to Minister of Health Cde Mavis Muvunda.

#### \* Soviet Gift of Books to University Praised

34000304B Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA* in English  
10 Jan 90 p 1

[Excerpt] Declining funding to the University of Zambia has greatly reduced its ability to update its library, said vice-chancellor Professor Kasuka Mwauluka yesterday.

Receiving about 500 books worth \$10,000 from the Soviet ambassador Cde Oleg Mirochkhine at the Unza library, Prof Mwauluka called on other embassies to beef up the institution's stocks.

The library's subscriptions to periodicals had dwindled from 7,000 to 2,000 periodicals since 1970s.

He said books in science and scientific fields had become outdated because of the continuously changing trends in the areas. [passage omitted]

### \* Students Paid High Price for Food Riots

34000407C Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA* in English  
22 Jan 90 p 1

[Editorial]

[Text] We hope, as "there are very high hopes" too at the University of Zambia, that when the academic term reopens today a lesson or two would have been learnt from the closure of Unza and the Copperbelt University [CBU] last November.

Were the students at the two institutions really justified to have gone on orgies of property destruction to press their points for increased food rations?

Nobody, not even the Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology, denied that at the present prices the allowances given for meals were not enough.

When students expressed their complaints university authorities assured them that since budgets had been already allocated they should hold fire as they were making fresh approaches to have the allowances reviewed.

If only the "handful" of agitators had not picketed others there would perhaps not been such mayhem at both Unza and the CBU.

But what is the result? Students will have to pay for the damage done to property and those at the CBU will cough up K750 before an application for administration is considered.

Not only that whereas those at the CBU have lost a whole academic year their friends at Unza are months behind their syllabuses. What a big and shameful waste!

We hope also the authorities will live up to their promise to improve on the present starvation meal allowances because a hungry student, like any other person, cannot be expected to perform at his best.

This brings us to the question of the quality of university education given even to a student with a full stomach.

There is a deafening crescendo that if Zambia does not do something to control, nay halt, the exodus of qualified lecturers her universities will shortly be manned by teachers who are fit to handle secondary school classes.

What has gone wrong? We have it on authority that out of budgets worked out by appropriate university bodies only small fractions, in some cases 40 percent, have been approved by higher authorities this year.

The problem Zambia has is not that lecturers are not paid high salaries (a lecturer earns K60,000 and above) but it is the take-home pay that matters.

Zambia has one of the highest taxation rates in the world; the Kwacha has lost its value and prices of everything are out of this world.

These are some of the factors that should be looked into if the country is endeavouring to retain its manpower; otherwise Zambia's is a lost cause as mere promises won't feed the professor.

### \* 700,000 Grain Bags Stranded in Tanzania

34000406C Lusaka *SUNDAY TIMES OF ZAMBIA*  
in English 21 Jan 90 p 1

[Text] Over 700,000 empty grain bags are piled at the Dar es Salaam port awaiting transport to Zambia, while another ten million bags are expected from Bangladesh soon.

The Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF) said this in Lusaka at the monthly task force meeting last Tuesday.

But no indication was given as to whether there were problems in ferrying the 760,000 empty grain bags needed by farmers for the coming harvest.

"The ten million empty grain bags from Bangladesh are expected to arrive within 12 days," ZCF said.

Information gathered from members who chose to remain anonymous indicated that the schedule for task force meetings had been changed from monthly to fortnightly for purposes of planning for the 1990-91 farming season.

A summary of fertiliser imports given by the ZCF at the previous meeting showed as at December 55,600 metric tonnes of various types of fertilizer had been ordered through Durban.

Out of this, 48,177.5 metric tonnes had already been received, 4,891.80 metric tonnes were still in transit, while 2,531.15 metric tonnes were still at the port.

Through the Dar es Salaam port a total of 152,255.28 metric tonnes of various fertilisers were ordered, 94,970.05 had been received, 29,439.63 were in transit, with 27,834.60 still at the port.

Through Beira, 52,995.54 metric tonnes were ordered, 11,315.25 had been received, 12,514.98 were in transit while 29,165.31 were still at the port.

And Nitrogen Chemicals, the company which has been given the task of importing fertiliser, tabled proposed import requirements totalling 122,550 metric tonnes between May and September this year.

The months given were tentative and subject to negotiation with suppliers. The report said more donors were expected to make their pledges of fertiliser donations soon.

"With each donor, arrangements will be made to ensure optimal use of all ports of entry to avoid congestion," the report said.



**\* Confusion Deplored in Mealie Meal Deficit**

34000408A Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA* in English  
14 Dec 90 p 1

[Editorial]

[Text] At last there is an explanation for the shortage of mealie meal in the capital. The Minister of Commerce and Industry Cde Rabbison Chongo told Parliament yesterday the shortage was caused by frequent breakdowns at the National Milling Company's Malambo plant early this month.

This information should have been given by a public relations officer at Indeco when the Press began inquiring about the shortage last week. The public was kept guessing and as usual panic buying followed. But what should people in authority do when such a serious situation arises?

The same Indeco has the answer. When the beer bottling plant breaks down in Lusaka Indeco brings beer from the Copperbelt so that Lusaka does not experience a tormenting dry spell.

This was not done in the case of mealie meal. The reason? Confusion as usual. Some Copperbelt millers could not supply Lusaka with mealie meal because they are exporting the commodity to Zaire at "an attractive" price. Is this nation in a position to export mealie meal and satisfy local demand?

Those responsible must have done some research and concluded we can export and still feed ourselves. We wonder however, if the research considered the existence of old equipment like the one at the Malambo plant.

These overlooked factors contribute to bad planning. This is the lesson people charged with the responsibility of feeding the nation should have learnt many years ago. Perhaps we need more lecturers. Or should we continue asking the boring question: "Will Zambia ever learn?"

If you are in doubt just examine the decision of the Copperbelt Cooperative Union (CCU). They have decided to sell maize to milling companies owned by Mulungushi Investment at two different prices.

The millers have been told to buy maize at K160 a bag if the mealie meal produced from that bag is intended for local consumption. The same bag will cost K240 if the commodity will be exported to Zaire. Milling firms which do not belong to Mulungushi Investment and therefore not allowed to export mealie meal were supposed to be exempted.

But they were told to buy the bags at the new price. That confusion contributed to the shortage of mealie meal on the Copperbelt. Lusaka residents had thus nowhere to run to. It might not be the whole story but that is what we have so far.

Questions will therefore continue being asked. What, for example, will stop some milling firms from buying bags

of maize at K240 and sell mealie meal locally instead of exporting it? What a New Year's gift!

**\* Farmers in Southern Province Not Paid for Grain**

34000408D Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA* in English  
6 Dec 89 p 9

[Text] A large number of farmers in Southern Province are still not paid for the maize grain they sold to the State this year, it has been learnt.

Reports from districts say banks were not honouring cheques given to farmers by Southern Province Cooperative Marketing Union (SPCMU) because of lack of funds against which the cheques were supposed to be drawn.

In Mazabuka alone over K10 million was required to pay the farmers. A similar situation was expected in other districts.

Area governor Cde Daniel Simoloka said yesterday that the situation was critical as farmers required the money to buy inputs for the current season.

He said Cabinet office which was supposed to release the funds and SPCMU were doing everything possible to sort out the issue and he hoped they would quickly resolve the matter.

Reports from Kalomo say farmers protested again at the weekend over non-payments for the maize grain delivered to SPCMU.

Prime Minister General Malimba Masheke recently assured the nation that money was there to pay farmers and urged commercial banks involved in the exercise to honour the SPCMU cheques.

**\* Fishermen Fined for Dagga Trafficking**

34000460A Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA* in English  
14 Dec 89 p 9

[Text] Three fishmongers were yesterday fined a total sum of K150,000 by Livingstone resident magistrate Mr Canisius Munyeme for trafficking in dagga.

The three, Patrick Katinga, Moses Munalula and Lawrence Siatongo earlier charged with illegal possession of dagga were each ordered to pay K50,000 before 17.00 hours or in default go to prison for nine months with hard labour.

Katinga, 22, of Maramba township, Munalula, 25, of Twafwane street and Siatongo, 30, of Maramba township all pleaded guilty to having 103 kg of dagga on August 27. They had no licence.

The three who pleaded for mercy told the court they were taking the drug to Ngwezi so they could barter it with fish.

All the three men asked the bench to exercise leniency saying they were forced to commit the offence because of economic hardships.

In reply Mr Munyeme told the men he was aware of the difficulties society was going through but that there was nothing he could do than impose the minimum statutory fine of K50,000.

A self confessed dagga smoker was fined K500 or three months simple imprisonment in default for illegal possession of dagga by the same magistrate.

Felix Chizyika, 20, unemployed of Livingstone central police camp pleaded guilty to having 48 grammes of the drug when he had no licence.

Chizyika told the court he was a habitual smoker of the drug for the past two years. He pleaded for mercy and promised to stop smoking dagga.

Mr Munyeme sentenced a charcoal burner to 29 days imprisonment with hard labour for theft of goods from a motor vehicle valued at K1,300.

Emmanuel Kapwepwe, 61, of Nakatindi township stole one motor vehicle pump, screw driver, pliers, jack, triangles and a Bible.

#### \* Liberian Charged With Possession of Mandrax

34000460B Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA* in English  
12 Jan 90 p 1

[Excerpt] A Liberian/Zairean national was yesterday charged with having Mandrax tablets worth K30.9 million in a Lusaka magistrates court.

Vafeen Fofana, alias Mutombo wa Mutombo, 30, was also charged with using a motor vehicle to carry dangerous drugs.

Fofana, a Zairean-based businessman of Bunya admitted the charge before principal resident magistrate Mr Peter Chitengi.

It is alleged on January 2 at Chambeshi bridge in Mpika, Fofana with other persons unknown had 258 packets of Mandrax tablets hidden in secret compartments of a Datsun van he was driving.

The total number of tablets identified by police were 243,772.

It is further alleged Fofana was found using a Datsun van registration number KTN 516 carrying the drugs.

Fofana conceded he was not licensed to have the drugs but "I was taking them to the owners."

The drugs were from Kenya and they were for three men resident in Zambia. Mr Chitengi adjourned the case to today for facts. [passages omitted]

#### \* Fine for Peddling Cannabis Imposed

34000460C Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA* in English  
16 Jan 90 p 9

[Excerpts] A clerical officer at National Assembly was yesterday fined K2,000 for drug peddling in a Lusaka magistrate court.

Before Mr Gilbert Muya, was Salome Namonje, 32, of Northmead who admitted having dangerous drugs.

Namonje was found with two kilos of cannabis or Indian hemp on August 9, last year. [passages omitted]

And in our Saturday's issue, we erroneously wrote that Lusaka magistrate Mr Peter Chitengi ordered two bags of Mandrax tablets to be burnt in the presence of the registrar of the High Court.

He actually said the tablets should be burnt in the presence of senior clerk of court.

We apologise for the embarrassment this might have caused to both parties involved.

#### \* Revision of Investment Code Called for

34000407A Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA* in English  
1 Feb 90 p 1

[Editorial]

[Text] Yesterday, a specialist in international trade and investment law advised the Government to "do its homework" on legislation affecting investment as the current review of the 1986 Act portrays instability of policy towards would-be investors.

Probably, the instability in the investment policy could be attributed to the fact that investment acts are peculiar to Third World countries. They are supposed to reassure and encourage investors, an attempt to compensate for an unfavourable investment climate.

This is necessary because in most developing countries there is a hostility either towards private investment as such or towards investment by foreigners, so a special law called an Investment Act or code is needed to encourage foreign money but unfortunately such laws are not sufficient by themselves.

For Zambia, almost three years after coming into effect the Investment Act of 1986 has virtually failed to attract foreign money which the country badly needs to stimulate economic development.

The country stoutly reassured both local and foreign industrialists to invest their money here citing political stability as a yard-stick. Well and good but, Zambia and other Third World countries should realise that the best investment climate is created by clear and precise rules in which the investor can have the greatest confidence.

The clarity and consistency of the rules are far more important than any short-term incentives that will

govern the investor's decision because it is hard to convince an investor to put his money in a country where the rules are vague.

In a nutshell these are the problems parastatal executives have to contend with when they are negotiating with international investors. They end up with unfavourable agreements and in most cases with none at all because the Act in its present form is inadequate.

There are a lot of questions left unanswered, and most likely the people entrusted with the task of wooing investors either don't understand its contents or the don't agree with it.

The political stability that is prevailing in Zambia and the positive official attitude towards investors should be accompanied by a sound and clear Act that does not need any icing.

Those serving in the investment council should speed up the review of the Act and make it attractive.

A beautiful icing is no good on a poor cake because once a few customers have been disappointed, word will go round that the cake is unpalatable and demand will flag, then we shall learn too late that beautiful icing was not enough.

### Zimbabwe

#### \* President Reviews Progress at New Year

34000121A Harare THE HERALD in English  
1 Jan 90 p 1

[Text] The Unity Accord signed between Zanu (PF) [Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front] and PF-Zapu [Patriotic Front Zimbabwe African People's Union] two years ago should not be viewed as a threat to democracy and an imposition of a dictatorship on the people, President Mugabe said in Harare last night.

Speaking at an end of year party at State House, Cde Mugabe said the unity of the two major political parties had created an atmosphere necessary for further economic development of the country, although some people regarded it as threat to democracy.

"There are people of little philosophy who look at this unity as a threat to democracy...Some people in Christian circles have grudgingly accepted this unity and preferred that the two parties remained apart and fought each other in elections," he said.

He told those gathered, who included senior Government officials and diplomats, that the achievements made in various fields during the past decade could not have been achieved if peace had not been maintained in the country.

In his address that lasted for more than one hour, he recounted the achievements and problems that faced the young nation in its first 10 years.

The nation was born against a background of conflict, fear and suspicion.

The policy of reconciliation and the drive towards national unity had ushered in an era of peace and tranquillity out of a situation that had the makings of a civil war.

The economy had done well during the early 1980s but was adversely affected by successive droughts. However, the farmers had performed better than expected under conditions of adversity and the country had enough food reserves.

"From the point of view of agriculture we should beat our own drums...That point has been acknowledged the world over," he said.

The manufacturing sector had also performed well despite the problems associated with the shortage of foreign currency.

There was also the fact that before independence the Rhodesian economy was closed to the rest of the world. The manufacturing sector only made goods for clandestine markets.

The opening up of the economy meant that this sector had to compete on the regional and world markets. Despite the problems, Cde Mugabe said, the manufacturing sector had done well and contributed significantly to the Gross Domestic Product.

The mining sector had also done well despite being affected by the vagaries of the world minerals market.

The public sector had expanded phenomenally, especially in education and health and the 1990s will see more of Government efforts towards the improvement of the quality of education.

However, there was a need to create more jobs so that the products of the education system would be employed, he said.

On the turmoil that was going on in some East European countries, Cde Mugabe said this was largely because the political systems in those countries had been imposed on the people.

With the coming of the Gorbachev era the people who had been denied a voice for a long time were now airing their grievances with "ferocity and anger".

He said Zanu (PF)'s approach to Government was one in which the people at grassroots level would be consulted on any issue that would affect them.

**\* Sporadic MNR Attacks Continue in East**

34000121D Harare THE HERALD in English  
1 Jan 90 p 1

[Article by Funny Mushava: "Villagers Urged To Move as Bandits Kill Seven in Rushinga"]

[Excerpt] People living in the security-sensitive north-eastern corner of Zimbabwe have been urged to move into security villages for better protection following the murder of seven people in the last two weeks by MNR [Mozambique National Resistance] bandits.

Tragedy struck in Mt Darwin and Rushinga just before the Christmas holiday and three days after New Year's day in which seven people died, five of them from one family. On December 21, a mother and her son were brutally murdered by the MNR bandits in Rushinga when they attacked their village.

On Wednesday this week, five people, a mother and her four children, were killed and the father is recovering from bullet wounds in Bindura Hospital.

The member of Parliament for Rushinga, Cde Paddington Zvorwadza, yesterday said in an interview in Harare that people who had not moved into security villages yet should do so quickly.

He said while there had been a lull in MNR bandit incursions and activities in the past six months, this did not mean that people should not be vigilant. He praised the police, the Zimbabwe National Army [ZNA] and homeguards for enforcing law and order and ensuring security to the villagers in this troubled corner of the country.

Cde Zvorwadza said the army's military intelligence had been able in the past to monitor the MNR bandit movements in Mozambique itself and inside Zimbabwe's borders and attacks had mainly occurred at night or in those areas where people had not moved into the security villages.

Commenting on the outcry by some villagers that the homeguards were not properly trained to fight the MNR bandits, Cde Zvorwadza said that while it was true that the ZNA were far better than the homeguards, the latter had played an important role in combating the bandits' incursions. This was evidenced by the lull in bandit activities in the past six months.

"But the situation in Rushinga is not static. At one time the law enforcement agents can cope with the demands and they fail when the incursions increase.

"The security forces have always been alerted of any build-ups of MNR activities and have been able to organise themselves in a manner that counters the attackers," said Cde Zvorwadza.

At times they were even alerted of the numbers, ammunitions and weapons carried by the MNR bandits. He

said since security villages were introduced in the constituency early last year, bandit incursions had been decreasing.

There were also cases of MNR bandits and their collaborators being apprehended in refugee camps. Cde Zvorwadza, who makes at least one visit a week to the constituency, said methods had now been devised to guard against bandits sheltering in refugee camps.

He said there had been suggestions from the local people that the refugee camps be moved into the interior, possibly as far as Kadoma, but Cde Zvorwadza said this was not feasible because the real refugees would end up suffering. There was no way a tired person, hungry and fleeing from war, could travel as far as Kadoma for help.

While this move would have helped in apprehending MNR bandits in Mashonaland Central much quicker, the real refugees would have suffered. [passage omitted]

**\* Editorial Notes Concern at Price Freeze End**

34000121B Harare THE HERALD in English  
1 Jan 90 p 2

[Article: "The Medicine for Economic Growth"]

[Text] The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions expressed the concern of the majority in their reaction to the Government's lifting of the price freeze last week. No amount of assurances that the prices of basic commodities will continue to be strictly controlled will allay the genuine fears of workers whose buying power has continued to dwindle over the years.

Among the items that strict price control will continue to be applied on are mealie meal, cooking oil, bread and matches. Alcohol and cigarettes will continue to be controlled too, but for very different reasons.

The peasantry may not be the concern of the ZCTU [Zambia Congress of Trade Unions], but they too will suffer from the action. They have already been paying a premium for these basic necessities from the rural trader who has to sell above normal mark-ups because of the extra costs incurred in transporting the goods to the rural areas.

The general public has great difficulty in understanding the high price of such items as mealie meal when this country leads in producing maize. The problem, as is the case with most other commodities produced by our own industry, lies with our unacceptably high production costs.

Trade liberalisation, which the Government has embarked on, will in the long run increase competition between locally produced goods and imported ones. Industry has hailed the move but it has to put its act together if it is to compete fairly. Prices and quality will determine their viability.



The liberalisation will not be complete without the full overhaul of the labour regulations. The Government, we have already been told, is moving in that direction. The ZCTU should see red in that as it might mean mass dismissals.

However, we cannot eat our cake and have it. Either we open our economy or we keep it under strict controls. The controls that were maintained on the economy over the 10 years of our independence have seen us through the difficult transition to our adulthood.

The purposes for which they were introduced are no longer quite necessary anymore and the international political, and economic realities are such that we would be committing economic suicide if adjustments were not made.

Economic hara-kiri can only lead to social unrest which is the root cause of much spilling of blood in many Third World countries.

Zimbabwe is just one of the many poor countries which has a great potential for economic development but only if the people accept the hard facts that in the interim may cause hardships. However, those in authority are duty-bound to make sure that extremes are avoided.

The rising cost of living is one such extreme that brims with potential dangers even though there may be explanations for it.

#### **\* Free Collective Bargaining Now in Effect**

34000121C Harare *THE SUNDAY MAIL in English*  
4 Feb 90 p 2

[Article: "Government Allows Free Bargaining"]

[Text] Bulawayo—The Government has announced free collective bargaining between workers and employers with immediate effect without its involvement.

From now onwards, said the Minister of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare, Cde John Nkomo, the Government would only monitor, vet and register agreements.

"But the need to stimulate wages in sectors where there are no employment councils such as the domestic sector will for the time being remain," Cde Nkomo told members of the Institute of Personnel Management of Zimbabwe at a seminar here on Friday night.

The move means that at each workplace, workers or their committees—in some cases with the help of their respective unions—would, with immediate effect, negotiate freely and collectively with their employers, wages and salary increments or scales.

Cde Nkomo, who was speaking on industrial relations in the 1990s, said the Government's past rigid controls on salary and wage determination "which have by and large served their purpose" would now be replaced by free collective bargaining.

"The function of the Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare in collective bargaining will remain mainly the monitoring, vetting and registration of agreements," he said.

To ensure prompt solution of disputes, Cde Nkomo said methods of internal or shopfloor grievance resolution would be strengthened. This would be achieved by first rationalising the operations of unions and employer organisations.

Said Cde Nkomo: "The principle of one union or employer's organisation for one industry will be adhered to. This enhances efficiency in collective bargaining and reduces the number of bodies an employer has to negotiate with."

Cde Nkomo told the seminar that "our philosophy must be to hire for development, refinement and utilisation and not to hire to fire".

"As we enter the 1990s we must adopt a scientific management style which requires continuous research, continuous application of decisions, monitoring of decisions so as to be able to detect and identify problems, and the ability to affect adjustments so as to instil and not undermine confidence," he said.

Productivity at any workplace, Cde Nkomo said, could not only be increased through the application of better and progressive management techniques.

He said the agenda for the 1990s should also be to develop the manager to enable him or her to identify advantages in the motivation of his/her workforce; the advantages of giving workers control over their destiny and also to assist the manager to turn the average worker into a winner.

"To achieve this, we will need a tough-minded manager who has respect for the individual worker; a manager who is willing to work and set certain expectations and targets for him/her; grant him/her a level of autonomy so that the worker is assisted to contribute directly to his/her job," said the minister.—Ziana.

#### **\* Development Bank Announces Promotion Fund**

34000120D Harare *THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE*  
in English 5 Jan 90 p 1

[Text] The Zimbabwe Development Bank [ZDB] yesterday announced the establishment of a soft-lending window, the Zimbabwe Development Fund (ZDF).

The fund, aimed at assisting the launching of high-risk commercial projects and at helping promoters start up in business, was given final approval by the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development in December, 1989.

ZDB managing director, Mr Xavier Kadhani, yesterday told the GAZETTE that more contributions to the fund are expected from the bank's other institutional shareholders, and other agencies.

He said its objectives would be the provision of financial support in the form of equity-type resources to new entrepreneurs for new projects, and the provision of technical support in the form of training to inject and enhance entrepreneurial skills and assistance in undertaking feasibility and technical studies.

The fund is also aimed at providing assistance in facilitating investment in disadvantaged areas, especially small towns and growth points.

The main source of funds for the ZDF are the bank itself, government, and other institutional shareholders of the ZDB.

The fund's initial capital base stands at \$600,000, being \$200,000 contributed by the ZDB and \$400,000 by government. The African Development Bank has earmarked over \$1m towards the fund, which will form part of a larger facility to ZDB expected to be finalised by the end of this month.

#### \* Norway, Denmark Aid Kariba Fish Project

34000120A Harare THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE-FARMING GAZETTE in English 5 Jan 90 p 11

[Excerpt] Denmark and Norway are helping Zimbabwe and Zambia formulate a rationalised and sustained system for the joint management of the fish resources at Lake Kariba in a project worth more than \$17 million over a period of five years.

The Zambia-Zimbabwe Fisheries Project was first proposed by Zambia more than six years ago, when it was presented to the second SADCC [Southern African Development Coordination Conference] technical consultation meeting on fisheries and wildlife, held in Swaziland.

Ms Mona Gleditsch, senior programme officer at the Norwegian aid agency, Norad, and Mr Sverre Melsom, the resident representative, told FARMING GAZETTE that the project would start in the first quarter of this year when a formal agreement had been signed between Zambia and Zimbabwe.

For the five-year period, Norway and Denmark through its aid agency Danida, would spend about NOK50 million (roughly \$17.2 million), said the two officials.

Ms Gleditsch said it was a very important project which would enable both Zambia and Zimbabwe to manage efficiently the fish resources in Lake Kariba, and benefit the fishermen around the lake.

Kapenta fish was an important source of protein for the low-income group, and it was essential that the resources in the lake were not destroyed, she said.

The project would benefit consumers of kapenta in both Zambia and Zimbabwe, commercial kapenta fishing companies and cooperatives and the two governments as they get revenue through tax.

According to Ms Gleditsch, the significant role played by the fishery industry, but as a producer of food and employer, had not been fully recognised by policy makers in both countries.

Experts say the Zimbabwe fishery industry produced more than 20,000 tonnes of kapenta annually, worth about \$25 million. It is believed that available development plans did not indicate proposed developments that might affect the future of commercial fishery at the lake.

Ms Gleditsch said that the Lake Kariba Fisheries Research Institute (LKFRRI), part of Zimbabwe's Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management, and the Department of Fisheries of Zambia, would be jointly involved in the project. [passage omitted]

#### \* Policy To Solve Land Problem Drafted

34000120B Harare THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE-FARMING GAZETTE in English 5 Jan 90 p 1

[Text] The government has drawn up a land policy to solve Zimbabwe's land controversy. The draft policy has still to be ratified by Cabinet, sources said this week.

According to the sources, it has been recommended that with the expiry of restrictions on amending the Lancaster House Constitution in April, government should, where necessary, expropriate commercial farmland and pay the owners in local currency.

However, in what appears to be a very sharp contrast sources said that while the willing seller/willing buyer provision in the present constitution would remain, government would reserve the right to purchase any land required for public purposes.

It is believed that in addition to 2.7 million hectares of commercial farmland purchased since independence, the government intended to buy a further 6 million hectares of land to be apportioned to communal and resettlement farmers as well as displaced labourers.

Another recommendation, the sources said, was that the Land Acquisition Act of 1985 be amended to give the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement powers to designate any land for resettlement.

This would also enable the minister to grant approval for land transfers from one person to another.

It had also been recommended that the Minister of Agriculture be given 90 days to respond to any land offers. The period for price negotiations would also be extended from 14 days to one month, they said.

It has suggested that government should control agricultural land prices in Zimbabwe. Two options on the control of land prices have been recommended: land

prices should be fixed at a realistic price per hectare by natural regions; or prices be fixed on the basis of the original purchase price of land, with the addition of the value of permanent improvements on the farm.

Once a fair price has been established the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development should consider the suspension of capital gain tax for farmers who sell their land to buy another, or invest in agricultural industry.

It was also proposed that government should "urgently" impose a land tax based on calculated production potential per hectare by ecological regions, said the sources.

In order not to burden the agricultural sector by tax payments, the rural land tax levied by local authorities should be removed and a new tax collected by respective rural councils introduced to be levied to resettlement and communal farming sectors.

For both equity and efficiency, it has been recommended that government "immediately" legislate to limit the ownership of more than one farm unit by individuals or companies, claimed the sources.

Individuals or companies already owning more than one farm would be encouraged to sell excess farms to government or other people or companies.

Absentee landlords would not be allowed to own land in Zimbabwe, except in cases where the land was fully utilised. Foreign investment in the agricultural sector would only be allowed in activities where government felt that technology and expertise were still lacking.

It was also suggested that government should encourage joint ventures between individuals, companies, and the state to ensure increased local participation in the agro-industrial development.

The sources said it was recommended that Arda [expansion unknown], the state farming agency, should continue to intensify its agricultural operations for the production of strategic crops, and to provide relief measures where farms could lie idle.

#### \* Minister Discusses Drought, Unemployment

34000120C Bulawayo *THE CHRONICLE* in English  
25 Jan 90 p 6

[Text] Harare—Zimbabwe is facing a serious drought and this year, the Government will spend more than \$36 million on drought relief throughout the country, the Minister of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare, Cde John Nkomo, has said.

Answering questions from the Press, he said the money would also be used for drought relief related projects during the current financial year.

He said more than one million people were on drought relief registers and were already receiving drought relief

food. The hardest hit areas were Matabeleland North and South provinces, the Midlands, Masvingo and parts of Manicaland.

In November last year, a total of 274.2 metric tonnes of maize were distributed to 503,420 people under the drought relief programme.

Cde Nkomo said efforts to meet the demand for food in drought-stricken areas were being hampered by logistic problems such as transport.

The other problem facing the Government was the increasing number of destitutes which on the average was costing \$445,000 a month. Although destitute cases had not all been registered there were 29,161 in November which had increased to 29,498 in December last year, he said.

At the moment, the Department of Social Welfare was assessing street kids who had been rounded up for rehabilitation and assistance.

The unemployment rate was growing rather than reducing. "What is more alarming is that while formal employment only increased by an annual average of 10,000 between 1985 and 1988, school-leavers averaged 100,000," the minister said.

The country's population had been growing at an average rate of 2.8 percent and the labour force was assumed to grow at the same rate: yet formal employment had been creating additional jobs at a rate of 0.006 percent a year.

He said the precise level of unemployment was not known mainly because of the large informal sector and communal farming community where hidden underemployment was rampant.

Cde Nkomo said although the Government was making efforts to resolve the problem of unemployment, there was a limit to which it could absorb the jobless because it did not engage in productive activities. "It would be catastrophic if the Government services were to expand at a greater rate than the production sectors," the minister said.

Through the Ministerial Task Force on Employment Creation, the Government had reviewed a number of constraints that were considered to be inhibiting economic growth.

These included investment, shift to labour-saving techniques of production, shortages of foreign currency, transport bottlenecks inflexible price controls, labour laws, lack of title deeds at growth points and other factors.

Already there had been attempts by the Government to address some of the constraints including publication of the new investment guidelines trade liberalisation and easing of price controls.

Cde Nkomo said the cash economy had also increased due to the Government's progressive agricultural policy. In 1985 the average annual income in communal lands and resettlement areas was about \$480 compared to more than \$3,500 in urban areas.

On whether the Labour Relations Act had achieved the purpose for which it was created, the minister said a lot had been achieved by the creation of the Act.

The workers' committees and workers' councils were now institutionalised in work places and there had been

great improvement in communication and better relations between workers and management.

More than 20 employment councils and 40 employment boards had been formed since the promulgation of the Act.

Cde Nkomo noted that the Act had some defects which the Government had tried to remedy and would continue to improve. There would be no going back to the era where a worker was treated by the employer as a [word indistinct]—a tool to be exploited and discharged at the whim of the employer.—Own [word indistinct]



## Ghana

### \* Botchwey Presents 1990 Budget Statement

#### \* Broadcast Budget Report

34000122A Accra GHANAIAN TIMES in English  
11 Jan 90 pp 1, 3

[Excerpt] Dr Kwesi Botchwey, Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning, said yesterday that the continuing imbalances in the international economy and the fundamental changes that shook the world in 1989 and ushered in the decade of the 1990s in such whirlwind fashion, posed major challenges for Africa, especially Ghanaians.

He was presenting the 1990 Budget Statement in a nation-wide broadcast in Accra.

Dr Botchwey said the headlong plunge towards political and economic liberalization in Eastern Europe, the diversion of aid and investment flows to Eastern Europe with consequent marginalization of the African continent, the continuing deterioration in the terms of trade, notably for cocoa, made it more urgent that Ghanaians improved their competitiveness in the production for export and domestic markets.

He said after expanding more rapidly in 1988 than in any year in the previous decade, a further sharp increase in world trade was reported for 1989.

That expansion had been unevenly distributed, with export earnings by primary producing countries continuing to decline due to the slump in commodity prices, he noted.

The result was that the two commodities of greatest concern to the country—cocoa and gold—suffered price falls.

The Secretary said the prediction in last year's budget statement that the price of cocoa would drop from its 1988 level of about 1,800 dollars per tonne, to 1,400 dollars per tonne in 1989, prove to be over optimistic.

By September 1989, the price had fallen to 1,045 dollars per tonne, the lasting decline being in response to the decision by a major producer to start disposing of its accumulated stocks, he explained.

Dr Botchwey said the price of gold for most of the year, stayed below 350 ounces, a reflection of the high rates of interest which encouraged the holding of reserves in commercial paper rather than in gold.

Cocoa production rose by more than 50 percent from 190,000 tonnes to 300,000 tonnes. However, as a result of the continuing decline in world market prices, foreign exchange receipts from cocoa exports declined.

Over the past year, the Secretary noted, the price of crude oil on the world market had risen significantly and continued to rise.

In 1988 for instance, the nation spent 150 million dollars to purchase 8.2 million barrels of crude oil at an average price of 14.50 dollars per barrel, while the nation spent 200 million dollars in 1989 to purchase 8.4 million barrels of crude oil at 17.90 dollars per barrel.

Dr Botchwey said that the government would continue to pursue a policy which would ensure availability of petroleum products on the local market and that prices covered the full cost of importation, refining and marketing. [passage omitted]

#### \* Further Details

34000122B Accra GHANAIAN TIMES in English  
12 Jan 90 p 1

[Text] Dr Kwesi Botchwey, Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning, said on Wednesday that the 1990 Budget like those of the past years, was set in the context of the medium-term recovery programme.

The Secretary was presenting the budget statement in a nation-wide broadcast in Accra.

He said the budget sought to facilitate the attainment of the key objectives of the medium-term programme.

The original target for the year included a growth rate of a real GDP [gross domestic product] of six percent, a reduction in the annual rate of inflation to 10 percent and the generation of foreign exchange resources to build up reserves.

They were also to eliminate existing payment arrears and generally improve the nation's international standing.

Dr Botchwey said in view of the sharp falls in commodity prices, the projected GDP growth had been reduced from six percent to five percent the rate of inflation raised to 15 percent and the overall balance of payments surplus decreasing from 110 million dollars to 90 million dollars.

He said total revenue was programmed to rise from 212.4 billion centimos in 1989 to 272.5 billion centimos, showing a growth of 28.3 percent while total expenditure was projected at 256.7 billion centimos representing an increase of 27 percent from last year's 202.2 billion centimos.

The Secretary said a number of issues needed to be noted on the revenue side. Government receipts had been affected detrimentally by the deterioration in the commodity terms of trade.

He stressed for instance, that the original estimates of cocoa revenue had had to be scaled down by about 6.9 billion centimos.

That and other revenue losses were to a large extent, offset by the rise in external grants from 23.8 billion centimos in 1989 to 35.4 billion centimos, Dr Botchwey said. While the compensatory effect of those grant flows was salutary to the extent that it enabled the nation to

avoid the disruptive effect of large cuts in expenditure, it gave cause for worry because it heightened the nation's dependence on such grants and deepened the nation's vulnerability.

#### \* Meet-the-Press

34000122C Accra GHANAIAN TIMES in English  
13 Jan 90 p 1

[Article by Bob Bentil]

[Text] The country has reduced its debts substantially from 600 million dollars at the start of the ERP [Economic Recovery Program] to about 20 million dollars, Dr Kwesi Botchwey, Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning, has announced.

He was speaking at the first Meet-the-Press, forum for the year at the Ministry of Information Conference Hall in Accra yesterday.

The meeting enabled the Secretary to go over the highlights of the 1990 Budget presented four days ago.

Dr Botchwey said the 600 million dollars debt included those owed to Nigeria. The total national debt now stands at three billion dollars.

Referring to the country's economic performances so far, he said it was not very satisfactory.

He said for instance that between 1983-89, gross inflows, purchase from IMF grants, concessional loans borrowings amounted to 4.3 billion dollars, while outflows, including payments of long-term debts and IMF funds, amounted to three billion dollars.

That indicated that inflows exceeded outflows by 1.3 billion dollars, he said.

Dr Botchwey said total export amounted to 5.1 billion dollars as against total imports of 5.9 billion dollars.

"This means that between 1983 to 1989, we imported 800 million dollars more".

He said in 1984, for example, the nation recorded 76 million dollars more imports and in 1989, there were 290 million dollars imports more than the nation's total exports.

The Secretary explained that the 1990 budget was meant to continue the path of increasing internal resource flow in order to provide adequate incentives for local exports.

Touching on the prices of fuel as spelt out in the budget, he said, the Government had sought to moderate the increase of prices of fuel to give Ghanaians some relief.

In coming out with the fuel prices, he said the Government took into consideration the cost of crude oil, cost of transportation, processing and distribution.

This year, Dr Botchwey said the Government, assumed that crude oil would be purchased on the World Market at about 18 dollars a barrel on the average.

If for any reason the price of crude oil should end up above what we anticipate, we will have to increase the prices", he explained

At the moment, the price per barrel is 23 dollars.

#### \* Shipping Information Network To Be Established

34000123A Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC  
in English 24 Jan 90 pp 8-9

[Article by Janet Quartey and Barbara Quarcoo: "Shippers Council To Start Cargo Information System"]

[Text] The Ghana Shippers Council in collaboration with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) will start the implementation of Advance Cargo Information System (ACIS) in the country, from next month.

The system, which will have its Central Logistics Unit (CLU) located at the offices of the Shippers Council, will serve as a network linking all agencies involved in maritime industry in the country as well as other West and Central African states.

Mr M. T. Addico, Chief Executive of the Ghana Shippers Council, announced this at the opening of a four-day course on introduction to marine insurance, jointly organised by UNCTAD and the Shippers Council in Accra yesterday.

It is being attended by 15 personnel drawn from public and private shipping organisations and insurance companies.

Mr Addico said ACIS will make use of historic data to help the government and institutions with the choice of investment programmes for the transport sector.

Furthermore, he said, ACIS using up-to-date communications, including satellites and computer technology, will supply updated data prior to cargo arrival in the country to enable shippers to prepare adequate off-take capacities.

He noted that though insurance plays an important role in international trade, the marine insurance sub-sector faces many problems.

Many shippers, he pointed out, have needlessly suffered huge losses as a result of mishandling of marine insurance issues or complete non-insurance of goods, whilst the country loses a lot in foreign exchange in insurance which could be contracted locally.

Mr Addico said some shipping lines have also defaulted in their obligations to shippers in situations of proven cargo loss aboard their vessels and called on insurance companies in the country to emulate the efforts of the

State Insurance Corporation (SIC) in bringing to the notice of the Council, such shipping lines for punitive measures to be taken against them.

Mr Addico mentioned the attempts being made by the EEC to monopolise the control of international shipping contrary to the UNCTAD Code of conduct for Liner Conferences which guarantees, among others, the carriage of national lines of at least 40 percent of cargoes generated by seaborne trade.

He called on the State Shipping Corporation (Black Star Line) to ensure the successful implementation of PNDC [Provisional National Defense Council] Law 181 which obliges shippers to patronise the national line.

The SSC [State Shipping Corporation], he said, should improve and sustain its marketing strategies, to publish reliable advance sailing schedules and establish regular contract with shippers to discuss in advance, shipping opportunities.

Mr A.R.N. Macaulley, Chief Technical Advisor of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) said the course would be further developed to a degree level at the Regional Maritime Academy.

He noted that although shipping is a very complex economic activity, the maritime industry has over the years concentrated on the technical issues to the disadvantage of the economics of shipping.

#### \* Oil Exploration Continues in West Region

34000123D Accra GHANAIAN TIMES in English  
13 Jan 90 p 1

[Article by R. Harry Reynolds]

[Excerpt] Mr Ato Ahwoi, Secretary for Fuel and Power, yesterday announced that three wells have been sunk at Tano in the Western Region, to determine the commercial quantity of oil and gas available in the area.

Answering questions on oil exploration yesterday, at the 'Meet-the-Press' forum in Accra, Mr Ahwoi said an agreement was signed for oil prospecting and exploration in the Western Region last year.

The government was between Government and four oil companies which had formed a consortium.

Results of the laboratory tests and appraisal on the wells were yet to be disclosed, he said.

Mr Ahwoi announced that another oil rig, off the coast of Tema, had been sunk by an American company.

"We are doing a lot of seismic studies", he said, adding that at Cape Three Points in the Western Region, a Nigerian company had just completed its studies.

The Government had attracted private investments of about 50 million dollars on the exploration without spending anything, he disclosed. [passage omitted]

#### \* Bulgarian Company To Repair Accra Roads

34000123B Accra GHANAIAN TIMES in English  
18 Jan 90 p 1

[Article by George Koramoa]

[Excerpt] A Bulgarian construction company, Trans Complekt, is to rehabilitate roads in the Accra metropolis.

The project is estimated at 20 million dollars.

A contract for the first phase of the rehabilitation would be signed in Accra next week.

Mr Kostadim Ghiaourov, out-going Bulgarian Ambassador announced this is a pre-departure interview at the Accra airport at the end of his 10-year work in Ghana.

Mr Ghiaourov, who was the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, said the agreement would be based on the barter system. Under it, Bulgaria would provide funds and equipment for the project in exchange for Ghana's cocoa. [passage omitted]

#### \* Iran Provides Tractors, Other Aid Projects

34000123C Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC in English  
30 Jan 90 p 1

[Article: "Ghana Receives 20 Tractors From Iran"]

[Text] Iran yesterday donated 20 tractors with accessories worth 110 million centimos (360,000 dollars) to Ghana.

Mr Askar Karimi, Charge d'Affaires of the Iranian Embassy, presented the tractors to Mr D. S. Boateng, Secretary for Mobilisation and Social Welfare at the Tema Harbour.

The tractors are to be used on agricultural projects in the Northern Region under a co-operation agreement between the Ministry of Mobilisation and Social Welfare and the Ministry of Jihad, the Revolutionary Reconstruction Unit of Iran.

Mr Karimi said the gift points to the growing cordial relations between his country and Ghana, since they established diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level six years ago.

He said even in times of difficulties created by the Iran/Iraq war, Iran managed to provide what help it could to Ghana during the drought and bushfires of 1983.

Mr Karimi said with the ceasefire in the Gulf war, Iran is ready to step up assistance to Ghana and hoped all obstacles to co-operation will be overcome for the two countries to undertake many joint ventures.

Mr Boateng said the gift gives practical meaning to the memorandum of understanding signed last year between the Ministry of Mobilisation and Social Welfare and the Ministry of Jihad.

The tractors, he said, have come at the right time to be used for land preparation in the North for the next planting season.

Mr Boateng hoped Jihad would work in close association with the ministry to teach farmers modern scientific methods of farming.

Mr Hussein Amonhadi, Director of Administration of Jihad in Ghana said Jihad is to embark on various projects, including establishment of rural industries, provision of corn-mills, construction of an agricultural complex and the drilling of bore-holes in the North.

He said Jihad will provide about 40 million centimos in interest-free loans this year to farmers in the Northern Region in the form of seed supply, insecticides and the repair of agricultural implements.

Mr Amonhadi announced that the programme will subsequently be extended to the southern sector.

Jihad already operates a clinic in Accra and has plans to establish a polyclinic at Nima.—GNA.

## Nigeria

### \* Cabinet Changes Said To Displease Christians

90EF0272A Paris LA LETTRE DU CONTINENT  
in French 25 Jan 90 pp 4-5

[Text] President Ibrahim Babangida, who was forced to cancel important trips to the United States and Italy last month, is still expected in France for an official visit 25-28 February. Since the cabinet reshuffle on 29 December and changes in the Strategic Military High Command, the general has been faced with a wave of protest from the Christian minorities who feel that they have been displaced in positions of power by Hausas, Foulatas, and Fulanis, who are Muslims. In his reading from the Gospel on Sunday 14 January, Monsignor Peter Jatau, archbishop of Kaduna, exhorted Christians to protest the attitude of the Nigerian president who "is sacrificing religious balance in favor of the Islamification of the country."

What triggered the discontent was the ouster of General Domkat Bali as minister of defense. His responsibilities have been assumed by President Babangida. Domkat Bali, the highest ranking military officer who is well-known among fellow officers in Ghana, Togo, Liberia,

Benin, and even in Angola, is portrayed by the authorities in Lagos as the main leader of a group of officers from the Middle Belt (the north central states), nicknamed the "Langtang Mafia" after a large city in the state of Plateau. Among the Christian members of this pressure group are Chu Okongwu, a former minister of finance, General Ike Nwachuckwu, a former minister of foreign affairs, General Joshua Dogonyaro, the former chief of the second mechanized division in Ibadan, and most important, John Shagaya, the former interior minister. President Babangida faults John Shagaya with having formed, without his knowledge, a special elite unit against organized crime known as the "Rangers" whose members (most of them Ibos) are trained by Israeli instructors. Those close to the Nigerian president also fault the officers in the Langtang Mafia for entrusting the civil and military engineering to the Israelis in contracting to build military bases on Nigeria's borders (Maiduguri and Yola in the northeast, Sokoto and Kainji in the northwest, Calabar in the southeast, Minna in the center, and Ibadan in the southwest).

General Ike Nwachuckwu inherited the command of the first mechanized infantry division in Kaduna, but was demoted from fourth to tenth position in Nigeria's supreme executive body, the Armed Forces Ruling Council. Vice Admiral Patrick Koshoni, who was identified last year as a supporter of the Beninese opposition member, Francois Kouyami (see LA LETTRE DU CONTINENT no. 85), was replaced as Navy chief of staff by Vice Admiral Murtala Nyako, who is a Hausa. Another Muslim, General Yusuf Nurani, has been named Air Force chief of staff. In January, Admiral J.G. Nadkarni retired as Air Force chief of general staff and was replaced by Vice Admiral Augustus Aikhomu, of mixed Beninese-Portuguese descent who is a friend of the president. General Ibrahim Alfa, Admiral Nadkarni's deputy, was recalled to the president's cabinet. He was replaced by Lieutenant General Abacha Sani, Army chief of staff and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. Finally, Major General Aliyu Mohamed, the former chief of security forces, has replaced Joshua Dogonyaro as the commander of the second mechanized infantry division at Ibadan, which has responsibility for Lagos.

[Editorial note, p 5] After sidelining these officers, the government in Lagos floated rumors of a "Christian plot" seeking to return General Joe Garba (the former minister of foreign affairs under Mohamed Murtala and Shehu Shagari) to power. Joseph Garba, who recently lost his position as Nigeria's representative to the United Nations to Ibrahim Gambari, is said to declare his opposition to the formation of two political parties in Nigeria: the Social Democratic Party and the National Convention for the Republic.



## Senegal

### \* Union May Split Because of Diop Interference

34190067A Dakar SUD HEBDO in French  
11 Jan 90 p 8

[Article by Hussein BA: "The Specter of Dissidence"]

[Text] The National Confederation of Senegalese Workers (CNTS) facing a new split?

A majority of the delegates of the Union of Knitted Goods and Ready To Wear Clothing Workers affiliated with the CNTS is seriously threatening to split off from the confederation if Madia Diop, the secretary general of the confederation, does not adopt an attitude of strict neutrality in the internal conflict between Matar Seye, the secretary general of the union who has completed his term of office (a popular figure who has every chance of being reelected), and Cheikh Gueye, Matar Seye's deputy, who seems to enjoy the support of Madia Diop.

In the course of a seminar organized on 6 December 1989 at the Labor Exchange, the delegates attending expressed their dissatisfaction with the obstacles preventing the holding of their congress, initially scheduled for 19 December. The congress was postponed indefinitely due to the lack of a consensus between the two union leaders. However, the delegates added: "This was due to the uncompromising attitude of Cheikh Gueye."

In effect, despite the reconciliation effort made at the beginning of the conflict by Moussa Mbaye, the acting secretary general of the CNTS, no consensus was reached because Cheikh Gueye continued to demand a complete change in the system for the distribution of membership cards prior to the holding of the congress, thus delaying voting by the congress. However, the leadership of the confederation (in the absence of Madia Diop, who was on a trip) and representatives of the majority of the delegates, meeting as the Executive Committee on 8 November, rejected Cheikh Gueye's request for a delay. On the same occasion the delegates unanimously chose the date of 19 December to hold their Fourth Congress.

#### Madia's Commitment

Everything seemed to have been resolved after the clear decision made by the leadership of the CNTS in favor of holding the congress on 19 December. However, this decision did not take into account the "imponderable" factor that particularly affect the CNTS. Only two days before the date decided on, Madia Diop returned from his trip and turned everything upside down, coming out openly in support of the minority faction led by Cheikh Gueye.

It is generally considered that Cheikh Gueye does not represent much. However, he is fortunate to be the protege of Madia Diop, who has always preferred him to Matar Seye who, in fact, is the secretary general elected regularly by the workers since 1986.

According to the same sources, Madia came out openly in support of Cheikh Gueye in order to weaken Matar Seye, the secretary general, who still remains one of the last trade union leaders capable of opposing Madia Diop's leadership methods. Madia Diop has provided assurances of his good intentions by stating before the workers attending the seminar that he does not support any of the existing factions. However, in reality, no one believes him. They say that in order to resolve the misunderstanding Madia Diop should act properly instead of relying on statements.

In the view of the workers this matter has gone on too long. They want to hold a congress within a reasonable period of time to resolve these internal problems in a definitive way. In a document published by all of the delegates, made public on 6 January, the following, significant questions are asked: "Is Madia Diop trying to impose on us a leadership that suits him? If he cannot attain this objective, is he trying to stymie our trade union organization?" At the same time the delegates again reaffirmed their affiliation with the CNTS, provided that this matter is resolved equitably. If not, they will split off and become an autonomous trade union.

### \* IMF Loan for Youth Employment, Urban Renewal

34190067B Dakar LE SOLEIL in French  
25 Jan 90 p 7

[Article by Amadou Gaye: "6 Billion CFA Francs From the World Bank"]

[Text] In the framework of the program for the employment of young people and the rehabilitation and maintenance of infrastructure in urban areas a loan agreement amounting to about \$20 million was signed between Senegal and the World Bank on 23 January in Washington.

This contribution by the World Bank is in addition to a loan from the African Development Bank [ADB] amounting to \$8.3 million. The overall total of these loans for public works and jobs projects is \$33.3 million (about 6 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs).

In view of the active cooperation between Senegal and the World Bank reflected in the pace of signature of agreements (two agreements were signed within five weeks), it should be recognized that the action by the Senegalese Government in the area of social adjustment does not need to be demonstrated any further.

The signature of this loan agreement in effect will make possible the creation of 13,000 temporary jobs and will certainly be a breath of fresh air at a time when the job market is shrinking.

There is no doubt that the provision of jobs to high school graduates, the reemployment of workers from the

public, semipublic and private sectors, and the employment of the jobless, particularly young people who benefit from special measures and priority actions on the part of the government, as well as the signature of this loan agreement, "come just in time," as Ambassador Ibra Deguene Ka emphasized. He indicated: "Unemployment is assuming more and more alarming proportions. This calls for immediate action to be taken on the important problem of employment in our country."

For his part, the vice president of the World Bank expressed pleasure at the implementation of "this innovative action," in contrast to programs usually undertaken by the World Bank. He expressed pleasure at the resumption of normal activity by the World Bank in Senegal.

Finally, we note that the gratitude of the chief of state and of the minister of plan and cooperation were expressed to the vice president of the World Bank through Ambassador Ibra Deguene Ka, who made use of the occasion to emphasize the beneficial effects of this project.

#### **\* Libyan Donation of Medicines Applauded**

34190067C Dakar LE SOLEIL in French  
23 Jan 90 p 6

[Text] At a ceremony held in Dakar on 20 January approximately two tons of medical supplies worth 30 million CFA [African Financial Community] francs were turned over to Minister of Public Health Theresa King

by Dr. Saad Abdel Salam El Rouaimi, coordinator and chief of the delegation of Libyan doctors, which has been visiting Senegal during the past two weeks. When the medical supplies were turned over to her, Minister of Public Health King stated: "This is striking evidence of the fruitful ties of cooperation, friendship, and mutual esteem that exist between Colonel Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi, chief of state of Libya, and Abdou Diouf, president of the Republic of Senegal."

The ceremony took place in the presence of Moustapha Cisse, Senegalese ambassador to Tunisia, and the representative of the World Association of the Islamic Appeal.

In turning over the gift of medical supplies, Dr. El Rouaimi stated: "By this gesture Libya expresses its solidarity with the fraternal Senegalese people to whom we are linked by longstanding relations of friendship and cooperation." The chief of the Libyan delegation then expressed a wish for a strengthening of the cooperation between the two countries and its expansion to other areas, in accordance with the ideals of the World Association of the Islamic Appeal, for which the establishment of peace in the world, in general, and between Muslim countries, in particular, is a high priority.

In the name of President Abou Diouf, his cabinet colleagues, and the Senegalese people, the minister of public health concluded by thanking the Libyan delegation. Previously, Minister Theresa King had assured the donors that the medical supplies will be used effectively by medical groups for the welfare of the Senegalese people.

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